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This paper examines contemporary international law of the
sea pertaining to the movement of vessels and aircraft on, over,
and under the oceans. Special attention is devoted to the Geneva
Session of the Third Law of Sea Conference (LOS). After initial
broad description of basic claims and fundamental policies, dis-
cussion centers upon the major categories of claim and counter-
claim, the more detailed policy considerations involved, and the
trends in decision respecting each category of claim, including
description of major LOS proposals and the Single Text. Trends
are assessed in terms of suggested policies and recommendations
are offered.
A. Claims and Counterclaims
As ocean use intensifies, potential interferences with
movement of vessels and aircraft become both more numerous and
relate to areas more and more distant from the coast.1  It is
not surprising, therefore, that controversies over access to
near-shore areas, and especially over access to straits, are
more serious In recent years, and that political disagreement
flares over potential disruption of traffic in waters once consid-
ered somewhat distant from ports and from land masses generally.
2
*This article was written prior to the New York Session
of the Third LOS Conference, appearing as Law of the Sea. Institute
Occasional Paper #28, November 1975. A sequel will appear in a
forthcoming Issue of Yale Studies in World Public Order. The
sequel will describe and appraise developments during 1976 con-
cerning the issues discussed here, including those In the LOS Con-
ference and in dnilateral actions by coastal states.
**Professor of Law and Marine Studies, University of Wash-
ington.
1. For a summary of development and prospects see "Poten-
tial Conflicts In the Use of Marine Resources," U.N. Doc. No.
E/5120 (1972).
Of course the means for employing the marine environment
are not static. The next 25 years will undoubtedly witness Inno-
vations and extensions of marine technology that make the present
level of ocean activity seem even less intense than it actually
is. The stress on International decision processes is likely to
be much greater in the future than in the past or present.
2. The best evidence for the political sensitivity of con-
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The pattern of controversy is composed of the claims to
authority advanced by states and other entities and the counter-
claims made in response.3 Authority claimed relates to access to
the various ocean areas as well to the competence to prescribe and
to apply policy to events in these areas.4 The areas concerned
are internal waters, archipelagic waters, territorial sea, zones of
resource and other limited coastal jurisdiction beyond the terri-
torial sea, and the ocean regions beyond national Jurisdiction.
The following is a brief summary of these claims and counterclaims
as they concern access for transport and communication.
1. Internal Waters
States claim complete authority to control access of ves-
sels, both private and governmental, to Internal waters whether
such waters are ports, bays, or areas beyond bays that may be use-
ful as a route for international transport.5  In recent times some
states wholly composed of Islands have contended that all waters
between the islands are internal. 6 With respect to such waters,
trols over transit in the ocean is the record of the U.N. delib-
erations on the whole ocean question dating back to 1968. It may
also be recalled that the continuing controversy over the Strait
of Tiran is now two decades old and this volatile straits issue
contributed to the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict. Closure of the
Suez Canal as a result of this war led in turn to rapid evolution
of very large crude oil carriers and the arrival of these mammoth
ships is responsible for a great deal of the agitation about pol-
lution control and the effects of this regulation on navigation
in the 200 mile zone. More recently the Straits of Malacca and
Hormuz have occasioned disagreement about coastal controls.
3. For explanation of the term "claim" as used herein see
M. McDouaal and W. Burke, The Public Order of the Oceans 1, n.]
(1962) (hereinafter cited as McDougal and Burke). Some passages
in this paper concerning policy with respect to particular issues
draw heavily upon policy discussions in this book.
4. Access to an area Is, formally, a component of a pre-
scription but is discussed here as a separate issue because of
its importance.
5. McDougal and Burke at 93; United Nations Legislative
Series,'National Legislation and Treaties Relating to the Law of
the Sea"42 (Norway) (U.N. Doc. No. ST/LEG/SER.B/16/(1974) (vol-
umes in this series are hereinafter cited as U.N. L.S.); Spain
(nuclear vessels), U.N. L.S. B/16/at 47; Australia (nuclear
ships), U.N. L.S. B/15/at 137.
6. See note 10 infra.
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the basic claim by coastal officials is to a discretionary author-
ity to permit or to deny access as they may unilaterally decide.7
In illustration of the arbitrary nature of this authority, denial
of entry is sometimes made a strategy for securing political objec-
tives unrelated to the use of internal waters, and the grant of
access is sometimes similarly aimed. Opposing claims vary accord-
ing to the area Involved. A denial of access by the port state to
a port in that state is commonly not opposed by direct contraven-
tion of the basic competence to deny, but by counterclaim that ac-
cess is provided for by agreement between the states concerned or,
Infrequently, that the vessel must enter because of the weather or
damage to the vessel. The counterclaim for access to Internal
waters may be based upon an alleged right to innocent passage or
to freedom of navigation, which are customarily recognized with
respect to the territorial and high seas, 8 and which allegedly
ought also be available to protect travel through such parts of
internal waters as have served or can serve the same purpose.
In the case of warships, the assertion of comprehensive
authority to exclude frequently takes the form of establishing
limiting conditions for entry.4 Counterclaims are the same as
for private vessels, except that considerably more controversy at-
tends the claimed -right of Innocent passage for military and other
government vessels.
2. Archipelagic Waters
Claims to special authority over access to the waters of
states composed entirely of islands are not new, but serious con-
sideration of them is recent. In earlier appearances at the 1958
Conference and in unilateral assertion, the claim was to a com-
plete discretion over passage through archipelagic waters, which
were then considered to be internal waters by the claimants.1 0
7. 4 Whiteman, Digest of International Law 186-188, 216-217,
250-251 (1965).
8. But the U.S. protest to the Soviet claim to Peter the
Great Bay is an assertion of a right of access on the ground that
the Bay could not properly be included as internal waters. 4
Whiteman, supra note 7 at 256-257.
9. See, e.g., Dominican Republic, Sweden, and U.S.S.R.,
U.N. L.S. B/1S/at 254, 259, 266; Brazil, U.N. L.S. B/16/at 55.
10. U.N. L.S. B/15, at 105 (Philippines); 4 Whiteman, supra,
at 284 (Indonesia).
U.S. and other responses rejecting the Philippines and
Indonesia claims are in 4 Whiteman, supra note 7, at 283-291.
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Recent assertions by way of proposals In the Seabed Committee and
at the LOS Conference exhibit a range in the authority claimed
over access for passage. Some versions still Insist on proclaim-
ing discretionary authority over passage, another would recognize
a right of innocent passage that must be honored In some part of
the archipelagic area even If suspended elsewhere, and still
another would recognize a special right through straits while con-
tinuing the right of innocent passage through the remainder of the
archipelago.
3. Territorial Sea
Claims to control access to the territorial sea Include the
denial of all passage through It and the claim to exclude particu-
lar vessels for cause. 11
The former is the most far-reaching claim to competence and
It may take two forms. One is that of forbidding access by any
vessel for passage, as by completely suspending the right of in-
nocent passage. 12 The other form Is by asserting that a class or
type of vehicle is not entitled to any right of passage. The lat-
ter is Illustrated by the contentions that aircraft have no right
of accessl3 and that military vessels cannot have access without
notice and authorization.1
4
The counterclaims to the above are that the coastal state
has no authority to suspend Innocent passage, a contention that
is pressed primarily with respect to straits. More recently this
counterclaim, in response to expansion by many states of the ter-
ritorial sea to 12 miles, has become an even more sweeping rejec-
tion of coastal authority by asserting that In straits the coastal
state should have no authority to deny any passage whatsoever in
whatever mode it may occur, whether submerged, surface or over-
flight and no matter what type of vessel is involved. 15 This is
11. The categories derive from the discussion in McDougal and
Burke 180-81. The documentation in the footnotes herein Is addi-
tional to that in McDougal and Burke.
12. See, e.g., Norway, Yugoslavia, U.N.L.S. B/15, at 193, 216;
Sudan, U.S.S.R., U.N.L.S. B/16, at 32-33, 214-16.
13. McDougal, Lasswell & Vlassic, Law and Public Order in
Space at 254, n.181 (1963); Cheng, The Law of International Air
Transport 133 (1962); Verplaetse, International Law In Vertical
Space 102-107 (1960); Murchison, The Contiguous Air Space Zone
In International Law 13 (1957).
14. See, e.g., Dominican Republic, U.S.S.R., and Sweden,
U.N.L.S. B/15, at 255, 213, 259-62; People's Democratic Republic
of Yemen, Sudan, U.N.L.S. B/16, at 25-27, 32-33.
15. The freedom of transit claim emerged because it ap-
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the free or unimpeded transit proposal.1
6
Another counterclaim is simply that a warship does have a
right of innocent passage and that all types of vessels have such
right.
The claim to authority to exclude particular passage for
cause, asserting that passage must be innocent or it can be pre-
vented or otherwise penalized, 17 is expressed In three different
ways but the basic claim remains the same. In one formulation,
the coastal state asserts competence to prescribe regulations for
events within the territorial sea, Including conditions governing
passage, and to enforce those prescriptions by denial of passage
or other severe sanction. 18 In a second formulation the coastal
state alleges infringement of certain Interests by a passing ves-
sel which justifies interference with passage by prohibiting or
otherwise penalizing the passage. 19 A third conception Is the
claim that a particular passage is "non-innocent," with Innocence
defined in terms of compatibility with local Interests and such
passage should be excluded or other sanction Imposed.2 6 All of
these asserted justifications for interfering with passage are In
fact functional equivalents in the sense that they all purport to
prescribe and to enforce policies for vessels in the territorial
sea and all might, in any context, refer to precisely the same
events. Coastal state laws sometimes use more than one of these
formulations.21
peared that a clear consensus had developed among states that a
12-mile territorial sea was lawful or would be accepted at a new
law of the sea conference. This meant, so far as the U.S. was
concerned, that some straits partially composed of high seas un-
der a 3-mile territorial sea would become part of the territorial
sea. Statements that a 12-mile territorial sea results in
"closure" of so many straits means that such straits would no
longer be open to high seas freedoms.
16. See text beginning at note 130 infra.
17. Some legislation is phrased more broadly. See, e.g.,
Yemen, Sudan, U.N.L.S. B/16, at 27, 32; Portugal, U.N.L.S. B/15,
at 176.
Other claims refer to innocent passage, e.g., Yugoslavia,
U.S.S.R., U.N.L.S. B/15, at 189, 213; Norway, U.N.L.S. B/16, at 43.
18. Portugal appears to make any violation of its law preju-
dicial and passage non-innocent. See U.N.L.S. B/15, at 176. See
also Jamaica, U.N.L.S. B/16, at 13.
19. E.g., Yemen, U.N.L.S. B/16, at 27.
20. Norway refers simply to "innocent passage" without fur-
ther reference to interests, U.N.L.S. B/16, at 43; Sudan, U.N.L.S.
B/16, at 32; Yugoslavia, U.S.S.R., U.N.L.S. B/15, at 189, 213.
21. See, e.g., People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Sudan,
U.N.L.S. 8/16, at 27, 32; Brazil, U.N.L.S. B/16, at 4.
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The major counterclaims to coastal competence to exclude
for cause are principally two: the assertion Is made that the
conception of Innocent passage is excessively general in terminol-
ogy and is formulated in such a way that coastal states might
choose to Interpret it subjectively in assessing the Innocent or
prejudicial character of passage.2Z Another contention is that
the coastal competence to prescribe is also conceived too broadly
and should be more specifically formulated to identify permissible
regulations with which passing vessels must comply or be excluded.
This aspect of coastal authority is becoming increasingly conten-
tious as technological change results in increasingly varied and
complex vessels with distinctive characteristics.
4. Ocean Areas Adjacent to the Territorial Sea
Traditionally the contiguous zone was the term for the
modest area beyond the territorial sea over which coastal states
asserted a limited, usually specialized jurisdiction or control
over access. This term is still employed to describe certain
coastal authority, but a number of other labels are also being
employed including adjacent sea, patrimonial sea, resource zone,
and, the most likely candidate for official recognition, the eco-
nomic zone. These latter terms usually refer to more extensive
authority than is associated with contiguous zones.
The claim to control access to the traditional contiguous
zone sometimes has asserted competence to prohibit access, but
typically access has not been affected and only minor degrees of
interference have been involved. 2 3 But the advent of proposals
for a more extensive and broadened scope of coastal authority may
change the traditional position to the detriment of vessels seek-
ing unimpeded access to the economic zone. In addition to poten-
tial direct claims to control access of vessels to the economic
zone, for movement through it, claims to prescribe for events in
this area are becoming more wide-ranging, seeking to protect a
greater variety of coastal interests. Accordingly, the claims to
coastal authority over these adjacent (but extensive) areas now
begin to resemble the coastal authority claimed and honored in
the territorial sea. As will be noted below, there is a very
good possibility, indeed a virtual certainty, that the community
will recognize major increases in coastal authority beyond the
territorial sea with an overall impact on navigation that is not
clear at this time.
22. Verbatim Statement by John R. Stevenson, Subcommittee
II, Aug. 14, 1972, at 3.
23. See U.N.L.S. B/15, at 311-18; Id., 8/16, at 115-17.
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The predominant claim in the adjacent area is still to un-
impeded movement of vessels and aircraft, based upon the doctrinal
justification that the area concerned is part of the high seas
within which high seas freedoms must be recognized. Recent claims
and proposals, however, would change at least the doctrinal posi-
tion and, by strong implication undermine the hitherto well-
recognized claim to free access of vessels and aircraft to this
area. Thus, as will be noted later, some nations insist that the
economic zone no longer be considered part of the high seas.
5. The Oceans Beyond National Jurisdiction
The specific claims customarily made to access to the ocean
as a surface beyond national territory are primarily Inclusive in
character and relate most importantly to transportation and com-
munication.2 4 Each state commonly asserts a right to sail Its
ships upon the seas, without the leave of others, and denies any
competence in other states to Interfere with such use except In
accord with the general community expectations crystallized In in-
ternational law. The space above the surface of the water as well
as the bottom of the sea are also valuable for both transport and
communication, and states make demand for access to and use of
these areas also. Thus every state insists upon Its right to send
aircraft and, more recently, space vehicles through the air and
space above the seas.
The extent to which ocean floor will continue to be open to
unimpeded use for transport and communication is now dependent
upon provisions for accommodating such use to other forms of ex-
ploitation, especially extraction of mineral resources.
C. Basic Community Policies
The basic policies at stake are those uniquely Involved In
the use of the ocean as a spatial extension resource which all
may share, subject to the necessary physical accommodation as well
as to those policies seeking both to protect the ocean from unwise
use and to preserve the overall value position of adjoining coast-
al states.
The primary inclusive interests (beyond the ever-present
aim of preserving minimum order) are In the maintenance of the
freest possible access to the ocean, its open spaces and its ad-
joining facilities. The maximum freedom of access for trans-
portation and communication continues to be in the interest of
all states as facilitating production and exchange of raw mater-
24. McDougal and Burke at 763-78.
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fals and goods, encouraging specialization, and linking together
the interdependent strands of a global production and distribu-
tion system.
An equally important inclusive interest Is that of main-
taining a healthy marine environment for all purposes, including
resource extraction, recreation, tourism, and amenities. An ap-
propriate weighting of this Interest requires only minor limita-
tions on freedom of access in terms of assuring that necessary
standards are being met by vessels and national and international
regulations are being observed. Interference with movement of
vessels should be kept to the minimum consistent with an effec-
tive system for environmental protection.
The common exclusive Interest shared by all coastal states
is to protect against deprivation that might be imposed by vessels
operating within national territory or Jurisdiction. Appropriate
recognition of this interest may, infrequently, require that con-
siderations of efficient transport be subordinated in order that
suitable protective action may be taken by a coastal nation.
The overall task for policy is to maintain an appropriate
balance between the Inclusive and exclusive Interests Identified
above. More detailed discussion of specific factors relevant to




I. Clarification of Policy
Internal waters claimed by states and recognized by inter-
national law are much more extensive than before 1958 and often
are large sectors traversed by ships moving between origins and
destinations located outside the coastal state concerned.2 5 The
1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone,26
25. The best source for these claims is in the series Limits
in the Sea produced and issued by the Office of the Geographer,
U.S. Department of State. This series includes claims by Indo-
nesia-Singapore, Soviet Union-Turkey, Poland-Soviet Union, Indo-
nesia-Malaysia, Cyprus-Sovereign Base Area (U.K.), Mexico-U.S.,
Denmark-Sweden and others.
26. 516 U.N.T.S. 205-82. The other Geneva Conventions may
be found in 450 U.N.T.S. 82-167 (High Seas); 499 U.N.T.S. 311-54
(Continental Shelf); 559 U.N.T.S. 285-342 (Fishing). All four
conventions are reproduced in 52 Am. J. int'l L. 834 (1958);
[VOL.2
1976] CONTEMPORARY LAW OF THE SEA 191
building upon the 1951 decision in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries
Case,2 7 authorizes nation-states to enlarge Internal waters sub-
stantially in certain circumstances. Subsequently many states have
adopted straight baselines in accordance with the Convention and
others have also used such baselines although there Is question
about their conformity with the 1958 Treaty.28 Furthermore there
are now insistent demands, not wholly new, by some archipelagic
states that they be permitted (or, as some assert, are already
authorized) to adapt straight baselines to their island groups,
thus establishing, at least potentially, enormous new areas of In-
ternal waters.
29
In contrast to earlier claims for expansion of the areas
subject to coastal authority the interests apparently sought to be
served include not only access to living resources but also protec-
tion against potential harms from ships entering the region. It
seems probable, however, that in most Instances resource Interests
provide the motivation for expanded boundaries and that concern
over transiting vessels is only exceptionally a factor.
There can surely be no doubt that the general or inclusive
interest In entry and transit through the new types of Internal
eaters Is realistically Intense and shared by virtually all states,
coastal and otherwise. Indeed the degree of community Interest is
magnified in some situations by the fact that areas sought to be
subject to control by a coastal state are virtually essential for
transit since the cost of avoiding the area is extremely high,
perhaps even prohibitive. Detouring around entire island groups
or selecting elongated alternative routes sometimes Is not prac-
ticable.
The Immediately important questions for policy appear to
be twofold: should any right of access for transit of Internal
waters be recognized (or continue to be recognized as provided In
the 1958 Convention30 or as otherwise provided) and, If so, what
should be Its nature? For the reasons noted above greatest weight
Is here given the community interest in efficient, reliable trans-
McDougal and Burke at 1143-1177. No citations will accompany fur-
ther references herein to these treaties.
27. Fisheries Case [1951] I.C.J. Rep. 116.
28. Pardo,'"The Common Heritage - Selected Papers on Oceans
and World Order"311-12 (1975) (1.0.1. Occasional Papers No. 3).
This source is a statement delivered by Dr. Pardo on Aug. 8, 1973,
Introducing the Malta draft articles on national ocean space. It
Is reproduced also in 1 Ocean Development and Int'l L.J. 315
(1974).
29. Pardo, supra, at 312-15, offers acidulous comment on the
extensiveness of these claims.
30. See text below.-
YALE STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
portation, and accordingly it Is believed that a right of access
should form part of international law binding on all states.
This preference is all the more strongly advisable in light of the
belief that the community and coastal states are adequately pro-
tected by an appropriate conception of the right of Innocent pas-
sage. Although this venerable doctrine has well served mankind's
interest in freedom of ocean navigation over many decades, it too
must be reformulated; this problem is discussed further below.
2. Trend In Decisions
It is generally understood that in customary law coastal
authority over internal waters extends to arbitrary control over
entry of foreign vessels whether this is for entry Into port or
for transit. 3l The 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea
made a partial change in that law, for the states parties thereto,
for those vessels seeking only to enter internal waters in order
to pass through. Article 5(2) provides that where a straight base-
line system includes former territorial sea or high seas areas
within internal waters "a right of Innocent passage. . . shall ex-
1st in those waters." The new right Is not, thus, available for
access to all areas of internal waters but only those resulting
from the employment of a straight baseline system.
3. Appraisal and Recommendation
Consideration thus far in the Third LOS Conference indi-
cates that no change will be made in provision for a right of ac-
cess if a treaty is adopted. The Main Trends Working Paper de-
veloped at Caracas simply repeats the Geneva provision and no al-
ternative formula is included.32 (Although other views might ex-
ist despite this latter fact, a change does not seem likely on
this point.) The Informal Text33 in Article 7 also continues the
Geneva prescription, although it deserves mention that the Text
provision on baselines enlarges the opportunity for a coastal
state to use the straight baseline system and, accordingly, also
31. See McDougal and Burke at 117-20 for further discussion;
see also id. at 99-117 for consideration of entry into port.
32. T-hird U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, Second Com-
mittee,'Formulation of Main Trends,"IWP No.l/Rev.2, Provision XI
(1 Aug. 1974).
33. "Informal Single Negotiating Text, Part II,"U.N. Doc. No.
A/Conf. 62/WP.8/Part II (7 May 1975). Hereinafter referred to as
the Single Text.
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enhances the potential importance of preserving freedom of access
through recognition of innocent passage in the area. As will be
discussed below, the concept of innocent passage may be clarified
and sharpened, as a result of the Third Conference, in ways that
reduce the scope of coastal authority. Continuation and enlarge-
ment of this provision for freedom of access clearly accords with
desirable policy and the apparent trend in the negotiations.
B. Archipelagoes
I. Clarification of Policy
34
Balancing coastal and community interests in passage through
the waters of island nations must recognize the intensity of both
sets of interests in-this setting. Insofar as the concentration
of coastal interests is concerned, the most important fact is that
the political unit is composed of a group of islands (or of sev-
eral groups) variously separated by expanses of water. 35 Exchange
of goods and movements of people within the state as well as to the
state from the outside depends in greatest measure upon use of the
ocean, and all local value processes in which exchange and personal
travel play a role are to a degree affected by this dependence upon
the oceans as a route for communication and transportation. In par-
ticular, exercise of authority for implementation of local policies
on matters of special importance to all states, such as immigra-
tion, entry of aliens, and the flow of commodities, becomes diffi-
cult in this context. The length of coastline to safeguard against
activities to circumvent local policies is very great in relation
to the land mass involved and poses severe problems for local offi-
cials.
Military considerations bearing on security are more com-
plicated because of the geographical situation. Espionage, sur-
veillance, and infiltration of arms and armed personnel are more
easily accomplished where ocean areas are so vast in relation to
isolated bits of land. The coastal state in such circumstances
cannot maintain a regular watch over all means of access to the
numerous islands or even to all parts of a single island. Foreign
naval strength may be a peculiarly potent threat to local deci-
sion processes when ocean communication is so vital to the func-
tioning of the community and, in particular instances, so vulner-
able to just such threats.
The broader community interest in transportation in these
34. Part of the following derives from McDougal and Burke
411-19.
35. The policy considerations set out here relate to a na-
tion composed of islands. Their applicability in other circum-
stances has not been considered.
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waters matches that of the Island nation. The Importance of this
use is magnified because travel between and through the Islands
may be not only the most efficient route but also the only prac-
ticable route between certain foreign destinations. A detour
around the whole of an archipelago may necessitate an enormous
deviation from, and lengthening of, the normal course between
foreign destinations. Where a time element is a crucial consider-
ation the archipelago route may be the only choice. In the main
these considerations apply to both air and sea transport.
These factors have different policy effects for different
archipelagoes. Local appreciation of archipelagic waters for pur-
poses of transport and communication perhaps remains more or less
constant, but the extent of the general community Interest depends
upon the location of the archipelago relative to established
routes for shipping and flying. It seems doubtful, however, that
it would be feasible to fashion policies which distinguish between
archipelagoes from this point of view, considering the present de-
centralized state of ocean governance.
The balance between exclusive and inclusive Interests seems
so especially fine that solutions for comparable problems In ap-
parently similar contexts require modification to be suitable in
this instance. To confer exclusive discretionary control over ac-
cess of all ships and aircraft through the creation of Internal
waters (or of territorial sea In the case of aircraft) out of all
the waters among the islands would appear to go beyond the realis-
tic needs of the nations concerned and at the same time Impose po-
tentially severe deprivations upon international transport. The
local state does not require complete freedom of decision In or-
der to secure adequate protection against undesirable effects in-
troduced by foreign vessels in the adjacent waters; controls can
be made considerably more selective than absolute exclusion of
all vessels for whatever reason appeals to local authorities.
This same consideration is also pertinent to the creation of ter-
ritorial sea out of the waters intervening between islands, the
only difference being that the concept of innocent passage re-
duces the play of coastal discretion. Although, In the modified
form that is now being discussed, coastal authority would be re-
duced by the removal of highly subjective elements, the scope of
coastal control would still in some respects go beyond what is
reasonably required for these nations. In particular It would
be undesirable to permit the archipelagic state to embargo all
movement of goods through the archipelagic waters by suspending
innocent passage. Similarly it would be undesirable to exclude
all overflight simply by recognizing the traditional right of
Innocent passage, which does not extend to aircraft.
The key elements for policy here relate to the interests
Involved or affected by specific vessels or categories of yes-
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sels and activities. The archipelagic state must be accorded the
authority to meet its unique interests while at the same time pre-
serving the genuine community-wide interest in efficient trans-
portation.
Vessels of particular importance to the archipelago state
include warships, tankers, and small craft especially suitable for
smuggling. With respect to the former a suitable balance would
provide for the right of innocent passage, with this right being
clarified to Insulate it from overly broad coastal discretion.
The community interest in reasonably free movement would be pre-
served by the requirements of this approach while coastal interests
are protected both by innocent passage and by permitting suspen-
sion of such passage for security reasons. It might be further
useful to safeguard coastal sensitivities by requiring that war-
ships provide notice of intended passage and that submarines trans-
It on the surface unless otherwise authorized by coastal authori-
ties.
The problem with respect to tankers does not differ mater-
ially from that of any coastal community. Desirable policy would
therefore recognize coastal competence to regulate tanker naviga-
tion through establishing approved routes of passage and regula-
tions for such passage, to be enforced by the coastal state.
The smuggling problem appears to be a highly specialized
one, involving recognition of extensive authority over smaller
craft that are used for this enterprise. Such authority would in-
clude visit and search throughout archipelagic waters. This prob-
lem can be handled adequately by provision of special authority
for this particular purpose.
The problem of aircraft does not seem to be a particularly
pressing one for island states. The speed of aircraft, fuel con-
siderations, the vagaries of weather, and general safety consider-
ations all support the notion that overflight above archipelagic
waters ought to be insulated In as great a degree as possible from
subjacent authority or control. It is Illusory to believe that
exclusion of aircraft would contribute much to island security,
although It might be possible and useful to place limits on ac-
cess of aircraft below a certain altitude.
2. Trend in Decisions
Prior to 1958 sporadic discussion and consideration failed
to develop any general consensus about the permissible scope of
state authority over archipelagic waters.3 6 The 1958 LOS Confer-
36. McDougal and Burke at 402-411; Amerasinhe,"The Problem
of Archipelagoes in the International Law ot the Sea," 23 Int'l
and Comparative L.Q. 539, 543-44 (1974); Evensen,"Certain Legal
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ence paid but slight attention to the matter, although both Indo-
nesia and the Philippines made and withdrew proposals, and nothing
was decided. 37 Since 1958 the unilateral claims made by these
same states have not been generally accepted, but they and others
have pressed their cause in the LOS context. At the present stage
the question remains unresolved, but it would not be surprising If
treaty provisions of some kind attracted general support, at least
if the inclusive community interests in navigation receive satis-
factory protection. The following comments note the differences
between the major proposals as they affect navigation and consider
them in relation to desirable policy.
Numerous formal proposals address the question of a special
status for the waters of mid-ocean archipelagoes, most of which
make express provision for access for passage.38 Two major pro-
posals, each by states composed entirely of islands but with total-
ly different perspect.ives, appear to pose the feasible alternatives
most directly. The so-called archipelagic states proposal, ad-
vanced by Fiji, Indonesia, Mauritius and the Philippines, began in
1973 as a short declaration of principles, 3 9 including one estab-
lishing a version of the right of innocent passage, evolved later
in 1973 into a full-scale set of articles dealing with passage in
detail and somewhat differently,40 and then in 1974 appeared again
as a slightly revised set of articles most of which were aimed at
Aspects Concerning the Delimitation of the Territorial Waters of
Archlpelagoes,"U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, 1 Official
Records 289, U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF. 13 (1958); 4 Whiteman, supra,
at 274-303.
37. McDougal and Burke, at 406-408; 4 Whiteman, supra, at
288-289, 295.
38. The proposals before Seabed Subcommittee I1: L.15 (Fiji,
Indonesia, Mauritius, Philippines), L.24 (Uruguay), L.27 (Ecuador,
Panama and Peru), L.34 (China), L.44 (United Kingdom), L.48 (Fiji,
Indonesia, Mauritius, Philippines). All are in UNGA, Official
Records,"Ill Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the
Seabed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdic-
tion,"28th Sess. Supp. No. 2: (A/9021) (1973) (Hereinafter cited
as 1973 Rep. III). The proposals added In Committee II of the
Caracas Session of the LOS Conference: L.49 (Fiji, Indonesia,
Mauritius, Philippines), L.52 (amendment to L.49 by Bulgaria, GDR,
and Poland), L.63 (Thailand), L.70 (Bahamas) and L.64 (Malaysia),
III Official Records, Third United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea (1975). (Hereinafter cited as IiI Off. Rec.)
39. U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.Ii/L.15.
40. U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/L.48.
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handling the passage issue.4 1 In essence the archipelagic states
would place the waters within the archipelago ("archipelagic
waters") under the sovereignty of the state, although the term
"Internal waters" is not used to label them, but provide for an
especially defined right of innocent passage through the archi-
pelago.
The structure of the proposed regime for passage is as fol-
lows. Article 4 provides that ships "shall enjoy the right of in-
nocent passage through archipelagic waters," subject to other spe-
cific provisions concerning coastal regulation and enforcement.
The most noteworthy point about this is that it refers only to
ships and excludes aircraft. The term "ships" is used without
qualification and the detailed provisions of Article 5 clearly
indicate that warships and all other categories are entitled to
the right.42 No mention is made of the mode of passage of sub-
marines and this matter is left, therefore, to the regulatory
competence provided for In Article 5.43
The principal element in the archipelagic proposal for a
balance between coastal and community interests is the designa-
tion of sealanes to which passage is restricted. Such passage
tust be innocent and can be ispended ("when essential for the
protection of its security") but the coastal state must substi-
tute other sealanes for those through which passage has been
suspended. In this conception passage is assured as a matter of
right'so long as it is innocent. The term "innocent passage" is
not" further defined, 4 5 presumably the version proposed elsewhere
by Fiji or by the strait states being in mind, but the articles
do provide a non-exhaustive list of the subjects of coastal regu-
4i. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.49.
42. Id., Article 5() refers to restricting "any types or
classes" of ships to designated sea lanes and Article 5(9) con-
cerns compliance by warships with coastal laws and regulations.
43. Id. According to Article 5(4) the coastal State may
take "the special characteristics of particular ships" into ac-
count when designating sea lanes and prescribing traffic separa-
tion schemes. Article 5(6) spells out numerous subjects of coast-
al regulation including "the safety of navigation and regulation
of marine traffic."
44. It may be recalled that this language, which is drawn
from Article 16(3) of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea
and Contiguous Zone, Is intended to establish that the decision
is not within the sole discretion of the coastal State. For dis-
cussion see McDougal and Burke at 214-16.
45. Of course there was no need for another definition
of this concept which was the subject of numerous proposals in-
cluding one by Fiji. U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.19, III Off.
Rec. 196.
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latory authority and gequire compliance therewith by all vessels
in innocent passage.-
The archipelagic proposal gives such states full authority
to designate sealanes and prescribe separation schemes. In doing
so the state Is to take into account
(a) The recommendations or technical advice of com-
petent international organizations;
(b) Any channels customarily used for international
navigation;
(c) The special characteristics of particular channels;
(d) The special characteristics of particular ships.
The sealanes are to be demarcated, Indicated on charts, and given
due publicity. Changes may be made, also after due publicity.
The United Kingdom proposal47 is much less detailed and
differs on this point mainly by treating access to all archi-
pelagic waters as a right of innocent passage, but with the im-
portant proviso that the provisions on straits apply "where parts
of archipelagic waters have before the date of ratification of
this Convention been used as routes for international navigation
between one part of the high seas and another part of the high
seas or the territorial sea of another state .... .48 The
archipelagic state must indicate all the routes used for inter-
national navigation.
The U.K. proposal did not address the question of compe-
tence to designate sealanes and prescribe traffic separation
schemes, but its straits proposal (which would apply in archi-
pelagoes)49 indicates a wholly different view than advanced by
the archipelagic states. In this latter proposal the straits
state could make a proposal on these points to the Intergovern-
mental Maritime Consultative Organization and could act only as
approved by that body.
46. Id. The subjects for archipelagic regulatory compe-
tence are the same as those proposed for the territorial sea in
the Fiji proposal on that subject (C.2, L.19) with the addition
of the broad category "the preservation of the peace, good order
and security of the coastal State." The addition of this cate-
gory may seem redundant in light of the provision in Article 4
that innocent passage is subject to the regulatory competence in
Article 5. It may have been thought necessary to spell out this
basis of competence because the interests mentioned are not else-
where included in the articles.
47. U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.Ii/L.44, 1973 Rep. III, at 99.
48. Paragraph 7, id. at 100. The U.K. proposal would
establish specific criteria for qualifying as an archipelagic
State. In discussion in Amerasinghe, sup note 36 at 555-556.
49. U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.138/SC .-i-L44 1973 Rep. at 99.
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The Single Text5 0 produced in Geneva most closely resem-
bles the provisions advocated by the U.K. and tends substan-
tially In the direction of community interests in navigation
and overflight. Two forms of protected passage are established,
one being the normal right of innocent passage as established in
other provisions of the Text51 and the other a new right of archi-
pelagic passage.5 2 The former right may be suspended by the
archipelagic state "if such suspension Is essential for the pro-
tection of Its security,"5 3 while archipelagic passage shall not
be suspended. It is this latter right which is most protective
of community interest, and the balance it would strike in this
respect is most significant.
The right of archipelagic passage for ships and aircraft
is to be exercised in "sealanes and air routes suitable for the
safe, continuous and expeditious passage of foreign ships and
aircraft . .. ,i,54 These passageways may be designated by the
archipelagic state In accordance with prescribed standards and
procedures which appear to limit the discretion of the coastal
state. First, the designated lanes and routes must embrace "all
normal passage routes used as routes for international navigation
50. Part VII is entitled Archipelagoes, Section I Archi-
pelagic States and Section II Oceanic Archipelagoes Belonging to
Continental States. Articles 117-30 are in Section I. Article
131. in Section II states "The provisions of Section I are with-
out prejudice to the status of oceanic archipelagoes forming an
integral part of the territory of a continental State." The
meaning of the term "integral part" is not apparent and there is
no legislative history to provide guidance on whether or not,
for example, such language would distinguish the status of
Hawaii and Micronesia, the former being a component State and
the latter in another category.
51. Article 123(1): "Subject to the provisions of Arti-
cle 124, ships of all States, whether coastal or not, shall en-
joy the right of innocent passage through archipelagic waters, in
accordance with the provisions of Section 3 of Part I."
52. Article 124(2): "Ships and aircraft of all States,
whether coastal or not, shall have the right of archipelagic
sealanes passage in sealanes and air routes through the archi-
pelago."
53. See note 44 supra concerning this language.
54. Article 124(IT -provides that an archipelagic State
"may designate" sea lanes and air routes. This use of the per-
missive does not, however, connote that the archipelagic State
may simply refuse to act and thereby eliminate the supposed
right. This point is considered in the text below.
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or overflight through the archipelago, and, within such routes,
as far as ships are concerned, all normal navigational channels
... *" Within these lanes the coastal state may also prescribe
traffic separation schemes. Second, before the coastal state
may designate a sealane or air route or prescribe a separation
scheme it must follow a set procedure which appears to give a
veto on such issues to an international agency. The archipelagic
state must refer proposed sealanes or separation schemes to "the
competent International organization with a view to their adop-
tion." The organization in turn Is limited to consideration of
these proposals for adoption. It Is only after this adoption
that the archipelagic state may designate the sealane or pre-
scribe the separation scheme. If the organization does not ac-
cept the proposal, presumably the archipelagic state cannot take
action. 55
Since the coastal state may not act, or be able to act, to
designate sealanes, it is very important to note the provision
that if this state does not designate sealanes "the right of
archipelagic passage may be exercised through the routes normally
used for international navigation through the archipelagic waters."
Accordingly, access for passage is provided irrespective of coast-
al authority or lack of action to designate sealanes or air
routes, at least insofar as there are existing routes "normally
used for international navigation."5
6
The right of archipelagic passage is subject to prescrip-
tions in the treaty, in other international agreements, and in
coastal laws and regulations on specified subjects. Article
125(0) prescribes that passage shall be without delay, shall re-
frain from impermissible coercion or other violation of the U.N.
Charter, and refrain from any activity other than that incidental
55. The U.K. proposal on this point, Article 3 of Chapter
Iii in C.2, L.3, differs in that the action of the international
organization is not limited to the proposals by the State affected
and it could approve other sealanes or traffic separation schemes.
III Off. Rec. 186.
56. This situation could arise because the State referred
no proposals to the international organization, because the lat-
ter did not approve the ones submitted, or because those approved
were not promulgated. In any circumstance It does not appear
that passage could lawfully be disrupted by the archipelagic
State simply because of its failure to act.
If the archipelagic State designates sealanes or schemes
different than those approved, ships are not obliged to respect
them under these articles. That obligation is limited to sea-
lanes and schemes "established in accordance with this article."
Article 124(11).
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to "normal modes of continuous and expeditious transit," with the
usual exceptions of force majeure or distress.
Vessels in passage are also, according to Article 125(2),
to comply with "generally accepted" international regulations
for safety and pollution prevention. Civil aircraft are to observe
the International Civil Aviation Organization's Rules of the
Air, while state aircraft "shall normally comply with such safety
measures. .... "57
Coastal regulatory competence is specified in Article 128
with considerable care to establish limits thereon not only by
specifying permissible subject matter but also In significant
instances by determining the content. The coastal state may
make laws and regulations regarding safety of navigation and
marine traffic but only as provided in Article 124. In that
provision it may designate sealanes or establish separation
schemes, subject to prior approval of an international organiza-
tion, and "[sluch sealanes and traffic separation schemes shall
conform to generally accepted international regulations."58 The
coastal competence to prescribe extends also to "prevention of
pollution" but only insofar as this gives "effect to the appli-
cable international regulations regarding the discharge of oil,
oily wastes, and other substances in the archipelagic waters
* .*" On two matters no specific limitations are placed on
coastal competence and, accordingly, the archipelagic state may
enact laws to prevent fishing and circumvention of customs,
fiscal, immigration or sanitary regulations. it is expressly
provided that these laws are to be non-discriminatory and must
not In application deny, hamper or impair the right of passage.
Other than provision for making laws and regulations and
the limitation just mentioned, there appears to be no article
dealing expressly with enforcement. It is difficult to under-
stand how much enforcement competence is left to the coastal
state if such actions cannot "hamper" passage, since any effec-
tive direct action beyond surveillance would appear to require
some interference with passage. Perhaps the prohibition against-
Impairing or hampering passage is to be interpreted as limiting
enforcement action only to that essential to make coastal pre-
57. Although this language no doubt reflects difference
in substantive policy, the difference between "ships shall com-
ply" and "aircraft shall observe" is not clear but probably it
Is not significant. Aircraft should also "at all times monitor
the radio frequency assigned by the appropriate internationally
designated air traffic control authority or the appropriate in-
ternational distress radio frequency." Article 125(3)(b).
58. Article 124(8).
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scriptions effective and ruling out unnecessary or excessive
measures not suitably aimed at preventing proscribed conduct.
3. Appraisal and Recommendation
The Single Text provision would without much doubt secure
the community interest In passage through archipelagoes. The
right of archipelagic sealanes passage provided for In Articles
124-128 is virtually identical with the right of transit passage
in Articles 38-41. In some major respects the provision for
archipelagic sealanes passage is very close to the Fiji concept
of innocent passage. In fact the main difference is not so much
the substance of the definition of passage but in the vehicles
entitled to a right of access. The archipelagic states proposal
would exclude aircraft and require surface passage by submarines,
while the Text allows submerged transit and overflight.
There is a major difference between the Text provision on
coastal competence to legislate and that permitted by the archi-
pelagic States proposal. The Text rejects the archipelagic states
position on their authority to establish sealanes and traffic
separation schemes, instead suggesting limitations involving in-
ternational organizational approval. However, such limitations
In the Text would not deprive the coastal state of protective
authority, because elsewhere the Text forbids virtually anything
a vessel might do except steam through the area.
One caveat about the Text concerns its provisions for en-
forcement, which are neither very forthright, nor, perhaps at
least in one respect, very adequate. As in other parts of the
Text, the competence to enforce is not directly established here
but has to be inferred from the provision that foreign vessels
shall comply with the laws and regulations of the archipelagic
state. Such a provision is often interpreted as authorizing en-
forcement competence, although it can be seen that no reference
is made in this provision to compliance with international regu-
lations. Articles 125(2) and (3) require such compliance by
ships and aircraft in transit, but it is not clear that they
authorize coastal enforcement. However, it seems probable that
the archipelagic state does have such competence as otherwise
there would be none, except in the flag state.
The Text in two different provisions enjoins the coastal
state from hampering archipelagic sealanes passage (Articles
126 and 128); this appears somewhat redundant. It may be diffi-
cult, in any case, to enforce local laws or any laws without
"hampering" passage.
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C. Territorial Sea
1. Clarification of Policy
Stated most generally, the major policy problem is the
familiar one of balancing the coastal interest In protection of
all its Internal value processes, including impact on both ocean
and land areas, from events In and over its territorial sea, and
the community Interest in safe and efficient movement of vessels
and goods.5 9 Recent changes in transportation technology serve
to emphasize and to heighten legitimate coastal concerns over
possible undesirable consequences from occurrences in its adja-
cent waters.60 At the same time the spectacular technological
development in the shipping Industry, coupled with increased de-
mand for petroleum and other commodities, place even greater
value on ocean transportation for individual states and for the
community as a whole. Dependence upon ocean transport is a char-
acteristic of every nation in the world.
A more specific policy question is whether the traditional
doctrinal expression, freedom of innocent passage, continues to
provide an acceptable compromise between the competing interests
Involved.6 1 As observed In another discussion of policy, "the
common inclusive interest in assuring full and efficient use of
the oceans is stressed in terms of freedom of passage, and the
concurrent common exclusive interest in permitting protection of
coastal value processes is recognized in the qualification that
to be privileged passage must be innocent, i.e., not offensive
59. It bears some emphasis that access to the territorial
sea is important also for safety reasons. This was part of the
message to Committee II in Caracas by the representative of the
International Chamber of Shipping. II Off. Rec. 120, para. 22.
60. Couper, A.D., The Geography of Sea Transport, Chapter
5 (1972); Bates and Yost,"Where Trends the Flow of Merchant Ships,"
In Gamble and Pontecorvo, eds., Law of the Sea: The Emerging
Regime of the Oceans 249 (1-973); Handley, The Role of the Marine
Insurance Industry In the Emerging Regions of the Oceans, id. at
25, 289-92; Frankel, E.G., and Marcus, Henry S., Ocean Trans-
portation (MIT Sea Grant, 1972); ECOSOC,"Uses of the Seau(U.N.
Doc. No. E/5120) (28 April 1972).
61. It is now generally agreed that states have no arbi-
trary competence to exclude all passage in the territorial sea
and this matter is not discussed here. For some discussion see
McDougal and Burke 196-216. States still continue to claim to
close off areas of territorial sea without mention of justifica-
tion. See U.N.L.S. B/15, at 192 (Ecuador), and 212 (U.S.S.R.).
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to certain coastal Interests."
62
Government officials of leading maritime nations have for
several years expressed major reservations about the adequacy of
this previous balance of interests and have urged new policies
on the world community. These reservations occur in part be-
cause of the potential incorporation into the territorial sea of
areas previously considered by some to be part of the high seas,
in which freedom of navigation hitherto prevailed. In summary
form, the complaints about previous authoritative policy are that
(1) the doctrine of Innocent passage permits an excessively sub-
jective judgment by the coastal state and such subjectivity may
imperil genuinely inoffensive passage; (2) the concept does not
apply to aircraft; and (3) submarines must travel on the surface
to qualify for the rlght. 63 Accordingly new policies are urged
which would permit vessels and aircraft to transit through, over,
and under straits in virtually the same manner as If the area
were high seas. The new policy would continue to subject vessels
and aircraft In straits to some laws and regulations regarding
safety of navigation and preservation of the marine environment,
but their application is seemingly not envisaged as a threat to
freedom of movement.
6 4
Adequate examination of policy preferences on such a com-
plex question is most usefully undertaken by considering the de-
tailed policy issues involved expressly or by implication. The
62. McDougal and Burke 185.
63. U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.8 (3 Aug. 1971)
(speech by John R. Stevenson); Stevenson, J. and Oxman, B.,"The
Preparations for the Law of the Sea Conference,"68 Am. J. Int'l
L. 1 (1974); A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.28, 24 Mar. 1972 (U.S.S.R.); II
Off. Rec. 140, para. 77ff. (UK.S.S.R.).
64. U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.138/SC.Il/SR.37 (Statement by
Mr. John R. Stevenson) 28 Jul. 1972). The U.S. proposal was for
coastal enforcement of internationally agreed regulations. It
is stated that "a coastal State has enforcement rights with re-
spect to violations of its laws and regulations over ships exer-
cising their right of free transit through the territorial sea in
straits." Verbatim Statement of John R. Stevenson in Subcom-
mittee II, July 28, 1972. But this is qualified by reference to
the U.S. proposal which appears to be limited to coastal laws
implementing international navigational safety standards and in-
ternationally agreed traffic separation schemes. See also note
88 infra.
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following are matters to be examined:
65
a) the right of innocent passage for military vessels;
b) coastal authority to deny innocent passage;
c) clarification of the concept of innocent passage and
the scope of coastal competence to prescribe laws
and regulations for passage;
d) the question of a special right, beyond innocent
passage, in straits.
(a) The right of innocent passage for military vessels
Despite opportunities decision makers have not yet ade-
quately resolved the policy problem of access by military ves-
sels to the territorial sea. 6 6 Unclear as authoritative decisions
may be, however, the interests at stake are no mystery. Despite
the rhetoric so freely employed in political discussions, there
Is a widespread community interest in assuring and safeguarding
freedom of movement for military vessels about the globe. Main-
tenance of naval forces is a common element of the policies of
many nations and no one seriously contends that this form of miii-
65. These specific policy issues are more detailed formu-
lations of the categories of claims discussed supra. The claim to
comprehensive continuing authority to deny all passage includes
the question of whether warships have a right of innocent'passage
and whether a coastal State may deny even innocent passage. The
occasional exclusive competence to deny passage for cause in-
cludes the innocent passage issue and the scope of coastal com-
petence to prescribe and to apply policy. The straits issue pre-
sents all three of the questions above mentioned in a specific
geographical setting.
66. Prior to the Corfu Channel Case in 1949 and the In-
ternational Law Commission consideration of this issue, publicists
tended rather strongly toward the view that warships had no right
of passage. Hall, International Law 198 (8th ed. by Higgins 1924;
Jessup, The Law of Territorial Waters and Maritime Jurisdiction
120_f927);"Harvard Research in International Law,"23 Am. J. Int'l
Law 295 (Spec. Supp. 1929); 11 Gidel, Le Droit International Pub-
li-cDe La Mer 284 (transl., 1934V;VI Bruel, International Straits
230 (1947); Colombos, The International Law of the Sea 114-115
(4th ed. 1959); I Lauterpacht, Oppenheim's International Law 494,
853 (8th ed. 1955).
The I.L.C. itself recommended that warships could pass only
on receipt of authorization if the coastal State wished to so re-
quire. Such provision is incompatible with a right of innocent
passage.
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tary force is incompatible in any way with the United Nations
Charter.67 There is, also, no doubt that military craft must
have access to the territorial sea in order to use the ocean in
a normal and effective way. We now have centuries of experience
with the peacetime deployment of naval ships all over the globe;
their movement through narrow ocean passages is quite common,
and remains generally unnoticed and without attendant controversy.
Although submarines are relatively new, experience does not indi-
cate that they present special problems and, accordingly, these
vehicles should also enjoy the right of innocent passage, subject
to particular conditions as mentioned later.
At the same time, warships are specialized to the exercise
or support of coercion and are usually perceived a meaningful
symbols as well as instruments of national power b. Warships are
frequently deployed to achieve coercive effects, though it is
often not Intended that a single weapon be discharged or launched.
The mere presence of a particular state's warships In a certain
region can have coercivg connotations for coastal and other flag
states in the vicinity.69 Accordingly, it is wholly understand-
able that in particular circumstances a coastal state may per-
ceive a genuine need for protecting itself against serious depri-
vations from vessels passing through its territorial sea. 70 For
this purpose the coastal state must have authority to consider
the potentially harmful impact on its position of such passage,
including the possible repercussions from third nations who feel
threatened, and to take appropriate action to safeguard Its in-
terests.
The requirements of these competing interests are not met
by the extreme positions currently being advocated, either deny-
ing any right of access for military vehicles or denying any
67. See Moore, John E., Foreword, Jane's Fighting Ships
1973-74 at 73-78 for comments on navies around the world.
68. On symbolic nature see Luttwak, Edward N., The
Political Uses of Sea Power 29 ff. (1974).
69. For an attempt at a comprehensive listing of naval
actions and expected effects see id. at 74-79.
70. "Any instrument of miitary power that can be used to
inflict damage upon an adversary, physically limit his freedom of
action, or reveal his intentions may also affect his conduct, and
that of any interested third parties, even if force is never
used. The necessary (but by no means sufficient) condition is
that the parties concerned perceive (correctly or otherwise) the
capabilities deployed, thus allowing these capabilities to in-
trude on their view of the policy environment and so affect
their decisions." Id. at 6.
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coastal competence, short of use of force in self-defense, to pro-
tect domestic public order and security. To ensure the legitimate
world community interest in freedom of movement for military craft,
It is necessary to recognize that such vehicles have a right of ac-
cess; to protect legitimate coastal state interests it is simi-
larly necessary to recognize that the above right is conditional
upon regard for important coastal interests. In sum an appro-
priate balance of interests recognizes that generally military
craft have a right of innocent passage in the territorial sea.
To be acceptable this balance requires that the doctrine of in-
nocent passage be reformulated to provide assurance that both flag
and coastal state interests are adequately protected.
(b) Coastal authority to deny innocent passage
Assuming that all vessels are entitled at least to inno-
cent passage through the territorial sea generally, it is as-
serted by some that adequate protection of coastal Interests re-
quires recognition that such passage can be denied for compelling
reasons related to coastal security. The factor of most im-
portance here in assessing desirable policy is the effect on the
general community interest In reliable and efficient movement of
commodities throughout the world. This factor varies greatly,
depending on whether the territorial sea affected by a denial is
within a strait, since this may impede all traffic between parts
of the globe and gravely disrupt the economic and physical well-
being of many nations. There is ample Justification for conclud-
ing that "in balance against the high importance of straits for
international navigation. . . there appears no coastal Interest
of sufficient gravity to merit authorizing the coastal state to
deny all passage through a strait, except In time of the highest
expectations of violence."7 1 In the latter context prescriptions
relevant to periods of violence are applicable, displacing those
considered part of the law of the sea.
In other areas of the territorial sea, however, this bal-
ance of interests no longer pertains. The threat of substantial
disruption to traffic movement is significantly less and certain
coastal Interests might Justify suspension of all passage. Be-
cause the effects of denial may still be serious, the Interest of
the coastal state should be substantial. "The state should be
made to Justify suspension by reference to a necessity for pro-
tecting an interest of an especially vital sort, such as mili-
tary security or other interest of equivalent importance. If
community authorization to suspend passage, whether innocent or
71. McDougal and Burke 189.
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not, were limited to protection of interests of this level of ser-
iousness, the potential, occasional harm to navigation would not
appear to outweigh the benefit to the coastal state."72
(c) Clarification of the concept of innocent passage and the
scope of coastal competence to prescribe laws and regula-
tions for passage
As noted earlier, coastal claims to authority over passage
are expressed in three technically different but functionally
equivalent ways73 and the same basic policy problem arises from
each claim. That problem is to determine the balance between
coastal competence to prescribe for events in the territorial sea
affecting passage and the preservation of efficient use of the
area. It may be useful to structure the discussion of this broad
policy question explicitly In terms of the three different ex-
pressions of the basic claim. Accordingly, the detailed dis-
cussion to follow is directed at (I) the general scope of author-
ity of the coastal state, (ii) a reformulation of the concept of
Innocent passage, (iii) coastal authority to regulate in the ter-
ritorial sea.
(I) general scope of authority of coastal state
Coastal state concern over preservation of internal value
processes continues to Justify the extension of state territory,
as such, into the ocean. Accordingly,it is desirable policy to
provide that state sovereignty over the territorial sea is exer-
cised subject to the provisions of international law. The most
Important policy problem, however, is to clarify the limitations
on the exercise of sovereignty over the territorial sea.
It ought to be noted, further, that the geographical ex-
tent of state territory and of the relatively comprehensive au-
thority called sovereignty should also continue to be modest.
While it is likely that the growing intensity of activities in
areas beyond a modest territorial sea will have increasingly im-
portant effects on the coastal state, it does not follow that the
best way to cope.with this development is to extend state terri-
tory further and further into the ocean. Limited, functional al-
locations of authority to coastal nations and to international
agencies appear more suitable as means to deal with coastal
problems. These functional allocations can be made beyond the
72. Id. at 191.
73. Ilustrations of these claims are in notes 18-20
supra. See also McDougal and Burke at 226.
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territorial sea as a means of extending jurisdiction for particu-
lar purposes.7
4
(Ii) a reformulation of the concept of innocent passage
The more precise policy question is how to summarize In a
rather concise doctrinal statement the scope of coastal compe-
tence to deny passage because it is not innocent, i.e., to define
what is meant by innocent passage. As indicated above there are
sound policy grounds for reformulating this concept.
The 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous
Zone defines innocent passage in Article 14 as that which is not
prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of the coastal
state.75 A number of alternative means might be employed for Im-
proving on this definition in terms of making it more precise and
less susceptible to the discretionary appreciation of the coastal
state.
Factors particularly bearing on policy on this question
Include the scope of the Interests sought to be protected by the
coastal state, the range of events believed to threaten coastal
Interests, the importance of the area concerned for Inclusive use,
74. It is presently not desirable policy, in the view
urged here, to extend state territory into the ocean under any
guise or label, including the exclusive economic zone. Some
coastal States take the view that the economic zone should not
be considered part of the high seas and that the only community
rights recognized In the zone should be those explicitly listed
in the treaty creating the zone. All authority and jurisdiction
other than that explicitly withheld would be considered to be
allocated to the coastal State. In substance this point of view
is that the economic zone is another part of state territory and
that residual authority in the zone belongs to the coastal State.
There is still serious doubt about whether or not States
will act to confer meaningful authority on international insti-
tutions to cope with the regulatory problems that will be
emerging as ocean uses continue to intensify beyond the terri-
torial sea. If states continue to be reluctant to establish ef-
fective international regulation the only alternative left will
be the coastal State. The former course still seems preferable,
but the desirability of this policy Is affected by the passage
of time. The problems that need to be met cannot be left unre-
solved or the interests of all suffer.
75. An account of earlier consideration of this issue
and different formulations is in McDougal and Burke 233-63.
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the type of vessels or vehicles concerned in terms of function,
and the procedure employed to protect coastal interests, In-
cluding the matter of notification.
An important aspect In the formulation of a doctrinal state-
ment of Innocent passage is the expression of the interests which
the coastal state may protect against prejudice. Certainly in
view of the sometimes critical, indeed indispensable, nature of
the territorial sea, including straits for navigation, the coastal
interest must have very considerable substance. Beyond the de-
gree of seriousness of the interest protected, however, is the
way this interest is expressed. If a single formula is used, as
in Article 14, or the words chosen are of high order of general-
ity and abstraction, the range of interests to be protected will
be wide and, more importantly, left to the unreviewed and, perhaps,
non-reviewable, discretion of the coastal state. There is, there-
fore, ample justification for preferring that a prescription on
innocent passage be formulated with maximum precision and certain-
ty of reference.
An accompaniment to either high abstraction (which gives
discretion to the coastal state) or great precision (hopefully
limiting coastal discretion) is to provide a third-party institu-
tional mechanism to which appeals may be made, regarding the
boundaries of coastal authority to protect exclusive interests
and the degree of protection available to flag state (community)
interests. If such an institutional device could be created to
operate with the necessary dispatch and reliability, It would then
be possible to secure optimum protection of all Interests con-
cerned. However, the difficulties inherent in such a mechanism
and the practical remoteness of realizing It could make this more
an ideal than a real alternative in policy.
In the absence of an Institutional structure, the community
Interest would be best served by reducing the degree of discre-
tion permitted by the present concept of innocent passage. An
initial step is to narrow the scope of coastal competence by dis-
carding the formula of "peace, good order, and security" In
straits, which Is the most critically important area. Although
some concept of innocent passage might continue to be applicable
In straits, the concentration of inclusive interests Justifies a
somewhat different and narrower formulation of coastal interests
that might Justify interference with passage. One such interest
is in military security. That this interest deserves preservation
and continues to have high importance in a community lacking re-
liable centralized institutions to protect against unlawful force
hardly needs documentation.
Another adequate justification is the interest in the regu-
lation of navigation for safety purposes. Preferably this inter-
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est would be effectively protected by prescription of interna-
tional regulations, including traffic separation schemes, but to
the extent that no agreement is reached, the coastal state should
be authorized to impose its own traffic regulations and to enforce
them by appropriate sanctions.
To assure that the coastal state actually has a timely op-
portunity to exercise the necessary surveillance and control to
protect itself, it may be further desirable to require that some
passing vessels should give adequate advance notice of their in-
tended transit. Since it is primarily from military craft that
a coastal state might have any realistic need to feel apprehen-
sion about security, the interest of most intense concern, it
is appropriate to limit this requirement to such vehicles, in-
cluding submarines. To the extent, if any, such a system is
thought to disadvantage one or another state, it is. perfectly
possible that special arrangements can be made for waiver of the
notice, or modification of its terms, or for special provisions
to deal in particular ways with different types of vehicles.
Submarines, especially, might be dealt with by such arrangements.
For areas of territorial sea other than straits a different
approach is warranted, and the current general formulation could
be retained in the community interest so long as another modifi-
cation, noted below, is adopted. Retention of somewhat broader
coastal discretion for areas outside straits appears to be in ac-
coro with community interests since these areas are not essen-
tial to international transportation and present far less poten-
tial for harmful impact on inclusive use. Accordingly, greater
weight might rationally be placed upon protection of a broad cate-
gory of coastal interests.
Another factor important for policy regarding Innocent
passage concerns the range of events the coastal state can take
into account in determining whether a particular incident of
passage prejudices coastal interests. It is one thing to base
this judgment only on the activities of a particular ship in trans-
it (even in light of the general context of contemporary rela-
tions between the coastal state and others) and quite another to
reach conclusions derived from a much broader state of affairs
such as the nature of the cargo aboard, its ports of call,
destination, previous history in transit, and so forth. To per-
mit coastal officials to take into account the latter range of
factors, and to link them with prevailing political relations
with or between other states, broadens coastal discretion very
considerably and extends it to substantial license. Concern for
the broad community interest (including the coastal Interest as
a flag state in other contexts) justifies establishing limits on
coastal discretion by providing that the innocence, or lack there-
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of, of passage must be determined only by specific acts occurring
during passage in the territorial sea itself. The long record of
experience with transit through the territorial sea establishes
that coastal interests are very rarely offended by the acts of
passing vessels. Such an arrangement therefore seems designed
both to provide ample protection for coastal interests and to
safeguard the broader community interest in movement of vessels
free of consequential interference.
Accordingly, an additional component of the formulation of
this policy factor would be a definitive list of activities that
a coastal state could with reason consider offensive or prejudi-
cial. The important characteristic of such a list is that the
acts are unequivocal in nature, subject to external scrutiny, and,
by definition, are closely related in a causal sense to detri-
mental impacts on coastal interests of serious consequence.
We have already noted in previous discussion of desirable
policy that submersible vehicles should be accorded the right of
innocent passage. The more critical question here is whether sub-
merged passage ought to be considered compatible with coastal in-
terests and, therefore, an exercise of innocent passage. Particu-
lar concern has been expressed by the United States over the pros-
pect that submersibles might be required to surface during passage
through straits. This particular subject has been ventilated on
numerous occasions7 6 and there is no need here to add to the dis-
cussion beyond the assertion that the case has not been made for
a new policy that would insulate submarines In straits from sub-
jection to the normal legal process otherwise applicable to ves-
sels. Submerged transit means, if it is significant at all, that
the coastal community has no notice or knowledge of a presence of
these vessels In its territorial sea. Indeed, so far as the
coastal state is aware, the submarines could be stationed within
the territorial sea as well as use the area for moving between ex-
ternal points.7 7 There appears to be a very insubstantial basis
76. J. Knauss,"The Military Role in the Oceans and its
Relation to the Law of the Sea,"in L. Alexander, Law of the Sea:
A New Geneva Conference 77 (1972); J. Goldblat,"Law of the Sea
and the Security of Coastal Statesu in Christy, et al., Law of
the Sea: Caracas and Beyond 301 (1975); R. Osgood,"U.S. Security
Interests in Ocean Law,"2 Ocean Development and Intl L.J. 1
(1974).
77. According to recent reports, U.S. submarines are em-
ployed for missions which call for stations within claimed 12
mile territorial seas but beyond three miles. The New York Times
report by Seymour M. Hersh described these missions as follows:
"The Holystone operation, which more recently has carried the
code names Pinnacle and Bollard, involves the use of specially
equipped electronic submarines to spy inside the waters of the
Soviet Union and other nations. The intelligence-gathering
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for concluding that the security position of the powers employing
nuclear or other submarines would be materially prejudiced by re-
quiring these craft to travel on the surface through straits or
other parts of the territorial sea.7 8 There may be, on the other
hand, understandable apprehension on the part of coastal communi-
ties about the use of national territory, without notice or
knowledge, by foreign military craft of great strategic and tacti-
cal significance.
Another contention is that safety requires submerged trans-
It. It seems rather late in the day to urge this seriously In
view of the previously wide acceptance of a requirement for sur-
face transit in the territorial sea, including acceptance by the
major powers operating nuclear submarines.79 There may be sub-
stance to this point, but concern for safety can be satisfied In
other ways more consonant with coastal interests than simply pro-
viding for unannounced submerged passage by large nuclear-powered
vessels carrying nuclear weapons.
An appropriate balance of interests in this situation sug-
gests that a submarine ought to be treated no differently than any
other vessel. This means that a submarine on the surface is en-
titled to the same right of passage as other vessels but submerged
transit requires authorization by the coastal state. In the event
that submerged transit is considered essential or desirable in a
particular situation the flag state can of course make special
operation was initiated in the early nineteen-sixties." N.Y.
Times, July 6, 1975, at 1, col. 2. On July 4, 1975 the Times
carried a UPI story originating in the July 3 issue of the San
Diego Evening Tribune reporting on a collision in May, 1974, be-
tween a U.S. and a Soviet submarine in Soviet waters "in the sea
approaches to the Soviet naval base at Petropavlovak on the
Kamchatka Peninsula. . . "' N.Y. Times, July 4, 1975, at 37,
col. 8.
78. In this connection, the development of surveillance
systems is relevant. See S.I.P.R.I., Tactical and Strategic
Antisubmarine Warfare 21-31 (1974), and S.I.P.R.I., World Arma-
ments and Disarmaments 303-325 (1974).
79. It may be recalled, also, that the traditional re-
quirement of surface passage applied to narrower territorial
seas than are now generally claimed. Submarines are now larger
than ever but presumably the submarines of yesteryear, such as in
1958, would also have been safer when passing submerged. This
contention does not seem to have been pressed when the 1958 Con-
vention was negotiated. Goldblat says that "in certain in-
stances submerged passage might be safer from the navigation
point of view." Goldblat, supra note 72,at 314.
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arrangements with the coastal state. It may be added that mili-
tary submarines ought as a matter of policy to provide notifica-
tion as would other military craft. Such a notice requirement
may be helpful in securing acquiescence by the coastal state In
submerged passage.
Among other factors relevant for policy are the type and
characteristics of a ship, including Its method of propulsion and
type of cargo. Of special importance are nuclear-powered craft
and carriers of bulk or hazardous cargo.8 0 As noted in the fol-
lowing section, desirable policy would recognize coastal com-
petence to prescribe special regulations for passage by such ves-
sels, including the use of designated sealanes. In this sense
such factors can be taken into account in determining whether a
particular passage is prejudicial to coastal interests. Such
policy would recognize that these classes of vessel have a right
of access to the territorial sea and that the conditions of its
exercise include conformity to reasonable coastal regulation.
(iii) coastal authority to prescribe and apply in the
territorial sea
The policy question here is how to balance exclusive
coastal interests with those of the wider community In formu-
lating a specific, rather than general, statement of coastal regu-
latory and enforcement authority in the territorial sea. An in-
dication of the scope of such authority, as a component of the
concept of innocent passage, might be a useful technique for in-
creasing the certainty of expectation of those whose vessels use
the territorial sea.8| The aim should be to reach a consensus on
the subjects to which coastal prescriptions may be extended and
on the categories of vessels to which specific regulations are or
may be directed. Of course a treaty provision indicating gen-
eral categories of the subjects of potential coastal legisla-
80. E.D. Brown and A.D. Couper,"Future Shipping and
Transport Technology and Its Impact on the Law of the Sea,1 in
Christy, F.T., Jr., et al., Law of the Sea: Caracas and Beyond
271 (1975).
81. The function of such provision goes further. The
simple provision of a definition of innocent passage and the
addition of a list of prejudicial activities does not meet the
needs for governing passage in the territorial sea. Indication
of the scope of regulatory authority is addressed to emplify-
ing coastal authority to meet such needs. In another sense,
too, recognition of adequate regulatory competence may assist In
persuading coastal states to accept an objective definition of
innocent passage.
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tion would not provide detatled guidance, which is the function of
the regulations themselves. Concerned coastal states presumably
would enact the necessary legislation containing the specific
directives applicable to all or part of the territorial sea.82
Nonetheless, general treaty provisions would serve to indicate the
bounds of coastal prescriptive competence and offer useful elabo-
ration of the requirements of innocent passage.
The coastal state should be recognized as having the neces-
sary authority to apply its laws and regulations for events in the
territorial sea by taking enforcement action. Clearly such en-
forcement will have an impact on navigation in the area, but such
impacts should be the minimum consistent with effective protec-
tion of coastal interests. In applying coastal law that state
ought not discriminate among vessels nor engage in petty harass-
ment for technical offenses.
An additional desirable feature of a treaty statement on
coastal competence to apply policy would be a limitation on the
nature or severity of the sanction applicable in the event of
non-conformity. Exclusion or prohibition of passage by an offend-
ing vessel may be considered a relatively light penalty in some
contexts. Imposition of a fine or the required posting of a bond
or even a prospective ruling of one kind or another may sometimes
be an appropriate as well as relatively light penalty but at
others an onerous burden. Where the impact of a violation of a
coastal regulation by a passing vessel is not too serious the
penalty should be one that accommodates the need for utmost free-
dom of movement. In areas outside straits, for example, the
least drastic penalty may be to require an offending vessel to
move outside the territorial sea to effect passage. In a strait,
however, this requirement might be extremely costly because of
the possibility that an extensive change of course and conse-
quent loss of time would be necessitated. Conversely, anywhere
in the territorial sea it may be very burdensome to arrest a ves-
sel and hold it for further, perhaps prolonged, legal proceedings.
Required posting of financial security could be an expeditious way
of providing both for a possible monetary penalty and for effi-
ciency of movement.
(b) Special right of passage for straits
As noted in previous discussion there are serious doubts
In some quarters that overall community interests, especially the
interests of maritime states, are adequately protected by recog-
nizing a right of innocent passage for all ships that cannot be
82. Of course states already enact such legislation. The
U.N. Legislative Series tncludes a large compilation of this ma-
terial.
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suspended in straits. In the traditional conception aircraft
would have no customary right of access at all. In this view the
innocent passage doctrine confers excessive discretion on the
coastal state to characterize passage as offensive to coastal in-
terests and, therefore, impermissible. The concern animating
this critical attitude is for both military and commercial ves-
sels, with oil carriers being the gravest concern among the
latter class. To allay the concern, some advocate removal of
the qualification of innocence entirely from the law applicable
to passage through straits, thus transforming these areas for
this purpose to a status resembling the high seas.83 This would
also permit overflight by aircraft and submerged passage by sub-
marines.
While there would be no dispute that this proposal pro-
tects navigation through straits, it is by no means so clear that
it adequately secures the protection of exclusive coastal in-
terests in some respects. The arguments advanced by proponents
of free transit are a mixture of legalistic assertion and of con-
tention that coastal interests are safeguarded by providing for
internationally prescribed regulations coupled with coastal en-
forcement.8 4 With respect to the former, it Is contended that
straits wider than six miles are now governed by the high seas
principle of freedom of navigation in the areas beyond a three-
mile limit. Accordingly, In this view,' it is apparent that
coastal states never previously required, or were permitted, pro-
tection of coastal interests and, presumably, they do not need
such protection now as they do in areas historically regarded as
part of the territorial sea.
83. The 1971 U.S. proposal on straits fits this descrip-
tion. The only authority explicitly recognized in the coastal
State was to designate channels suitable for transit. U.N. Doc.
A/AC.138/SC.II/L.40 and Corr.], 1971 Report 241. In the State-
ment Introducing the proposal, it was acknowledged that the
coastal State "could enforce compliance with reasonable traffic
safety regulations, but could never use safety regulations as a
way of impairing the right of free transit." U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/
SC.II, SR.8, Aug. 3, 1971.
84. Perhaps there is some irony in Cuba's position in
support of free transit deserving mention: "Because of the ag-
gressive policy towards Cuba which the United States had pur-
sued since the beginning of the Cuban Revolution, principally
in the seas surrounding Cuba, it was vitally important for his
country, from the standpoint of both economics and defence, that
there should be a guarantee that maritime communications with
other continents could not be cut off; ..... " II Off. Rec.
127, para. 11.
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The more substantive contention is that the free transit
(later this shorthand term became "unimpeded transit") proposal
would protect coastal interests because it contemplates the ap-
plicability of treaty provisions concerning environmental protec-
tion and safety of navigation as well as a limited coastal com-
petence to designate traffic lanes. 85 It is contended too that
the coastal state has no need for other authority over passage
because straits are not suitable places for vessel activity that
would prejudice coastal interests.8 6
Only this substantive contention deserves serious con-
sideration. The legal contention, mainly advanced by the United
States, is weak and self-serving. By the late 1960s and early
1970s, if not even earlier, it was plain that a twelve mile terri-
torial sea was the single most popular limit among states and
that there was absolutely no prospect of confining this region
to a three-mile width.8 7 Indeed by the time the legal argument
85. Statement of John R. Stevenson, U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.
138/SC.II/SR.37, July 28, 1972.
The U.S. proposal for the strict liability of all vessels
and aircraft in straits was "for accidents caused by their fail-
ure to observe" the relevant IMCO and ICAO regulations and pro-
cedures. Liability in other instances would presumably have to
be established in accordance with prevailing law.
86. "A strait was an area of confined waters in which no
captain of a surface ship, much less of a submarine, would choose
to take action threatening the security of a strait State."
Statement by John R. Stevenson, II Official Records 135, para. 65.
See also to similar effect Stevenson and Oxman, The Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The 1974 Caracas
Session, 69 Am. J. Int'L.L. 1, 15 (1975).
The difficulty with these arguments is the assumption that
the authors know what will be considered to threaten coastal
security, and that "hostile intent" must connote overtly antagonis-
tic actions. This conceptualization unfortunately fails to take
Into account the whole range of coercive actions and effects In-
volved in employment of naval vessels. See Luttwak, supra, note
68. Of course military missions are undertaken in confined waters,
apparently as a matter of course. See note 77 supra. Continued
repetition of statements which fly in the face of evidence sup-
portive of widespread suspicions may be harmful and, at the least,
erodes the credibility of the United States.
87. It was already apparent in 1958 that this limit had
not the slightest prospect of gaining general acceptance. The
1959 Conference never seriously considered the three-mile limit
and It was clear then that nothing less than a six-mile terri-
torial sea had a chance of adoption. The advent of numerous
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for free transit was being emphasized, the most important straits
were already fully incorporated within the claimed territorial sea
of adjoining states (Malacca, Gibraltar, Bab-el-Mendab, Hormuz,
etc.), 88 and it was clearly evident to most observers that inter-
national law permitted a territorial sea out to twelve miles.89
The reality was that straits states had claimed a 12-mile terri-
torial sea which incorporated these areas within national mari-
time territory and it was no longer tenable to negotiate as if
this fact did not exist9 0 or as if less than 12 miles would be
newly independent States beginning in 1960 rather quickly elimi-
nated any realistic possibility of a 6-mile territorial sea.
However the U.S. Navy has continued to insist and to rely
successfully upon a 3-mile territorial sea and the failure to en-
force a wider limit lends some credence to the U.S. positions.
On the other hand the success of this insistence and reliance
might also be laid solely to considerations of superior strength
and not to expectations about conduct in conformity with law.
88. This has not gone unnoticed in the debates. See re-
marks of Tanzania and Spain, U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.138/SR.28, 24
Mar. 1972.
89. At least so far as the LOS Conference is concerned,
the U.S. legal case seems irrelevant, but it may have continued
to make sense to press the U.S. position in opposition to state
claims in specific situations. Even here, however, the strong
case for a 12-mile limit as compatible with international law
put this opposition on a very fragile foundation.
In 1958 the U.S. announced that its 6-mile proposal was
only for negotiation purposes and it was returning to its 3-mile
limit and views after the failure of the Conference to agree.
2 "Official Records of the 1958 Conference on the Law of the Sea
69. This course no longer seems credible.
90. As of 1970 the claimed territorial seas of adjacent
states already included either the whole of these straits or the
channels for navigation. Only the Strait of Hormuz retained an
area of high seas (which was eliminated by the Oman extension to
12 miles in 1972), but the navigation channels were within the
internal waters of Oman assuming the use of the hypothetical
baseline system. For the territorial sea claims of various
strait states including Iran, Oman, Malaysia, Indonesia, Spain,
Morocco, Yemen (Aden), Yemen (Sana), Ethiopia, France, Egypt,
Saudi Arabia, see U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelli-
gence and Research, Office of the Geographer, National Claims to
Maritime Jurisdictions, April, 1974, 2d Rev. as amended June,
1975.
The Geographer has also issued maps depicting claims for
the Straits of Malacca, Hormuz, Bab-el-Mendab, Gibraltar and others.
[VOL.2218
CONTEMPORARY LAW OF THE SEA
considered required by International law in the future, if the
conference failed to produce a treaty.
One difficulty with the view that the free transit proposal,
as described above, recognizes sufficient coastal authority to
protect exclusive interests is that a major issue at stake Is:
who initially decides whether or not a particular passage preju-
dices coastal interests. It may well be that a third party would
conclude on review of a situation that no significant coastal in-
terests were offended by ships in straits; however, this would
not provide an adequate response to an argument that such a de-
cision should be made by coastal officials, who alone have the
responsibility and effective authority for safeguarding internal
value processes against detrimental impacts of acts In the adja-
cent territorial sea. There is, furthermore, a measure of un-
reality in the idea that coastal states should be satisfied to
accept in advance, sight unseen, the good will and beneflclent
Intentions of known and unknown9 l future flag states operating
with unknown equipment and weapons in an unknown future context
of relations with other nations. In the absence of an interna-
tional institution responsible for securing coastal state in-
terests, a free transit proposal geared primarily to Interna-
tional arrangements (including the U.N. Charter) leaves the
coastal state without any recourse whatsoever in all conceivable
future circumstances that might engage interests which the
coastal state might wish to protect.92
91. Egypt made a special point of Inquiring of the United
States "how the coastal state could verify whether a submarine
refrained from testing weapons of any kind during its passage
through straits if it remained submerged." II Off. Rec. 131,
para. 11. The U.S. reply was that it intended to abide by its
legal obligations in this respect and that ships, surface or sub-
merged, would not choose to use confined waters such as straits
to take action threatening coastal security. Furthermore sub-
merged passage was the safest way for submarines to travel
through straits. II Off. Rec. 135, paras. 64-65. See note 85
supra. 92. We are wont to look on these questions of coastal
security solely In terms of weapons and ships employed by the
superpowers. The territorial sea Is not very relevant when con-
sidering the use of highly sophisticated and extremely destruc-
tive weapons systems by such powers. But the territorial sea
has importance in a variety of other contexts, including both
those involving activities and coercive methods other than direct
force and those in which smaller, weaker states are antagonists.
in the former instance, coastal states may be concerned with
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From the most general perspective the policy problem is
not only to protect navigation in an area indispensable to its ef-
fective functioning but also to assure the coastal interest in
safeguarding its internal processes. If this is an adequate state-
ment of the problem, it is not desirable policy to adopt an ap-
proach which in substance provides only for the former and not
for the latter.
This is not to deny, however, that there is ample justifi-
cation, as well as precedent, for making special provision to pro-
tect vessel movement in straits. The 1958 Convention on the Ter-
ritorial Sea and Contiguous Zone makes such provision for straits
generally by forbidding the suspension of innocent passage In
straits. In addition there have long been special international
arrangements for especially strategic straits as well as for com-
parable artificial waterways; these agreements date back to the
early 19th century.93 Nothing in ocean use or in disputes about
such use today suggests any less need for special protection of
transit through straits, and there is much evidence of intensi-
fied and more critical international.dependence to support such
protection. The critical difficulty, and need, is to achieve
special protection for navigation in straits while at the same
time preserving essential coastal interests.
Desirable policy to achieve the above purposes calls for
some changes in previous legal. provisions, particularly in those
concerning innocent passage. It is not important whether or not
that precise term is continued, although there is some advantage
in it because it stresses that both coastal and community in-
terests are at stake. If the concept were to be retained in
straits it certainly would continue to be indispensable to pro-
vide that It cannot be suspended or similarly abridged in any way.
Beyond this, it is clear that a highly abstract formulation of
Innocent passage cannot offer an acceptable assurance of the un-
impeded movement that is required by international transport.
Reformulation and refinement are needed to provide the essential
breadth of doctrinal application, objectivity in determination,
superpower coercion, if not violence, and it is simply not
credible to pretend that these situations are not pertinent or
not present in the minds of negotiators. Diplomats are able to
read newspapers too.
The gist of the text statement is that the complexity of
the real world demands reference to a very large context of
pertinent state-to-state relations. A proposal which dismisses
them as irrelevant or unimportant may face difficulty in adoption.
93. McDougal and Burke at 197-98; Baxter, '[hJeLaw ofL -
ternational Waterways 7 (1964).
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and fairness to all interests concerned. Such reformulation could
take a variety of forms, as discussed in the previous section, so
long as navigation in straits is insulated from interference unre-
lated to vital coastal interests. The conceptual improvements al-
ready mentioned appear satisfactory for this purpose.
A final word needs to be added about aircraft. Although
the problem is a narrow one, involving relatively few states and
one class of aircraft, it is desirable to provide that those air-
craft are entitled to a right of access to pass over straits In
the same sense as vessels. One reason for this conclusion ap-
pears to be the incongruity of permitting aircraft to enter as a
matter of right when on the deck of an aircraft carrier but not
when in flight. Another is that some bodies of water might other-
wise become virtually closed seas for military aircraft since ac-
cess by air could become difficult if not impossible. The es-
tablishment of a closed sea by all bordering nations might be an
acceptable arrangement, but it is quite another matter to permit
straits states to make this decision for all concerned. Recogni-
tion of this right of access can of course be accompanied by con-
ditions that safeguard coastal interests.
2. Trend in decisions; appraisal and recommendation
The following discussion Is organized about the four prin-
cipal policy issues just discussed.
(a) The right of Innocent passage for military vessels
Although the 1958 Conference made provision for innocent
passage for "all ships" including warships, some states were
vigorously opposed to inclusion of the latter, while the number
favoring inclusion of warships in the right of innocent passage
was not large.94 In light of this, there could understandably
be some uncertainty about the general consensus on this issue
when, beginning in 1960, a large number of new states reached In-
dependence. It appeared reasonable to speculate that a number
of these states, and perhaps a large number, might be unsympa-
thetic to extending the right of innocent passage to military
craft. As the new consideration of the law of the sea began,
therefore, It was doubtful that states generally were in accord
on a provision on this issue.
The question of access by military vessels to the terri-
torial sea must be classed as one of the overriding issues con-
sidered by the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea and its
94. 4 Whlteman, supra note 7 at 416; McDouoal and Burke
at 218-20.
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preparatory body, the Seabed Committee. At the Conference, how-
ever, relatively little attention has been given to the question
of denying access to warships by withholding the right of Inno-
cent passage from such vessels. There are numerous proposals re-
garding passage through the territorial sea, but few proposals
seek to single out warships and to deny them the right of inno-
cent passage. Some do distinguish warships, however, and there
is considerable sentiment in favor of this course, but the major
issue is whether or not warships should have an even more secure
right of access to straits than innocent passage. The leading
maritime states take the view that a right of innocent passage
alone is not adequate, insofar as straits are concerned.
During the preparatory work, only two proposals of over a
dozen9 5 provided expressly that the coastal state could require
authorization and notification of the passage of warships. The
so-called "straits states" proposal would have done so,9 6 although
some of these states joined in inconsistent proposals in other
contexts (both Indonesia and Malaysia would recognize a right of
innocent passage for warships through archipelagic waters); it is
not surprising to find this polar position being advocated by na-
tions in this group. The other proponent, also not surprising
despite incompatibility with its own long-term interests, was
China,97 which seized every opportunity to oppose the Soviet
Union and, to a lesser extent,, the United States.
Of the new or revised proposals tabled at the Caracas
session of the Conference, onl-y that of Malaysia, Morocco, Oman,
and Yemen denied a right of innocent passage to warships.98 These
states would, in addition, require notification or authorization
for nuclear-powered ships or ships carrying nuclear materials, a
category not limited to warships. This proposal also would re-
quire notification, except for passage in designated sealanes,
for research and hydrographic ships. Tankers and ships carrying
nuclear substances or materials (apparently other than weapons)
would be required to pass via designated sealanes.
The Single Text stipulates that the rules applicable to
95. The reference is to formal proposals and to the OAU
Declaration. The latter does not mention warships as such. 1973
Rep. II, at 4. Nor do several of the formal proposals, e.g.,
SC.Il, L.21; SC.II, L.24; SC.ll, L.27; SC.ll, L.37, all in 1973
Rep. Ill.
96. U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.138/SC.II/L.I8, in 1973 Report II,
3, 9.
97. U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/L.34, 1973 Rep. III, 72.
98. U.N. Doc, A/CONF.62/C.2/L.16, III Off. Rec. 192.
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all ships 99 do, indeed, apply to warships, as defined in this
treaty,10 0 and, accordingly, these vessels would be entitled to
the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea.10 1  In
the exercise of this right the warship is to comply with coastal
laws and regulations and may be required to leave the territorial
sea if it disregards a request for compliance therewith. It may
be required to leave "by such safe and expeditious route as may
be directed by the coastal state."
Appraisal and Recommendation
The debate in Committee II on the territorial sea and in
straits used for international navigation sheds uncertain light
on the outcome concerning the concept of innocent passage for
warships. The issue is hardly even mentioned in the territorial
sea discussion: the nature of the debate and the ambiguous terms
used in the consideration of straits combine to obscure a definite
trend. In the latter debate it is worth emphasis that the basic
issue discussed, the notion of unimpeded transit or transit
passage (labels signifying the same thing) assumes that warships
already have a right of innocent passage but that it is unsatis-
factory. The response to this by some states rather fuzzes the
issue. Some reject both free transit and innocent passage and
declare that warships require authorization. Others state that
innocent passage for warships is enough but that authorization
is required. This latter view is a contradiction in terms; there
can be no right of passage if the coastal state may or may not
give authorization. Other states simply state a conclusion that
innocent passage is enough, without clarifying what these words
connote or whether they mean to extend the right (whatever it is)
to all ships.
The impression one gets from these debates, however, is
that there is considerable support for the idea that warships
have a right of innocent passage in the sense of a genuine right
of access. There does not appear to be any great pleasure in
this view, as may be seen most directly In the statement of Sri
Lanka, but some influential developing states appear willing to
acquiesce. Other developing countries, of course, vigorously
reject any notion of a right of access for warships, even where
qualified by the term innocent. it is not possible, on the basis
99. "Section 3: Innocent Passage in the Territorial Sea.
Subsection A. Rules applicable to all ships." U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
62/WP.8/Part 11 at 8.
100. Article 29(1), id. at 13.
101. Id., Article 29T2h.
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of the public record at least, to forecast the relative numbers
in these camps, but there is reason to speculate that the sup-
porters of innocent passage are in the majority. If the maritime
states would compromise on a form of innocent passage in straits,
it would seem likely that this right of access might achieve the
necessary two-thirds support to become part of a treaty. The
compromise might involve the giving of notice of passage, as sug-
gested by Sri Lanka and Nigeria.
(b) Coastal authority to deny innocent passage
Previous decisions indicated a firm general expectation
that coastal states could lawfully deny all passage through the
territorial sea even if in any particular instance it were not
prejudicial to coastal interests. But the permissible occasions
for such denial were limited. The consideration of this Issue
in the International Law Commission10 2 and the decisions at the
1958 Conference establish the qualifying conditions for the exer-
cise of this authority: (1) the suspension of innocent passage
is permissible only in specified areas of territorial sea not
within straits; (2) suspension cannot be selective or discrimina-
tory; it must apply to all vessels; (3) it must be temporary, al-
though the meaning of this is not defined; (4) suspension should
be effective only after publication of notice, presumably thus
giving potentially affected vessels an opportunity to choose al-
ternative routes and prohibiting instantaneous decisions; (5) sus-
pension is permissible only for protection of coastal security In
the narrow military sense of the term; (6) the judgment that
security reasons justify suspension is not within the complete
discretion of the coastal state.
The record of proposals and discussions in the LOS Con-
ference establishes that the previous firm expectation continues
to exist on this issue. There were relatively few proposals dur-
ing the Seabed Committee dealing with the question of suspension
of passage and those few uniformly repeated the 1958 Convention
provision.10 3 The only substantial change in this respect was
suggested by the archipelago states in their proposal on access
to those waters. As noted earlier, suspension of innocent
passage through these waters would be permitted for security
102. A/CN.4/SER.A 1956/Add.l at 273 Yearbook of the Inter-
national Law Commission, 1956.
103. Cyprus et al. (SC.II, L.18); Malta (SC.II, L.28);
Fiji (SC.II, L.42 and Corr.l); Fiji, Indonesia, Mauritius, and
The Philippines (SC.ii, L.48) (on archipelagic waters). Several
proposals did not address this .issue at all.
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reasons, but the coastal state would have to substitute other sea-
lanes.104
Proposals in the 1974 Caracas session were for the most
part simply reiterations of the 1958 provision,10 5 except for a
novel change suggested by Poland, the GDR, Bulgaria and USSR. In
this proposal (C.2, L.26) the coastal state could suspend inno-
cent passage, subject to the additional condition "that the other
shortest routes for innocent passage have at the same time been
designated.ul06
The Single Text deals with suspension in the two different
sections devoted to the territorial sea and straits used for in-
ternational navigation. Article 22(3) of the former section is a
verbatim copy of Article 16(3) of the 1958 Territorial Sea Conven-
tion,the provisions of which are summarized in the first para-
graph of this section. The section on straits provides for a
right of innocent passage, and also a right of transit passage,
through certain straits, neither of which can be suspended. The
scope of these rights of passage and the straits to which they do
and do not apply are discussed in a later subsection.
Appraisal and Recommendation
Discernible sentiment In the law of the sea discussions
appears still to be in favor of allowing the coastal state to
protect its security by denying all passage through the territor-
lat sea, albeit under limited conditions. A widespread under-
standing continues to exist, however, that the right of Innocent
passage through straits cannot be suspended even for security
reasons. These trends continue to accord with desirable com-
munity policy.
It might be made clear In the Single Text that the pro-
hibition in Article 21 against hampering or denying innocent
passage Is subject at least to Article 22, according to which
all innocent passage can be suspended. The sense of the former
article appears to be that in the absence of suspension which
applies to all traffic, the coastal state is forbidden to hamper
or deny Innocent passage In particular instances, whether it
seeks to accomplish this aim directly or by manipulating coastal
104. Id., Article V(9), 1973 Seabed Rep. III, 105.
105. U.K. (C.2, L.3); Malaysia, Morocco, Oman, and Yemen
(C.2, L.16); Fiji (C.2, L.19); Fiji, Indonesia, Mauritius, and
The Philippines (C.2, L.49).
106. U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.26, III Off. Rec. 203.
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law governing events in the territorial sea. 107
(c) Clarification of the concept of Innocent passage: the defini-
tion of coastal interests; scope of coastal authority to
prescribe laws and regulations;scope of coastal authority to
apply laws and regulations
Definition of coastal interests
Dissatisfaction with the 1958 Convention provision on inno-
cent passage is evident in the various LOS proposals for a new con-
ception of this term. The major thrust for revision is to provide
detailed specification of activities in the territorial sea that
are prejudicial to the interests of the coastal state. All pro-
posals retain the 1958 Convention definition that passage is in-
nocent unless it Is prejudicial to the peace, good order, or
security of the coastal state. However, In seeking to provide a
listing of acts considered prejudicial to these Interests, a major
difference is to be noted between lists which are exhaustive and
those which are either illustrative or otherwise open-ended.
Thq major proposals tabled In the Seabed Committee, those
by FijilO5 and by the straits states, 10 9 fall into the latter
category. Article 7 of the straits states proposal prefaces its
list of prohibited acts by reference to "activities such as,"
suggesting that still other activities are also prejudicial and
not to be allowed. The draft articles by Fiji provide, according
to the explanatory note, an "objective test" for "determining
what acts are In fact considered to be prejudicial to the peace,
good order and security of the coastal state." Article 3(2) does
contain what appears to be an exhaustive list except that the
last item is "any other activity not having a direct bearing on
passage." This all-embracing category assumes, apparently, that
"any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage" must
be prejudicial to important interests of the coastal state. What-
ever the assumption in this regard, this open-ended category
seems to vitiate in some degree the objectivity achieved by spe-
107. It perhaps goes without saying that Article 21 does
not preclude enforcement of coastal laws. Violations of most of
the laws listed would probably justify claiming passage as non-
innocent and enforcement permissible. To the extent a vessel re-
mains in innocent passage after or while violating coastal law,
reasonable interpretation of Article 21 would not prohibit en-
forcement action.
108. U.N. Doc.. No. A/AC.138/SC.II/L.42.
109. U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.138/SC.II/L.18.
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cifying prejudicial acts.''
0
The other major proposals, presented In Caracas, were those
by the United Kingdom ll and by a Soviet bloc groupl] 2 and each of
these contains an exhaustive list of activities considered preju-
dicial.
The various prejudicial activities identified in the sev-
eral proposals differ in detail but, with the exception noted in
regard to Fiji, the differences are not major.113 Perhaps the
only substantive difference of possible importance Is that the
Soviet bloc uses the term "deliberate" to qualify acts of Inter-
ference with communication systems or any other facilities or In-
stallations. The effect of this is to re-introduce an element of
subjectivity, since it raises the Issue of Intent dr purpose, but
it does so to reduce coastal authority and not to Increase it.
110. The difficulty is that the vessel cannot know wheth-
er it is conforming with coastal interests or from what acts
it must refrain. If a coastal state wishes to harass vessels In
passage this category serves the purpose well.
On the other hand it is difficult to envisage what a ves-
sel might do beyond those acts already prohibited and this catch-
all provision may be simply an understandable method of compen-
sating for imperfect foresight. Furthermore a coastal state in-
terested in harassment does not have much need for colorable
legal justifications when a long list of acceptable ones Is al-
ready provided.
111. U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.3, Iil Off. Rec. 183.
112. U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.26, II Off. Rec. 203.
113. Perhaps what is major depends on the point of view.
Both Fiji and the 4-power strait states list ten categories of
acts while the UK mentions but six and the U.S.S.R. Identifies
seven. Half of the differences consist of references by the
former two proposals to espionage and propaganda. The strait
states would label the conduct of research as prejudicial; both
the U.K. and U.S.S.R. provide for a requirement of authoriza-
tion for such activity.
More important than these differences, in the view of
some, at least, is the exculpatory clause in Art. 16(3) of the
U.K. proposal. Canada thought this would provide excessive
discretion to the vessel master. II Off. Rec. 130, para. 7.
According to this article the activities previously identified
as "prejudicial" could not be so considered if it is "prudent
for safe and efficient navigation In accordance with the normal
practice of seamen; . . ." This need not be interpreted as con-
ferring discretion on the master but more properly as a standard
for reviewing his course of action.
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The Single Text on this point appears to be a mixture of
the various important proposals, taking part from those of states
with a coastal or straits orientation and part from those of
maritime states. The definition of innocent passage is that used
In the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea coupled with a list
of activities considered prejudicial that is drawn from all the
proposals before the Conference. In fact the list includes vir-
tually every Item mentioned in proposals tabled at the Confer-
ence Itself, omitting only the reference suggested by Fiji and
the 4-power straits states to "warlike acts" and "any threat or
use of force" which appear even to rule out legitimate acts of
self-defense. One item mentioned, "any act of wilful pollution,
contrary to the provisions of the present Convention," is not
found in any previous proposal. Although it is comprehensive,
the list is not exhaustive since its last item is "any other
activity not having a direct bearing on passage."
The principal emphasis In the list of prejudicial activi-
ties (12 in number) is upon the coastal interest in security in
the military sense, at least half of the activities directly re-
lating to defense or security.11 4 Other items relate to security
in a broader sense as well as in some instances to military
security, including references to wilful pollution, the conduct
of research or survey activities, and acts aimed at interfering
with communications systemsand other facilities and installa-
tions. Coastal concern for a number of value processes is in-
volved In "the embarking or disembarking of any commodity, cur-
rency or person contrary to the customs, fiscal or sanitary regu-
lations of the coastal states."
None of the activities listed is to be considered preju-
dicial, according to Article 16(2) of the Single Text, if au-
thorized by the coastal state, and certain of the activities
are not prejudicial if they are made "necessary by force majeure
or distress or for the purpose of rendering assistance to persons,
ships or aircraft in danger or distress." l5
114. Of the six activities in Article 16(2)(a)-(f) all
but one refer to use of force, weapons, defense or security.
III Off. Rec. at 184.
115. Activities excused by these circumstances are those
involving aircraft, military devices, embarking or disembarking
any commodity, currency or person, willful pollution, research
or survey, interference with communications systems or any other
facilities or installations, and any other act not having a
direct bearing on passage. Id.
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Scope of coastal authority to prescribe laws and regulations
The distinctions just noted regarding exhaustive versus
illustrative listing are also relevant for characterizing pro-
posals defining the competence of the coastal state to adopt laws
and regulations for vessels in passage. In this instance, how-
ever, only the formulation advanced by the straits states (SC.II,
L.18) to the Seabed Committee is open-ended and even this formu-
lation is somewhat narrowly conceived. Article 6 provides:
The coastal State may enact regulations relating
to navigation in its territorial sea. Such regu-
lations may relate inter alia, to the following:
Although this appears to limit coastal prescriptions to those
relating to navigation, the illustrative list refers also to ex-
ploration and exploitation of resources, pollution and research.
Still other matters could apparently be dealt with if the coastal
state so wished.
Interestingly the proposal in Caracas by some of these
same States (Malaysia, Morocco, Oman, and Yemen) (L.16) also
contains a list of subjects for laws and regulations which is
exhaustive, as well as a bit longer. Among the regulatory sub-
jects specified is"[t]he installation, utilization and protection
of navigational facilities and aids" which one observer believes
clearly implies regulation of ship design and construction.1
16
A major difference in proposals regarding coastal pre-
scriptive competence is that some specifically exclude from that
competence certain subjects of particular import for navigation,
as well as regulations having a particular effect on passage.
The U.K. proposal (C.2, L.3), for example, itemizes the only
permissible subjects for coastal regulation and then adds the
following exclusion and prohibition:
116. Miles,"An Interpretation of the Caracas Proceedings,
in Christy, F.T., Jr., et al., eds., Law of the Sea: Caracas and
Beyon 74 (1975). This interpretation seems doubtful on the
basis of internal evidence. The other references in L.16 to
navigational aids and installations appear to refer to the
equipment emplaced by the coastal state. Article 7(6) and
Article 23. In any event other components of coastal authority
could more plausibly provide a basis for such a claim, such as
the "safety of navigation and the regulation of marine traffic"
and "the preservation of the marine environment of the coastal
State and the prevention of pollution thereof."
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2. Such laws and regulations shall not: (a) apply
to the design, construction, manning or equipment of
foreign ships or matters regulated by generally ac-
cepted international rules unless specifically au-
thorized by such rules, (b) impose requirements on
foreign ships which have the practical effect of de-
nying or prejudicing the right of innocent passage
in accordance with this Convention, and (c) dis-
criminate in form or in fact among foreign ships.
The Soviet proposal is nearly identical on points (a) and (b).
The Fiji proposal is less restrictive In that it would permit
coastal regulations relating to design, construction, manning,
or equipment if they are not "more restrictive than those pro-
vided by the International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships, of 1973, or of any subsequent interna-
tional convention of general application."
In spelling out coastal prescriptive competences, it is
noteworthy that all propasals mention, and some give strong em-
phasis to, the creation of sealanes and traffic separation
schemes. Generally speaking, this question is muted in the pro-
posals of maritime states such as the U.K. and U.S.S.R., but
treated with great prominence in coastal and straits states pro-
posals. The former proposalsdispose of this matter simply as
one of a list of items of coastal regulatory competence [U.K.,
C.2, L.3, Article 18(1)(a)] or a single short article (Bulgaria,
German Democratic Republic, Poland, U.S.S.R., C.2, L.26,
Article 21).117 In contrast, the similar proposals by Malaysia,
Morocco, Oman and Yemen (C.2, L.16, Article 7) and by Fiji (C.2,
L.19) spell out the basic coastal competence to designate sea-
lanes and establish traffic separation schemes, indicate factors
to be taken into account in doing so, and deal expressly with
questions of publicity, substitution of new lanes, and appli-
cable collision regulations.
117. The U.K. proposal distinguishes sharply between
coastal competence in the territorial sea generally and in
straits. There are no external constraints in the former in-
stance but in the latter the approval of the "competent inter-
national organization" is required. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/
L.3, Chap. II, Article 18()(a) and Chapter III, Article 3.
The Soviet proposal on straits does not even mention sea-
lanes and traffic separation schemes but,following a provision
in the 1971 U.S. straits proposal, does allow the coastal state
to "designate corridors suitable for transit by all ships through
such straits."
See discussion at 235-236, infra.
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The major territorial sea proposals differ sharply in
singling out special types of vessels for differing regulatory
competence. The straits and coastal state proposals have special
sections on "ships with special characteristics" and provide
either for authorization or notification for certain classes of
vessels. The major maritime state proposals, on the other hand,
do not mention this matter prominently although they do contain
provisions aimed at specific types of vessels.11 8 The proposal
by Malaysia, Morocco, Oman and Yemen provides that't]he coastal
State may require prior notification to or authorization by its
competent authorities for the passage through its territorial
sea" of nuclear-powered ships or ships carrying nuclear weapons.
Marine research and hydrographic survey ships may be required to
give prior notice for passage except in designated sealanes.
Oil and chemical tankers and ships carrying nuclear substances
or materials may be required to use designated sealanes.
The proposal by Fiji contrasts sharply with the straits
states' proposal because It does not envisage authorization
for nuclear-powered ships or ships carrying nuclear weapons. But
other provisions do envisage notification for "tankers and ships
carrying nuclear or other inherently dangerous substances or
materials" and permit the coastal state to require use of desig-
nated sealanes for certain types of vessels. The Fiji proposal,
however, does not single out research or survey vessels for
special regulation of passage.
One specific legislative action of special interest to
straits states concerns the problem of navigational aids and
assistance. The 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and
Contiguous Zone dealt with this in Article 18:
I. No charges may be levied upon foreign ships by
reason only of their passage through the terri-
torial sea.
2. Charges may be levied upon a foreign ship pass-
ing through the territorial sea as payment only
for specific services rendered to the ship.
These charges shall be levied without discrimi-
nation.
118. The U.K. refers to fishing vessels as a special
subject for coastal regulation lid., Article 18(1)(g)] and
singles out research and hydrogra-phic survey ships in prohibit-
Ing such activities during passage in the territorial sea
(Article 19). Article 20 provides that "submarines and other
underwater vehicles" may be required to navigate on the surface.
The Soviet bloc articles make similar distinctions and refer-
ences.
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The effect of this arrangement is to place the general burden of
navigational aids and assistance wholly upon the coastal state,
presumably on the assumption that reciprocal provision of such
aid evens out the burden. Some states are inequitably treated
in this approach, especially in light of increased needs of
assistance for safety of navigation due to Increased size and
numbers of vessels carrying bulk cargo such as oil.
Three principal approaches to this problem were advanced.
One, by Fiji, would simply have repeated the 1958 provision
quoted above. The other two suggestions would have retained
this provision for the territorial sea outside straits, although
the U.K. proposed the slight change of inserting "reasonable" be-
fore charges. In straits, the U.K. and straits states proposed
assistance to the straits state under different terms and condi-
tions. The U.K. called for cooperation "by agreement," while
the straits states would "require" cooperation. The U.K. pro-
posal, which appears in the Single Text, is:
User States and strait States should by agreement
cooperate in the establishment and maintenance in
a strait of necessary navigation and safety aids
or other improvements in aid of international navi-
gation or for the prevention and control of pollu-
tion from ships. 11 9
119. Dr. Pardo has commented on this problem, appearing
to indicate a need for greater specificity in treaty arrange-
ments: 'We are all aware that many modern supertankers have
drafts approaching one hundred feet and have difficulty in stop-
ping in less than three or four miles and in maneuvering. It
would require some changes in international law with regard both
to standards in tanker construction and manning, and with regard
to transit through straits and through shallow and heavily
travelled seas. In particular, the duties of the coastal state
can no longer be confined to refraining from obstructing passage
or to permitting free or innocent passage, but must also include
positive obligations such as deepening of navigation channels,
providing appropriate aids to navigation, new detailed charts of
waters less than twenty fathoms deep and other, often costly,
measures. In short, it costs money to provide for the needs of
modern navigation; coastal states will inevitably wish to recoup
their expenditure in this respect. This means that we can ex-
pect that sooner or later charges will be levied for passage
through some straits and shallow seas. Should such charges be
levied unilaterally by the state concerned, or should there be
treaty provisions specifying under what circumstances charges
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As with the definition of coastal interests in terms of
listing prejudicial activities, the Single Text again seems to
reflect the details of every major LOS conference proposal on
competence to adopt laws and regulations. The Text identifies
the subject-matter of the laws and regulations as those "relating
to innocent passage." This formulation comes from the United
Kingdom and Eastern European proposals and differs from that of
the four-power straits states ("navigation through the territor-
ial sea") and Fiji ("relating to passage through the territorial
sea"). It is not clear what difference Is suggested by employ-
ing the legal term "innocent passage" rather than one that is
more factual. It would not seem that the former term implies
any limitation or restriction on coastal competence to take ac-
tion to enforce the laws it prescribes, including measures that
interfere with the passage of ships offending against coastal
laws. 120 Although the individual proposals use somewhat differ-
ent words, terms or phrases in listing the specific matters with-
in the scope of coastal authority, they appear to be in substan-
tial agreement on these.12 1 The Text items sometimes are ver-
batim copies of individual proposals but some items differ from
any proposal. There does not appear to be any substantial en-
largement or diminution of coastal competence because of this
except, possibly, in the omission of reference to ships of spe-
cial characteristics. Even this omission, however, does not
suggest that coastal regulatory authority cannot make distinc-
tions between types or classes of vessels in promulgating local
can be imposed and how the scale of charges is to be negotiated?"
Pardo,'taracas: Assessment of Results - Implications for the
Future,"in Perspectives on Ocean Policy 383, 394 (1975). See
also Pardo, supra note 28 at 394.
120. For example, it might be contended, perhaps, that
in "relating to innocent passage" the laws do not directly con-
cern that concept and that infringements of such laws according-
ly do not involve prejudicial activities. Therefore, the coastal
state would not be permitted to prevent passage for violations
of these laws or to take any enforcement action which would
"hamper" such passage. This appears to be an unreasonable in-
terpretation of the Single Text. If, however, this were the in-
tended meaning of this phrase, the latter ought to be changed
In the final text.
121. About the only unique items were the reference to
conservation of the living resources of the sea in the Fiji
articles and passage of ships with special characteristics in
the 4-power strait states'articles. Every other item in the
various proposals was found In at least two other proposals, if
In somewhat different language.
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laws.
12 2
The Single Text follows the lead of the maritime states
in including a specific exclusion from coastal competence.
Article 16(2) declares that'[s]uch laws and regulations shall not
apply to or affect the design, construction, manning, or equip-
ment of foreign ships or matters regulated by generally accepted
international rules, unless specifically authorized by such
rules." 12 3 This provision appears to go beyond any other pro-
posal in forbidding even any effect upon the excluded subject
areas. A further and somewhat broader protection for community
use is offered in Article 21(2) which forbids application of
laws and regulations that "impose requirements on foreign ships
which have the practical effect of denying or prejudicing the
right of innocent passage; .... 11
The Single Text emphasizes coastal competence to prescribe
for navigation safety by mentioning sealanes and traffic separa-
tion schemes both in the general article listing the permissible
subjects of coastal laws and in another article which expressly
provides that the coastal state may require vessels in innocent
passage to use them where the coastal state "considers it neces-
sary having regard to the density of traffic concentration."124
Authority over certain vessels is perhaps even broader in light
of the provision, which would otherwise seem somewhat redundant,
that "tankers and ships carrying nuclear or other inherently
dangerous or noxious substances or materials may be required to
confine their passage to such sealanes."1 2 5 However, the coast-
122. However it does suggest that the specific compe-
tences claimed must actually be regulation and not prohibition,
such as in the trait states'proposal (Article 8).
123. None of the proposals contained the term "affect."
Soviet use of the verb "relate" perhaps is not much different
and could be more inclusive than "affect."
124. As in the U.K. proposal, the Single Text permits
greater coastal authority in the territorial sea generally than
in straits. See discussion at 250-51 infra.
125. Article 20 also might create some confusion. It
states: "Foreign nuclear-powered ships and ships transporting
nuclear substances shall, when exercising the right of innocent
passage through the territorial sea, carry documents and ob-
serve special precautionary measures established for such ships
by international agreements." Since the obligations mentioned
are already specified in other agreements, it Is difficult to
see what is added by this provision. It might be deduced that
if a vessel does not have the documents or take the measures
established that It is no longer in innocent passage. This
seems to be an improbable interpretation, although It suggests
the hazardof incorporating unneeded provisions.
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al state does not have carte blanche in this aspect of its compe-
tence to prescribe. Article 19(4) provides:
In the designation of sealanes and the pre-
scription of traffic separation schemes under
the provisions of this article the coastal
state shall take into account:
(a) the recommendations of competent inter-
national organizations;
(b) any channels customarily used for inter-
national navigation; and
(c) the special characteristics of particular
ships and channels.
Scope of coastal authority to apply laws and regulations
The 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous
Zone contains two quite different provisions that deal with
coastal competence to enforce its laws governing events occur-
ring in the territorial sea. The most direct and explicit of
these provides that "1[t]he coastal State may take the necessary
steps in its territorial sea to prevent passage which is not in-
nocent." [Article 16(1).] In accordance with this provision,
a vessel infringing a local law and regarded as not innocent may
be subjected to the "necessary steps" to prevent further passage.
This is a highly specific form of enforcement, and it concerns
only such activities by a vessel as are so prejudicial to the
coastal state that passage is no longer innocent.
Other than this specialized provision, the only relevant
provision states that "foreign ships exercising the right of in-
nocent passage shall comply with the laws and regulations enacted
by the coastal state . . " While this language does not in so
many words recognize coastal enforcement competence, observers
have construed its use in the 1958 Convention as implicitly es-
tablishing such competence.12
6
In some respects the current proposals on authority in
the territorial sea do not differ much from the 1958 Convention.
Each major proposal repeats the above provisions verbatim and
none contains clear and express provision for enforcement. None-
theless It is difficult to read the various proposals without
concluding that coastal enforcement competence is implicitly as-
sumed in a variety of provisions. Illustrative in this respect
126. For reference to such interpretations, see
McDougal and Burke 272-73.
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is the new provision in several proposals that coastal states
shall ensure that the application of their laws and regulations
conforms to the Convention (C.2, L.3, L.16, L.26). It seems per-
missible to infer too from provisions authorizing criminal and
civil jurisdiction in certain circumstances (every territorial
sea proposal contains similar provisions on this) that the states
concerned assume the existence of an enforcement competence for
violations of coastal laws by vessels in the territorial sea.
Of the various proposals, however, only that of the four-power
straits states expressly provides for certain enforcement action
in this instance. Article 5(4) thereof provides that"[t]he
coastal State may require any foreign ship that does not comply
with the provisions concerning regulation of navigation through
the territorial sea to leave it by such route as may be directed
by the coastal State." The following article then lists eight
categories of navigation regulations.
The Single Text closely resembles the 1958 Convention by
incorporating its two provisions that deal, arguably in one In-
stance, with enforcement. It also contains a new provision, re-
flecting all the major proposals, that the coastal state is re-
sponsible for any loss or damage which results if,in the appli-
cation of its laws and regulations,it acts contrary to the Con-
vention.
Appraisal and Recommendation
Dissatisfaction with the 1958 definition of innocent
passage appears sufficiently widespread to assure that a new law
of the sea convention will effect some improvement. 1 27 The
direction is toward a more explicit understanding of what con-
stitutes passage that is prejudicial to coastal interests, and
accordingly what passage is innocent, and also toward a more
precise identification of coastal competence to legislate for
events in the territorial sea. On the former point the Single
Text would be measurably improved by removing the catch-all
category of "any other activity not having a direct bearing on
passage.1"128
127. Dr. Pardo does not share this assessment: ". . . it
is doubtful whether the conference majority will accept any real
constraints on the present unfettered discretion of coastal
states to define innocent passage." Pardo, supra note 119, at
388. Outside some Latin American states, however, there appears
to be substantial opinion in support-of this course.
128. Perhaps-deletion would not be necessary if some
modification could be added to make sure that the term "any
other activity" does not Include cargo or destination (neither
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The Single Text provisions for coastal competence to pre-
scribe have no counterpart at all in the 1958 Convention.12 9
Important protections for community use are embodied in the pro-
hibition against laws for or affecting construction, design,
manning, or equipment.
Most proposals and the Single Text on enforcement in the
territorial sea appear to provide the necessary coastal author-
ity although they do not adequately spell out this important ele-
ment. It is left to inference to conclude that violations of
coastal laws may entail a decision that passage is prejudicial
and therefore can be prevented. This point could usefully be
addressed with more clarity than in the Single Text. Article
5(4) of the straits states proposal might be adapted for this
purpose.130
(d) Special right of passage through straits
It is familiar knowledge that a major impetus toward the
convening of a new law of the sea conference lay in the dissatis-
faction of the superpowers over the continued expansion of terri-
torial seas and national jurisdiction, with their possible unde-
sirable impacts on naval uses of the ocean.'3 1 Both the U.S.
and the U.S.S.R., the latter being a recent convert to this
view,13 2 were apprehensive that general recognition of a 12-mile
of which have a direct bearing on passage) and that the acts in-
volved have harmful impact on the coastal state. The aim would
be to permit some leeway in judgments about what is prejudicial
but retain the advantages of objective conduct and minimize the
subjective element.
129. The mere fact of statement seems to be an advance
both for the coastal state and the general community. Despite
the 1958 Geneva Convention's reticence on this subject there
can hardly be question about coastal authority to regulate, but
it still reinforces this authority to make express provision for
it. At the same time the community interest is served by an un-
equivocal delineation of coastal authority to prescribe.
130. The importance of this provision is in its indica-
tion of the link between coastal prescriptive authority and in-
nocent passage. It would not be desirable to provide for ex-
pulsion from the territorial sea for every violation of coastal
law.
131. See the remarks by Chile, II Off. Rec. 138, para. 41.
132. The delegation of China Is awfully fond of empha-
sizing this change in view. See statements by China in U.N.
Doc. No. A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.36 (July 24, 1972); and II Off. Rec.
210, para. 110.
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territorial sea would threaten their access to, and movement
about, the world ocean through straits which already were, or
would become, subject to the sovereignty of the adjacent state
or states. As noted earlier, the worry was that the right of
innocent passage through straits was inadequate because it did
not include aircraft, submarines would have to transit on the
surface, and the concept itself was highly subjective and al-
lowed the coastal state excessive discretion to judge the inno-
cence of passage. Ironically, the U.S. bore major responsibil-
ity for this last condition due to its influence on the unfor-
tunate formulation of the doctrine of innocent passage, adopted
at the 1958 Convention. 13 3
It is not surprising, therefore, that one of the earliest
proposals tabled in the Seabed Committee was that of the U.S. to
preserve high seas freedom of navigation and overflight within
straits used for international navigation.13 4 This extremely
brief, but explicit, U.S. provision was followed the next year
by a similar but longer proposal by the U.S.S.R.135 Both states,
then and subsequently, have left no doubts that their views on
this issue would have to be accommodated if they were to accept
the results of the negotiations.13 6 Indeed, the prominence and
133. It was the United States which successfully proposed
deletion of the phrase which tied decisions about innocent pass-
age to the commission of acts in passage. For comment on this
episode and the effect of the deletion in enlarging coastal dis-
cretion see McDougal and Burke n.220 at 258.
134. The U.S. articles provided for the same freedoms of
transit and overflight for the purpose of transit as ships and
aircraft have on the high seas. 1971 Report 241. See statement
of John R. Stevenson, U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.138/SC.Il/SR.8 (Aug.
5, 1971).
The other provisions of the U.S. draft articles dealt with
the unfinished business of the 1958 and 1960 conferences, the
breadth of the territorial sea and fisheries beyond.
135. The Soviet proposal in its first paragraph is near-
ly identical to the U.S. version, the principal difference being
that the Soviets do not include straits which connect the high
seas with a territorial sea. The remaining provisions on ships
(aircraft were treated separately in similar provisions) concern
the rules applicable to transit. 1972 Report 162.
136. The U.S..has consistently and repeatedly averred
that it cannot imagine a successful negotiation which does not
satisfy its interests in unimpeded navigation. U.N. Doc. No.
A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.8 (Aug. 3, 1971).
The U.S.S.R. has made its-intentions equally clear by ex-
plicit reference to a package deal according to which settlement
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emphasis placed on this issue by the U.S. in the seabed nego-
tiations caused substantial domestic problems within the U.S. and
its delegation.13 7
By the time the LOS Conference convened in Caracas, how-
ever, the U.S. had adopted a less prominent position on this is-
sue, and its initial proposal was never formally developed or
promoted as such. The major proposals were four in number: the
U-K.3 8 (surrogate for the U.S. in effect), the Eastern Euro-
pean139 (an expanded and refined version of the earlier U.S.S.R.
proposal), a four-power straits states proposal,1 40 and, finally,
a Fiji proposal.14 The two former proposals represent the views
of the maritime states while the latter two, though different in
important ways, are weighted more toward the Interests of the
coastal straits states.142
of some major seabed issues are dependent upon a solution to
establishment of a 12-mile territorial sea, freedom of passage
through straits, and fishing adjacent to the territorial sea.
See Explanatory note submitted by the USSR delegation, appended
to U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.138/43, N1971 Seabed Committee ReportM 67.
This document contains draft articles of a seabed treaty. See
also U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.38, draft articles on the eco-
nomic zone, for a more expansive statement of the "package deal."
III Off. Rec. 214-16.
137. Of course the obvious predominance of the territor-
ial sea and straits issues might have suggested to some that the
U.S. placed less weight on its resource interests. The state-
ment of John R. Stevenson sought to redress this supposed im-
balance. Statement to Plenary Meeting of the Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of
National Jurisdiction, August 10, 1972, at 2.
138. U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.3, III Off. Rec. 183.
139. U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.11, id. at 189.
140. U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.16, I-TI Off. Rec. 192.
The sponsors of this are Malaysia, Morocco, Oman, and Yemen. Ex-
cept for Oman, these states joined in the 8-power straits'propos-
al tabled before the Seabed Committee, U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.138/
SC.Ii/L.18,"1973 Seabed Committee Report I!I, at 3.. The 1974
proposal is substantially more complete than the 1973 one and is
used here for purposes of comparison and discussion.
141. U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.19, III id. at 196.
142. Other, partial proposals were that by Algeria which
dealt with free transit to or from a coastal state bordered a
semi-enclosed sea, U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.20, III id. at
198, and two proposals which dealt with straits in archipelagic
waters. One of these is that by the archipelagic states, U.N.
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The major features of these proposals and the Single Text,
and the differences in them, can be described most easily in
terms of (i) the types of vehicles accorded or denied certain
rights; (ii) the definition of a strait to which rights are ap-
plicable; and (iii) the definition of passage in terms of the
permissible behavior of the vessel and the allocation of compe-
tence to prescribe and to apply policy in straits.
(i) Type of vehicle
The primary difference among the proposals concerns the
treatment of aircraft and warships. The straits states and Fiji
proposals would leave aircraft subject to present law, i.e.,
without any right of access in customary law and by treaty only
in the case of military craft and scheduled international air
services,143 and the straits states could deny innocent passage
both to warships144 and to some nuclear-powered ships and ships
carrying nuclear weapons.145 However, if the latter were mer-
Doc. No. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.49, III id. at 226, and the other an
amendment to L.49 by Bulgaria, German Democratic Republic and
Poland, U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.52, III id. at 228.
Certain other proposals concerned specific issues such as
the definition of straits. See discussion infra at 242-45.
U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.3, at 183 (U.K. proposal); U.N.
Doc. No. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.44 at 221 (Algeria, et a].).
143. The U.S. representative, Mr. Moore, stated that
the Chicago Convention was insufficient to protect overflight
because "first, not all states had become parties to that Con-
vention; secondly, with respect to overflight of territorial
waters by private aircraft, the Convention authorized states in
certain circumstances to restrict or suspend overflight, and
thirdly, the provisions of the Convention did not apply to over-
flight by state-owned aircraft." I! Off. Rec. 128, para. 20.
See also the Convention on International Civil Aviation,
15 U.N.T.S. 296.
144. The coastal state may require prior notification
and authorization. In any realistic sense this means that
these vessels have no access to straits as a matter of right.
However, "[f]oreign warships exercising the right of innocent
passage may be required to pass through certain sea lanes as may
be designated for this purpose by the coastal State." Whether
or not the term "right" is apt in this context, the provision
is that once permitted to pass, the warship must refrain from
any prejudicial acts. This proposal expressly provides that all
rules concerning innocent passage are applicable to warships.
Articles 15 and 16, Iii Off. Rec. at 194.
145. Article 8 (l)(a), id., states that the coastal state
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chant vessels, a term not defined in the proposal, they would be
entitled to innocent passage and passage through straits would
be presumed to be innocent.1 46
Both the Soviet and U.K. proposals provide that all air-
craft enjoy the special right of passage over straits, and nei-
ther proposal distinguishes among ships in providing special
rights for them. The Fiji proposal on ships also accords rights
to vessels without distinction (but not the right of transit
passage)147 but treats certain vessels somewhat differently.
Submarines must navigate on the surface and show their flag un-
less prior notice of passage has been given and, if required by
the coastal state, passage is confined to designated sealanes.
The U.K. and Soviet proposals permit submerged transit without
condition. In addition, Fiji would require tankers and ships
carrying nuclear or other inherently dangerous or noxious sub-
stances or materials to give prior notice of passage and to use
sealanes designated for that purpose.
The Text follows the maritime state view on this issue in
providing that all ships and aircraft are'entitled to the right
of transit passage. No distinctions are made in the Text be-
tween types or functions of vessels, except for singling out
fishing vessels for mention in connection with coastal authority
to prescribe laws for transit.1
48
(ii) The definition of a strait
All major proposals affecting straits, whether for trans-
it or innocent passage, stipulate that they must be "used for
international navigation," but Canada suggests adding the term
may require notification or authorization for these vessels.
146. According to article 22(1)"[t]he passage of foreign
merchant vessels through straits shall be presumed to be inno-
cent." Id. It is not clear how this relates to Article 8. One
interpretation might be that the coastal state could not with-
hold authorization. A more plausible interpretation is that the
presumption of innocence applies only to ships for which no au-
thorization of passage is required.
147. See, however, the discussion infra at 247-48.
which questions how much difference there is between the Fiji
conception of innocent passage and that of transit passage pro-
vided in the Single Text.
148. In providing that the coastal state may regulate
to prevent fishing, including the stowage of gear, the Text un-
derlines that fishing vessels are entitled to the right of
transit passage.
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"traditionally,'" 14 9 apparently in order to exempt straits such
as those in the Arctic area near Canada that have been seldom
used, if ever. A group of Arab states would stipulate that the
phrase itself means "customarily used." 150 Otherwise this re-
quirement of use does not operate to exclude any passageways ex-
cept those which only connect internal waters with the high seas.
In addition the U.K. would withhold the right of transit passage
in such straits and permit only innocent passage where (1) a
suitable high seas route exists in the strait and (2) a strait is
formed by an island of the coastal state and a suitable high seas
passage exists seaward of the island.
Both the U.K. and East European drafts would limit the
new right of transit passage to straits connecting areas of high
seas. In both proposals, if the strait connects the high seas
with the territorial sea of a foreign state there would be a
right of innocent passage which cannot be suspended.15l
149. U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.83, III Off. Rec. 241.
Algeria also submitted a proposal to this effect. U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.62/C.2/L.20, III Off. Rec. 198. The Canadian representa-
tive seemed to argue for the addition of this term by asserting,
incorrectly, that the ICJ in the Corfu Channel case had adopted
a frequency of use criterion for determining what straits were
"used for international navigation." The Court instead insisted
that the criterion was "essentially geographical." Of course
reference to the Corfu Channel case conveniently overlooks the
1958 Conference which rejected efforts to provide a use criterion
that referred to frequency or normalcy of use.
See HcDougal and Burke 204-14 for discussion of the Corfu
Channel case and of subsequent consideration of this point by the
International Law Commission and the 1958 Conference.
See also the comments by Chile, II Off. Rec. 138, para.
41 ff.
150. Algeria, Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, Syria, Tunisia and United Arab Emirates, U.N. Doc. No.
A/CONF.62/C.2/L.44, III Off. Rec. 221. This provision also
would limit such straits to those "connecting two parts of the
high seas," thus eliminating of the Strait of Tiran from con-
sideration.
Oman stated in regard to L.16 that Article 20 referred to
straits as defined by the ICJ in the Corfu Channel case and
therefore it did not apply to straits which historically had not
been used for international navigation. This too is a misread-
ing of that case if it suggests that the Court there stipulated
a long period of prior use. II Off. Rec. 135-36, para. 13.
151. Insofar as a strait which is used for international
navigation connects the high seas with the territorial sea of a
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The proposal of the straits states applies to a strait
which is used for international navigation and forms part of
the territorial sea of one or more states.
152
Most proposals contain provisions which leave untouched
the situation in straits which are already the subject of spe-
cific international agreement. 15 3
The Single Text basically incorporates the U.K. proposal
for the type of waterways to which transit passage and innocent
passage are applied, respectively.15 4 One very noticeable dif-
ference, however, is the addition, wherever the term "high seas"
appears, of the concept of "exclusive economic zone." This is
made necessary because of the provision elsewhere that the ex-
clusive economic zone is not part of the high seas and that the
latter refers to the sea beyond the zone. This addition might
in one Instance make a substantive difference in the type of
strait concerned, and it is worth noting in passing here (and
in more detail in the following section) that freedom of navi-
gation in the economic zone Is not necessarily the same legal
concept as freedom of navigation on the high seas. Transit
foreign state, the U.K., East European, and straits states pro-
posals concur in providing only for a right of innocent passage
which cannot be suspended. But, as noted elsewhere, the straits
states proposal differs in major respects on what is meant by
innocent passage.
152. This does not exclude straits connecting the high
seas with the territorial sea of a foreign state. See preced-
ing footnote.
153. But the strait states proposal(L.l6) contains noth-
ing on this nor does that by Fiji, L.19. The terms of the pro-
visions in the U.K. and East European provisions are somewhat
different. Compare Article 10 of Chapter III in L.3 with
Article 1(3)(c) of L.11. See also the Algerian provision L.20.
154. Several particular points deserve explicit mention.
The Text provides that the rightsof transit or innocent passage
apply in a strait although the specific area concerned might be
internal waters rather than territorial sea or economic zone.
However, this appears to be true only where the waters were
considered high seas or territorial sea prior to the drawing
of straight baselines in accordance with Article 6. Article
35 thus appears to provide for a point made by Dr. Pardo in
commenting on the results from Caracas. Pardo, supra note 119,
at 395.
Second, the Single Text does not accept the views of
Finland and Sweden that free transit ought not to apply to
straits whose status is not changed by the 12 mile limit, i.e.,
straits 6 miles wide or less. See Statements of Finland, II
Off. Rec. 124-25, and Sweden, IT- ff. Rec. 129.
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passage applies in straits used for international navigation (the
term "traditional" as proposed by Canada and Algeria is not used)
between areas of high seas or exclusive economic zones or be-
tween one and the other. However none of the provisions on
straits are applicable to such a strait if it contains a high
seas or zone route of "similar convenience." In addition,
transit passage does not extend to a strait formed by an island
of the coastal state if a high seas or zone route of "similar
convenience exists seaward of the island."
The latter situation is not particularly clear and the
addition of the zone language does not help. There are, first,
no indications of criteria for "similar convenience" in a con-
text by necessity involving a detour of some length. Second,
the use of the alternative concepts "high seas route" and "ex-
clusive economic zone route," could imply a judgment that these
are necessarily of "similar convenience," a conclusion that is
both arbitrary and unreasonable. The high seas route seaward
of an island would be at least 188 miles further seaward than
the nearest economic zone route. It does not seem very likely
that apart from the abstract judgment of those who drafted the
Text there will be found anywhere in the world a "high seas"
route in this context which is of "similar convenience," when
its use requires several hours additional sailing time, and per-
haps additional hazard. The effect of this could be to enlarge
the category of strait to which transit passage applies. 15 5 A
contrary conclusion would narrow this category.
The Text does not alter the arrangements for straits
(called "legal status" in Article 35) "in which passage is regu-
lated in whole or in part by long-standing international conven-
tions in force specifically relating to such straits."15 6
(iii) Definition of transit passage
The essential elements of the proposed new right of
transit passage through straits consist of the permissible
activity vessels may engage in during passage and the extent of
155. But of course the reverse also pertains. If it is
insisted that the high seas route is similarly convenient, even
if it means additional transit time of several hours, then the
right of transit passage applies to fewer straits.
156. Whether or not intended to do so, the addition of
the words "long-standing" would appear to rule out inter alia
any newly arranged "sweetheart" agreements between straits
states or others which would impose restrictions not counte-
nanced by the LOS treaty.
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coastal authority to prescribe and apply law relating to such
passage. The following discussion deals with these separately,
to the extent possible.
The differences among the proposals are in the different
conceptions of innocent passage offered in the two, which would
extend this right to straits, and between these conceptions and
the right of transit passage suggested by the maritime states.
Consideration of the extent of these differences may also help
to clarify the Single Text provisions.
The straits states proposal would carry over to straits
the nonexhaustive list of prejudicial activities, in effect con-
tinuing the previous broad discretion of the coastal state, and
would deny any right of access to aircraft, warships and nuclear-
powered ships and ships carrying nuclear weapons. The Fiji pro-
posal, in contrast, would recognize the right of innocent pass-
age for all ships but not aircraft, and would require submarines
to pass on the surface. The Fiji listing of prejudicial activi-
ties is also open-ended but in a somewhat less serious way.
Both the U.K. and the Soviet proposals define the right
of transit passage as the exercise of the freedom of navigation
and overflight through and over certain straits, which right is
not to be impeded. The U.K. specifies that this freedom is
"solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditious transit of
the strait," a specification that is perhaps not adequately con-
veyed by the Soviet proposal's reference to "freedom of naviga-
tion for the purpose of transit passage through the straits."
The U.K. proposal goes further in describing the meaning of the
right of transit passage to declare that ships and aircraft
"shall proceed without delay through the strait and shall not
engage in any activities other than those incident to their
normal modes of transit." The Soviet proposal seems to contain
a similar substantive point, although quite differently phrased,
in declaring that "In the event of any accidents, unforeseen
stops in the strait or any acts rendered necessary by force
majeure, all ships shall inform the coastal States of the
straits;....
The two proposals differ in some degree in forbidding
conduct relating to coastal security. The U.K. version is that
vessels and aircraft shall "refrain from any threat or use of
force in violation of the Charter of the United Nations against
the territorial integrity or political independence of an adja-
cent straits State."1 57 The Soviet version does not mention the
U.N. Charter and it also adds an open-ended list of acts pro-
157. III Off. Rec. at 186. It is difficult to see what
this adds to coastal security since the Charter prohibition ex-
ists independently in any event.
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hibited for warships: "[sihips in transit through the straits
shall not cause any threat to the security of the coastal States
of the straits, or to their territorial inviolability or politi-
cal independence. Warships in transit through such straits
shall not in the area of the straits engage in any exercises or
gunfire, use weapons of any kind, launch or land their aircraft,
undertake hydrographical work or engage in any other similar acts
unrelated to transit." The major difference here is the U.N.
Charter reference, which might be construed to narrow the pro-
scribed conduct to acts which reach a higher level of coercive
impact than in the Soviet conception. However, the U.K. pro-
posal probably covers much the same ground in ruling out any
activities not incident to the normal mode of transit. This
proscription, however, might not rule out the use of aircraft
by vessels during passage through straits, which does seem pro-
hibited by the Soviet draft.
The real question about these definitions, however, is
how much they differ from the new definitions of innocent
passage which, by listing prejudicial activities, appear to rule
out virtually everything a passing vessel could do except pass
on the surface. It might be objected that while transit passage
must not be impeded so long as the vehicle refrains from doing
any of the specifically proscribed acts, the straits state pro-
posal does not actually mention all of the proscribed acts and,
accordingly, assurance of unimpeded passage cannot be given or
derived from such provision. Although this objection is cogent
in relation to the strait state proposal, it is somewhat tenuous
when applied to the Fiji definition of innocent passage, which
is open-ended only because it refers to "any other activity not
having a direct bearing on passage." Although this might be
construed to include even the most innocuous conduct, such as a
sailor blowing his nose on deck during transit or flippinq a
cigarette over the side, it does seem to be rather precious to
distinguish between these definitions on such a thin basis. In
any event, if this item were deleted, and it should be, the two
views would be virtually the same in their conceptions of pass-
age that must be allowed.
In the end, the only substantial distinction between be-
havior during transit passage and innocent passage as defined
in the Fiji text is that the latter does not permit aircraft
overflight and does not unconditionally permit submarines to
navigate submerged. Insofar as actual conduct by vessels is
concerned, there seems to be no material difference between
transit passage and innocent passage. In practical terms the
subjectivity of innocent passage appears to have been elimi-
nated sufficiently in the Fiji text to make this concept vir-
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tually the same on this point as the right of transit passage.
The concept of transit passage in the Single Text is drawn
verbatim from the U.K. text with only minor changes. Transit
passage is the exercise of freedom of navigation and overflight
solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditious transit of
the strait. Vessels and aircraft are to proceed without delay,
refrain from threats or use of force in violation of the U.N.
Charter,158 and "refrain from any activities other than those
incident to their normal modes of continuous and expeditious
transit unless rendered necessary by force majeure or by dis-
tress." As noted, this varies from the Soviet proposal by re-
ferring to the Charter and excluding the list of acts found in
the Soviet text.
Turning to the question of prescriptions governing the
activities of vessels in transit passage, both the U.K. and
Soviet drafts severely limit the scope of coastal competence by
providing that only internationally prescribed regulations ex-
tend to transit. The U.K. draft in fact contains no provision
for any independent coastal prescriptive competence. It states
that ships in transit are to adhere to "generally accepted in-
ternational regulations, procedures and practices for safety at
sea" and for "prevention and control of pollution." While in
the U.K. proposal the coastal state may designate sealanes and
prescribe traffic separation schemes, these must first be re-
ferred to and approved by "the competent international organiza-
tion." In an article that strains credulity (and not because
the beginning clause reads "Subject to the provisions of this
article, a straits State may make laws and regulations. ."),
no independent prescriptive authority is mentioned. The only
laws and regulations the coastal state may "make" are those
mentioned in Article 3 (which deals with sealanes and traffic
separation schemes that can take effect only when and if ap-
proved by a "competent international organization") and those
which give "effect to applicable international regulations re-
garding the discharge of oil, oily wastes and other noxious sub-
stances in the strait." The meaning of these provisions is
simply that the straits states would be unable to adopt inde-
158. Article 39(1)(c). The Text adds, however, "in any
other manner in violation of the Charter of the United Nations."
It is not obvious what this adds that is helpful to the coastal
state.
A useful deletion is the reference to actions "without
. ..justification under international law," which is in the
U.K. proposal. The problem with this passage is its vagueness
and the possibility of creative interpretation it affords to
justify otherwise prejudicial acts.
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pendently any laws respecting vessels in the strait. All of
the applicable law must be found either in the LOS Convention 15 9
or other treaties.
If anything, the Soviet articles are even more restric-
tive on this score and appear to envisage very little law of any
kind to govern transit, other than the LOS treaty itself. The
coastal state 'may designate corridors suitable for transit by
all ships," but nothing is said about any obligation of compli-
ance. Another section, however, would allow the coastal state
to establish traffic separation schemes which ships must observe,
but such schemes may be implemented only "on the basis of recom-
mendations by IMCO." No mention is made of any other coastal
competence. The only reference to law, other than the treaty it-
self, is that ships shall comply with international rules on
prevention of collision between ships or other accidents. With
respect to pollution there is no reference to existing agree-
ments or to coastal law, but simply that ships are to "take all
precautionary measures to avoid causing pollution. . . or any
other damage. . . .' Supertankers are to take "special precau-
tionary measures" regarding safety of navigation and avoidance of
pollution.
The paucity of these provisions for laws regulating trans-
159. One very important provision is that providing for
State responsibility to the coastal State if a ship or aircraft
entitled to sovereign immunity acts contrary to provisions on
straits or laws and regulations adopted in accordance with
Article 41. The responsibility is for loss or damage to the
"strait State or other State in the vicinity of the Strait."
This provision differs in detail from all proposals al-
though the principle is common to all. The straits State pro-
posals and Fiji define the objects of harm to include the
coastal State and "its environment and any of its facilities,
installations or other property, or to any ship flying its
flag. . . ." Responsibility might arise from harm due to vio-
lation of "other rules of international law." U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
62/C.2/L.19 (Art. 14), III Off. Rec. at 198 (Fiji).
The U.K. proposal refers simply to "any damage to a
straits State" but the Soviet proposal mentions also "their
citizens or juridical persons." The latter proposal also ap-
pears to require that the liability of the ship be established
as well as a failure to proof before the flag state is liable.
See U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.2, id. at 186 (Art.7) (U.K.);
U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.lO, id. at 189 (Art. 1, 92(d))
(U.S.S.R.).
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it passage are of course in marked contrast to both other pro-
posals. As noted in earlier discussion these contain lists of
subjects for possible coastal laws. The straits state proposal
would permit laws regarding the passage of ships with special
characteristics; in context, this means that some of these ships
would have no right of access at all. Furthermore the coastal
competence to establish sealanes and traffic separation schemes
would be unrestricted in this conception.
The Fiji proposal on laws and regulations is a very mod-
erate one, however, and does not differ materially from either
the U.K. or Soviet drafts on the territorial sea outside
straits. The regulations it would authorize would have very
little, if any, impact on legitimate passage in the territorial
sea and, In all probability, would not affect transit passage
appreciably either. Again, it should be noted that under the
Fiji proposal the coastal authority is substantially unre-
stricted in setting up sealanes and traffic separation schemes.
Instead of prior approval by an international organization, its
recommendations are only to be taken into account.
In sum the difference between the Fiji conception of laws
applicable to straits and the maritime states are very large in
terms of the scope of coastal competence to prescribe. A sub-
stantial range of coastal laws could be prescribed, according
to the one view, while literally none, in the U.K. conception.
It is a different question whether passage would or even could
be more affected by the Fiji conception than b. the U.K.
The designation of coastal prescriptive competence in
the Text differs substantially from that in the U.K. Text but
is not as extensive as the straits states or Fiji suggest.
Coastal competence to prescribe laws and regulations for safety
of navigation and the regulation of marine traffic is limited
to that concerning sealanes and traffic separation schemes. Be-
fore acting on these measures the strait state is to refer pro-
posals to the competent international organization which may
only adopt such sealanes and schemes "as may be agreed with the
strait State, after which the strait State may designate or
prescribe them.',160 This has the effect of allowing the or-
ganization to frustrate the straits state's measure, but does
not permit it to impose another system on that state.
160. Insofar as the coastal state's participation is
concerned this does not differ from current practice of IMCO
which is to-take into account the views of all states and
parties. For discussion of this practice and recent develop-
ments see Brown and Couper, in Christy supra note 80, 288-93.
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Additional coastal laws may include those for the preven-
tion of pollution, however apparently only in order to give "ef-
fect to applicable regulations regarding the discharge of oil,
oily wastes and other noxious substances in the strait," for
fishing, and for "taking on board or putting overboard of any
commodity, currency or person in contravention of the customs,
fiscal, immigration, or sanitary regulations of the strait
State."
It is provided that laws must be nodiscriminatory among
foreign ships and, perhaps of more importance, shall not "in
their application have the practical effect of denying, hamper-
ing or impairing the right of transit passage .... i
Perhaps the most critical provision on the scope of
coastal competence is one which has the apparent effect of ex-
tending the normal laws governing events in the territorial sea.
Article 38(4) provides that "Any activity which is not an exer-
cise of the right of transit passage through a strait remains
subject to the other applicable provisions of the present Con-
vention." Among other things, this would appear to extend
coastal prescriptions to activities by a vessel which are not
within its right of exercise of transit passage. With the addi-
tion of this provision, the articles on transit passage seem to
bear a reasonable resemblance to the essential elements of the
major proposals, with the important exception of the vessel and
aircraft exclusions and special treatment of ships with special
characteristics in the straits states'and Fiji proposals.NI6
In major respects the Text is fairly close to the Fiji draft as
well as that of the U.K. and, to a lesser degree, the U.S.S.R.
Turning to the enforcement of laws and regulations in
straits, it should not be surprising to find rather laconic pro-
posals on this, in light of the severe limitations in proposals
for coastal prescriptive competence. The U.K. proposal appears
to envisage coastal enforcement of the laws and regulations on
sealanes and traffic separation systems as well as on pollu-
tion, at least so long as the latter merely give effect to in-
161. The term "other applicable provisions" seems to be
the key element here because these include the enumeration of
prejudicial acts, the provision for coastal regulatory compe-
tence, and the provision for prevention of passage which is not
innocent. Article 38(4) thus equates straits with the terri-
torial sea generally insofar as passing ships engage in any
activity other than transit passage would allow. This seems to
confirm that transit passage does not differ materially from
innocent passage except as to the questions of aircraft and
submarines.
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ternational discharge regulations. 162 It is not clear who is
to enforce regulations for safety at sea, including collision,
and prevention and control of pollution, nor is it evident from
this proposal who is to take action in the event some vessel
actually uses force in violation of the U.N. Charter. 163 Pre-
sumably the coastal state would be authorized to take enforce-
ment action, especially against a prior use of force, but this
allocation of competence is not explicitly set out in this pro-
posal.
The Soviet proposal on straits is no more forthcoming; it
contains one provision which implies severe limitations on any
enforcement action. Article 2(e) provides:
No State shall be entitled to interrupt or
suspend the transit of ships through straits,
or engage therein in any acts which interfere
with the transit of ships, or require ships
in transit to stop or communicate informa-
tion of any kind.
This combination of prohibitions, and especially the one re-
ferring to communications, probably would make any significant
enforcement impossible.
The Fiji and straits states'proposals do not make separate
provision for enforcement in straits, although the latter does
enjoin the coastal state not to hamper passage and to attempt to
ensure "speedy and expeditious passage." The basic enforcement
competence appears to be the same as in the territorial sea,
namely to prevent noninnocent passage and to enforce the coastal
laws and regulations governing events ,in this area.
The enforcement provisions of the Text are expressed in
the indirect fashion that seems to characterize provisions on
this aspect of laws concerning navigation. It is not expressly
stated who is to enforce the proscription against unlawful use
162. Article 4 does not expressly provide that the coast-
al State is authorized to enforce but this seems to be a per-
missible deduction. It does provide that the straits state may
make laws and regulations in conformity with Article 3 which
deals with sea lanes and traffic separation schemes. Paragraph
4 states that foreign ships shall comply with the laws and regu-
lations. This can be reasonably interpreted to provide for
strait state enforcement.
163. These matters are dealt with Article 2 and are not
referred to in Article 4 which concerns enforcement of specific
coastal laws.
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of force, although it can be presumed that the coastal state is
permitted to exercise self-defense and generally to take actions
permitted by the U.N. Charter. Nothing is included regarding
enforcement of safety, collision and pollution regulations al-
though, again, it is to be assumed that coastal state authority
may be exercised for this purpose in accord with the treaties
establishing these laws.
Article 41 regarding coastal laws and requlations con-
tains the provision that has often been interpreted to authorize
coastal enforcement: "Foreign ships exercising the right of
transit passage shall comply with such laws and regulations of
the coastal State." Beyond this usual treatment, however,
Article 38(4), which refers to "activity not in exercise of the
right of transit passage," would seem to extend normal coastal
enforcement competence in the territorial sea to apply coastal
laws to any activity that infrinqes such law. In this sense
full coastal enforcement authority appears to be recognized in
straits for those specified activities.
Appraisal and Recommendation
The Single Text appears to go beyond the policy recom-
mendations advanced earlier by allowing passage by submerged
submarines. Although this is in the direction of promoting in-
clusive use, and may have some safety features, it is at the
cost of denying the straits state authority over a particular
class of ship that might reasonably be perceived as a threat.
This circumstance would be unexceptionable if community in-
stitutions were adequate to protect coastal interests in terri-
torial integrity and political independence, but they are not.
In other respects the Text appears to be a combination
of suggestions that is better than any single source thereof,
whether maritime or straits oriented. The broad conception of
straits is commendable in employinq the simple criterion of use,
without qualification as to customary practice, duration, or
frequency.1 6 4 The extreme insulation of passaqe proposed by
the maritime states is considerably attenuated and more solici-
tude, displayed toward coastal interests. The concept of
"transit passage" is adopted, but the scope of coastal author-
ity to prescribe and to apply law is much greater than that de-
manded by the U.S. and U.S.S.R. and approximates the views of
the moderate straits position advocated by Fiji. Hence, even a
164. Article 37 refers to straits which "are used" for
international navigation, connoting the simple fact of use with-
out regard to time period.
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modest amendment of Fiji's territorial sea proposal would allow
for an acceptable compromise on a straits provision.
D. Ocean Areas Adjacent to the Territorial Sea
Claims to authority beyond but adjacent to the territor-
ial sea are and have been expanding over the past quarter cen-
tury.1 6 5 Essentially these claims have been directed at re-
source use, but increasingly since about 1970 assertions are
that other activities should be governed by the coastal state
exclusively. Earlier, the typical coastal state claim related
to a specific problem of use, extending coastal authority for
that particular purpose and accommodating it to minimize inter-
ference with other uses. Some proposals in the LOS negotiations,
however, go beyond this approach of use-by-use extension of con-
trol to lay claim to an area within which virtually all author-
ity would be allocated to the coastal state and the only inclu-
sive uses permitted are those specifically reserved to the com-
munity.
I. Clarification of Policy
There are two principal policy issues involved. They are
(1) the scope of coastal authority to prescribe and to apply laws
affecting passage in an area beyond the territorial sea because
such passage has or can have an effect upon coastal interests
in the area and (2) the coastal authority to make use of the
area in ways that substantially interfere with and exclude ac-
cess either of vessels or of other instrumentalities. In the
former instance it is assumed that navigation of vessels will oc-
cur and the issue concerns interference with that activity on
a vessel-by-vessel basis. In the latter instance the question
is one of priority of uses in a particular context, i.e., should
any navigation or other use for movement of objects be permitted.
With respect to the first question, the most important
factor for policy about navigation is that the community in-
terest in maintaining an efficient and smoothly functioning
global transportation system continues to be intense while the
165. It should be noted that the nature and extent of
these claims have changed in the period since 1965 because of
the continuing process of enlarging the territorial sea beyond
three and six miles. The extension of this belt to twelve miles
meant in numerous instances that special claims to limited au-
thority beyond the territorial sea were now simply an accepted
component of authority over the latter area.
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weight of coastal (exclusive) interests in this area Is less
than that experienced in areas closer to land. Transportation
by ship requires access to the region adjacent to the territor-
ial sea and use of the zone by vessels is both usual and cus-
tomary. This fact inheres in the nature of the ocean and its
use for transportation purposes. Moving from port-to-port
around the globe means that large parts of he ocean near land
masses must be utilized for this purpose.lb
While the high priority assigned to free access for trans-
port is familiar, this use is changing not only In intensity but
also in the technologies involved. The main item now being
moved around the globe is petroleum and the ships used for this
purpose have changed enormously over the past decade.167 The
principal difference is in the size of the vessels used, per-
mitting them to carry enormous quantities of bulk cargo. Oc-
casional catastrophes involving accidental discharge of oil into
the ocean coupled with large estimated intentional discharges
166. Various calculations have been made of the costs to
the U.S. of avoiding 200 mile pollution control zones. A U.S.
Treasury Study of Persian Gulf-Philadelphia and Persian Gulf-
San Francisco placed the cost, on the figures they assumed, at
8 cents and 26 cents per barrel round-trip, respectively. This
(apparently unpublished) study is entitled "Comparative Costs
for Oil Shipped by Alternative Routes from the Persian Gulf to
the United States" (May 24, 1974). A Federal Energy Office
Study set forth a fanciful scenario which appears to project a
greater discrepancy in cost. "Maritime Transportation of Energy
Study" (1974) (unpublished).
Studies limited to U.S. conditions omit a good deal. A
recent report states that tankers over 200,000 dwt and 18.9m
in draft will be banned from the Strait of Malacca. (A simi-
lar prohibition in 1972 has not been enforced.) The report
states that a diversion of Japanese tankers to Lombok Strait
would mean an 8% increase in the cost of Crude oil in Japan.
LXXX Marine Engineering/Log 10 (April 1975).
167. Bates and Yost,"Where Trends the Flow of Merchant
Ships,"supra note 60; Couper, A.D., The Geography of Sea Trans-
port, Chapter 5, Trends in Modern Shipping (1972).
But these very large crude carriers are now being laid
up in great numbers and the world tanker market is badly de-
pressed, due mainly to high oil prices leading to decreased
consumption. See Blenkey, "The Year that the Bottom Dropped
Out," LXXX Marine Engineering/Log 91 (June 15, 1975). See
also "World Shipbuilding - 1974 A Record Year; Future Looks
Grim," id., at 125.
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have increased concern among coastal states for preservation of
the marine and coastal environments. The policy question is
whether or not coastal authority to interfere with vessel move-
ment, or to preclude it altogether, ought to be recognized in
order to protect its interests. Interference might take the
form, for example, of stopping vessels for inspection, search,
and investigation either in connection with identifiable epi-
sodes of discharge or for more general purposes and, perhaps,
arrest of a vessel or officer for a violation of coastal or other
law.168
168. A study by the U.S. Federal Energy Office asserts
that many of the following forms of interference are already be-
ing experienced daily by tanker operators:
"1. Prohibition on transit of vessels of a certain cate-
gory, presumably for environmental or safety reasons:
a. Oil tankers which exceed a certain tonnage.
b. Nuclear-powered vessels, or vessels carrying
nuclear arms or radio-active materials.
c. Vessels carrying certain hazardous cargoes
(chemicals, etc.).
2. Rules and regulations for the construction or design
of vessels with which most merchant ships cannot reasonably com-
ply:
a. Requirement for double-bottomed oil tankers.
b. Requirement for segregated ballasts tankers.
c. Requirement for specific construction materials,
e.g., hull composed of certain strength steel.
3. Rules and regulations for the construction or de-
sign of vessels which can be met but which require an unavoid-
ably high cost of installation.
4. Standards for operational discharges of oil by ves-
sels which in effect require different vessel construction.
5. Operational standards and other requirements which
unjustifiably impede navigation;
a. Manning standards which would require that ves-
sel crews be certified by the coastal state itself.
b. Requirements that vessels not transit during
certain climatic conditions, or at night.
c. Requirements that vessels not exceed a certain
speed.
6. Abuse of coastal state enforcement powers for politi-
cal, economic or overzealous environmental reasons:
a. Forcing vessels to stop in order to inspect con-
struction certificates.
b. Boarding vessels for inspection purposes.
1976]
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For vessels in movement through the zone the only coastal
authority that ought to be recognized would be that to enforce
laws about intentional discharge of oil in the zone. This would
exclude any coastal interference with passage in connection with
laws relating to construction, design, manning or equipment, or
with events occurring outside the zone or unintentional dis-
charges within the zone. In all these latter cases the impact
upon inclusive use seems well out of proportion to the protec-
tion afforded to coastal interests. In fact attempts at inter-
ference with large tankers in transit may have a very undesir-
able effect not only on passage but also possibly on the in-
terest in environmental protection. The occasion for this
should be limited to the maximum extent possible.
c. Arresting vessels for supposed violations of
standards and taking them into coastal state port.
d. Detention of vessels in port pending prosecu-
tion.
e. Exorbitant fees for violations of coastal state
controls.
f. Prosecuting vessel crew for criminal charges.
g. Confiscation of cargo.
h. Demands that vessels undergo unwarranted re-
pairs at shipyard of coastal states.
7. Discriminatory treatment for political reasons of
vessels of different nations or vessels carrying different car-
goes.
8. Economic incentives for controlling navigation could
include:
a. Levying of tolls for use of area as a means to
increase domestic tax revenues.
b. Requiring use of national port facilities in
order to generate additional revenues or to en-
courage international trade.
c. Requiring use of other facilities such as re-
fineries, shipyards, etc.
9. Use of navigational controls to exact strategic,
political and other economic concessions from user states.
If coastal states have already engaged in such inter-
ference in recent years at a time when there was widespread
recognition that the legitimacy of these actions was under nego-
tiation, there is good reason to believe these actions will in-
crease when it becomes clear that the negotiation has failed."
Federal Energy Office, Maritime Transportation of Energy Study
6-8 (1974). Apparently this study is not published, nor is it
classified.
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With respect to conflicting uses, balancing the interests
at stake should recognize both the high importance of navigation
and the possibility that in some context other uses might re-
quire preference. In all instances of potential conflict there
should be no substantial impairment of effective exercise of the
freedom of navigation in the zone. This balance of interests
would permit a degree of coastal exclusive use in specific con-
texts where the effect on vessel transportation was minor either
because it is limited in time or requires only slight deviation
in course. For example, emplacement of artificial structures for
a variety of purposes ought to be a permissible activity when it
serves an important coastal interest so long as there is no
serious impact on access of vessels. It is conceivable that
some type of coastal exclusive use might even be permissible
when it works only a very short, if total, disruption of pass-
age. Provision of adequate notice would assure that the degree
of disruption could be minimized even in this circumstance.
This latter policy would extend, for example, to hazardous uses
connected with military or perhaps space operations.
The other major policy question concerns use of the sea-
bed for movement of goods or messages by pipeline and cables.
It seems appropriate to recognize a right of such use for pur-
pose of crossing the zone by other states but to defer to
coastal state authority to decide upon initial location and
routes. Once a cable or pipeline is installed the coastal
state must also be afforded such authority over its continued
use as is consistent with recognition of its paramount author-
ity over resource extraction.
2. Trend in decision
It is well known that for decades coastal states have
acted, mostly unilaterally, to extend their authority beyond
the territorial sea to deal with perceived problems which they
thought demanded such authority to safeguard local value pro-
cesses. By and large these extensions, which took a variety of
forms and served a number of different purposes, did not meet
with vigorous objection,and as time passed they came to be ac-
cepted under the general doctrine of the contiguous zone.1
69
During the period after World War II through the 1960s this
process intensified and the purposes of extending authority
169. For an account of the period through the 1960 LOS
conference, see McDougal and Burke 565 ff., especially 584-607,
612-21, 623-30.
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came to include issues of generally appreciated importance such
as the oil resources of the shelfl70 and the fisheries resources
of waters adjacent to the territorial sea. 17 1
It was clear by the time of the 1958 LOS Conference that
this unilateral process of extending coastal authority would con-
tinue if the general community of states did not devise and wide-
ly accept internationally prescribed regulations for such im-
portant matters as marine fisheries. The 1958 Conference did
not succeed in adopting any effective regulations in this re-
gard, partly because the regulations they did adopt failed to
confront the genuine problems involved. 172 Within less than a
decade, so many states had acted unilaterally to extend their
authority to acquire exclusive fishing rights that this exten-
sion just as quickly came to be regarded as customary inter-
national law.173
170. The claims to the continental shelf are of course
another form of extending limited coastal authority for particu-
lar purposes and in this sense represent only a new form of the
contiguous zone claim.
171. Claims to living resources beyond the territorial
sea were not frequent but still also not unknown before the 1958
LOS conference. See McDougal and Burke 647-50.
172. The adoption of-the Convention on Fishing and Con-
servation of the Living Resources of the High Seas has not been
widely ratified nor has it been employed as between ratifying
states. One reason for this is that the Convention does not
attempt to resolve the problem of allocating resources or the
benefits of resources, although this issue is the major divi-
sive influence concerning living resources. And, of course,
the attempt at international agreement on an exclusive fishing
zone failed, if only barely.
173. In 1966 the U.S. extended its fisheries jurisdic-
tion to 12 miles and in the process testified to the evolution
of law on this point. See Hearings before the subcommittee on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries of the Senate Committee on Com-
merce, 89th Congress, 2d Session, on Senate Bill 2218, May 18-20,
1966, Serial No. 89-65; Statements by D. MacArthur II, at 2, and
Stewart L. Udall, Secretary of the Interior, at 3.
By 1974 the I.C.J. was able to declare, in the Fisheries
Jurisdiction Case, that the concept of the fishery zone beyond
the territorial sea had "crystallized as customary law In re-
cent years arising out of the general consensus revealed" at
the 1960 Conference on the Law of the Sea, 13 Int'l Legal
Materials 1049, 1059 (1974);
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Although in this latter respect it failed, the 1958 Con-
ference did adopt several provisions extending coastal author-
ity beyond the territorial sea. The most significant of these
is the Continental Shelf Convention which provided that beyond
the territorial sea to 200 meters or to the depth admitting of
exploitation the coastal state has sovereign rights for the
purpose of exploring and exploiting the seabed and subsoil. The
Convention also made provision for accommodating these rights
with those of inclusive use of the waters above and of the sea-
bed and subsoil. It is not the purpose at this point to discuss
this agreement in detail, but simply to note that it dealt with
the problem of coastal resource use and the accommodation of
this use with navigation. Discussion of the 1975 LOS Single
Text below will point out the provisions of the 1958 Convention
which relate to navigation.
The other main provision in the 1958 Convention concern-
ing coastal competence that relates to access for navigation is
Article 24 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Con-
tiguous Zone. This article concerns the "contiguous zone"
which is used here (and also in the 1974 LOS negotiations) as a
legal concept of fixed and narrow meaning. This article states
In a zone of the high seas contiguous to its
territorial sea, the coastal State may exer-
cise the control necessary to:
(a) Prevent infringement of its customs,
fiscal, immigration or sanitary regulation
within its territory or territorial sea;
(b) Punish infringement of the above regu-
lations committed within its territory or
territorial sea.
The notion that the contiguous zone concept as formu-
lated in the 1958 treaty did, or could, express the full scope
of coastal authority beyond the 12 mile zone rested on a very
fragile basis at the time; subsequent events demonstrated this
rather quickly. As noted above, beginning in the 1960s coastal
states unilaterally adopted measures that were not accepted at
the 1958 Conference when they extended exclusive fishing au-
thority beyond the territorial sea. This movement toward satis-
fying this coastal interest no doubt re-inforced a later but
rather weak trend toward an expansion of authority for still
other purposes, principally environmental protection. The
Canadian Arctic Pollution Prevention Act is the principal im-
petus in this movement that was intended to establish new cus-
YALE STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
tomary law.17 4 By the time the Seabed Committee began prepara-
tory work for the conference, there had developed a widespread
feeling that coastal authority ought to be extended for a
variety of purposes (not limited to resources) over an extended
,area of adjacent ocean. This expansion has been sought and de-
fended not in terms of an enlarged "contiguous zone" as such but
rather as an "exclusive economic zone" or "patrimonial sea." 175
At the same time this latter label was being invented and dis-
cussed, some states continued to use the term "contiguous zone"
as a doctrinal expression for a certain scope of coastal author-
ity within a part of the economic zone.
The present purpose is not to examine the proposed eco-
nomic zone as such, but rather to take note of decisions on
comparable issues on the continental shelf and to consider LOS
proposals concerning access to the zone for navigation and other
movement. The discussion centers about, first, the general
scope of authority in the zone and shelf in relation to Inclu-
sive uses for transportation and communication, including spe-
cific provisions for safeguarding these latter uses, and, second,
more detailed provisions for accommodating inclusive with ex-
clusive uses and authority. A third subject concerns the re-
lationship between navigation rights and potential coastal au-
thority in the zone over vessel activities affecting the marine
environment.
(1) General Scope of Authority In the Zone and Inclusive Use
for Transportation and Navigation
It may be recalled that the International Law Commission
and the 1958 LOS Conference confronted the same general issue
when attempting to formulate what came to be the 1958 Convention
174. But Canadian officials and others now agree it has
not done more than bring the issue before the international
community. See statements by Alan C. Beesley and Louis Henkin
in Perspectives on Ocean Policy 352-53 (1975). The Single Text
provides that in limited circumstances, not unlike those prevail-
ing in the Arctic, the coastal State may unilaterally establish
in the economic zone "appropriate nondiscriminatory laws and
regulations for the protection of the marine environment. .....
Part 111, Article 20(5), U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.62/WP.8, at 8.
175. The economic zone concept is associated with the
African States while the patrimonial sea concept came from some
Latin American nations. The former label appears now to be
used most frequently and is employed here.
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on the Continental Shelf.17 6 The problem then, however, was a
broader one involving all inclusive or open uses of the shelf and
the waters above.17 7 The result In the 1958 Convention is com-
posed of several brief but significant provisions.
In reconciling enlarged coastal authority over the shelf
as seabed and subsoil, Article 3 of the Convention declares that
the new coastal rights "do not affect the legal status of the
superjacent waters as high seas, or that of the airspace above
those waters." The effect of this is to preserve all high seas
rights and freedoms in the waters above the shelf subject to
accommodation with coastal rights and activities. The alterna-
tive to this general formulation was to name certain specific
freedoms, such as navigation, and omit others. This choice was
rejected. 178
Since high seas rights continued to exist above the shelf,
the problem still remained of providing for their specific ac-
commodation with coastal authority. The most general provision
on this states that "[t]he exploration of the continental shelf
and the exploitation of its natural resources must not result
In any unjustifiable interference with navigation. . . ." As
noted elsewhere, this directive is quite general In nature and
provides little specific guidance to those concerned, 17 9 although
a later provision [Article 5(6)] indicates how the interests are
to be balanced in one situation by providing: "neither the in-
stallations or devices, nor the safety zones around them, may be
established where Interference may be caused to the use of
recognized sea lanes essential to international navigation."
Other, more detailed articles (discussed below) deal with ac-
commodation of navigation with fixed installations.
It can be seen that the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention
maintained the traditional legal separation of the ocean into
the territorial sea and the high seas, with nothing in between.
Thus, even as coastal authority was enlarged by the Continental
Shelf Convention to include shelf resources, and later as cus-
tomary law permitted coastal control over living resources, the
region adjacent to the territorial sea retained its character as
part of the high seas.
There is now a vigorous move to change this traditional
176. See McDougal and Burke 693-704 and sources there
cited.
177. In 1958 only narrow coastal rights to the shelf
were Involved, In contrast to the rather broad coastal author-
ity now being discussed in relation to the waters and the bottom.
178. McDougal and Burke at 703-04. This, of course, is
precisely the approach now being recommended in the Single Text.
179. Id.,at 706-09.
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conception by providing that the high seas do not Include the
region to be called the economic zone.180 Apparently the notion
of working a drastic reduction In the high seas while enlarging
coastal state authority began early In the Seabed Committee, if
not before. Certainly the formal records Indicate this view by
early 1972 when Kenya introduced its draft articles. Shortly
thereafter, the Declaration of Santo Domingo in June 1972 recom-
mended that the high seas not include the patrimonial sea. Prior
to the Caracas session, the patrimonial sea proposal by Mexico,
Colombia, and Venezuela was introduced to implement this
Declaration. This proposal clearly indicated the view that the
patrimonial sea and high seas were entirely separate areas. 18 1
Also, the Ecuador, Panama, Peru proposal, which would establish
a 200 mile territorial sea but call it an "adjacent sea," lent
some fuel to this fire by providing that the term "Interna-
tional seas" replace "high seas" and that it refer to all areas
beyond the part subject to coastal state sovereignty and juris-
diction. Moreover, the Chinese working paper, which dealt with
the territorial sea, exclusive economic zone, and continental
shelf, does not even mention the term "high seas" or any equiva-
lent thereof, would establish only a truncated version of free-
dom of navigation in the economic zone by excluding navigation
below the surface, and would recognize a far-reaching coastal
authority to regulate all activities in the zone.1 82 In another
working paper China placed the "international sea area" beyond
the limits of national jurisdiction.183
At the Caracas session the only specific proposals on
this point were by El Salvador to place the high seas beyond
the zone, 18 4 and by the U.S., expressly to extend the concept
180. There is no doubt that this effort is one component
of a broader spectrum of actions which are intended to enlarge
the rights of coastal developing nations and to diminish those
of developed countries. Mr. Njenga of Kenya spelled this out
quite explicitly during the spring 1972 meetings of the Seabed
Committee, even before proposals were made to effect the change.
U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.29 (28 March 1972).
181. There is no specific provision on this. The pro-
posal, however, has separate sections on the patrimonial sea
and high seas and each contains provision for the freedoms to
be recognized therein. U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.138/SC. I/L.21,
Articles 9 and 16.
182. U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.138/SC.Il/L.34.
183. U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.138/SC.Il/L.45.
184. There are two pertinent proposals by El Salvador
on this point. One, on the economic zone, would include pro-
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of the high seas to the economic zone. The Main Trends contained
four alternatives on this point, two of which would remove the
zone from the high seas1 8 5 and another (reflecting the Chinese
view and the Ecuador-Panama-Peru 200 mile "adjacent sea") would
provide that the "international seas" denotes the area not sub-
ject to coastal sovereignty and jurisdiction. 18 6 Only one al-
ternative embodied the present law.1 8 7
The Single Text is strongly oriented toward affirming
coastal rights in the zone at the expense of community uses. In
addition to directly subordinating community use for transporta-
tion and navigation to coastal rights, without employment of
qualifying terms protective of such uses,18 8 Article 47 coupled
with Article 73 create a no-man's land which is neither state
territory nor part of the high seas.1 9 Article 73 defines the
high seas as "all parts of the sea that are not included In the
economic zone. . . ." Article 47(2) concerning the zone Incor-
porates by reference a total of twenty articles on the high seas
and excludes only three, one of which recognizes the various
freedoms of the sea exercised on the high seas. 19 0 Given Article
vision for coastal jurisdiction over other economic uses of the
waters, residual rights and competences in the coastal state, and
"indication that the exclusive economic zone is contiguous to the
high seas." U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.60, III Off. Rec. 232.
The other proposal is on the high seas and it expressly provides
that the high seas are parts of the sea outside the exclusive
economic zone. U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.68, id.,at 235.
185. Formula B: "The waters situated beyond the outer
limits of the patrimonial sea - economic zone - constitute an
international area designated as high seas. Formula D: "The
term 'high seas' means all parts of the sea that are not included
in the internal waters, the territorial sea, or the exclusive
economic zone of a State."
Provision 136, AfCONF.62/C.2/WP.l, id.,at 84.
186. Formula C: "The term tinternational seas' shall de-
note that part of the sea which is not subject to the sovereign-
ty and jurisdiction of the coastal State." Ibid.
187. Formula A: "The term 'high seas' means all parts of
the sea that are not included In the territorial sea or in the
internal waters of a State." Ibid.
188. See infra TAN 203.
189. For further discussion see the text infra at 281-84.
190. Article 75 is a new version of Artic-le2 of the
High Seas Convention. Articles 98 and 99 are directed at parts
of the ocean beyond the economic zone.
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73, it is sensible that Article 47(2) would exclude high seas
freedoms as such from the zone, even when these are subject to
the qualification in Article 47(2), "insofar as they are not
incompatible with the provisions of this Part."
Article 47(4) strongly underscores the priority attached
in this Text to coastal interests by declaring that in exercis-
ing rights to navigation and overflight "States shall have due
regard to" coastal rights and duties and shall also "comply with
the laws and regulations enacted by the coastal State in con-
formity with the provisions of this Part and other rules of in-
ternational law." The emphasis is upon the need to defer to
coastal rights and duties and laws and regulations. Article 45
does require the coastal state to have due regard to the rights
of other states, but these are elsewhere made subject to the
rights of the coastal state. 191
Turning to provisions expressly dealing with navigation,
beginning with the introduction of the first draft articles on
the economic zone in 1972 by Kenya,192 most proposals contained
provisions to protect free navigation and overflight in the
area.193 Even proposals which either created a 200-mile terri-
torial seal9 4 or left the width to coastal discretion195 sought
to provide some formula that at least appeared to safeguard the
general community's interest in transportation by vessel and
plane.
191. Article 45 thus offers cold comfort to those con-
cerned about community rights in the zone. The rights to which
Article 45 says the coastal state owes due regard are those which
are already qualified by subjection to coastal rights. Thus,
"due regard" would apparently mean whatever the coastal state
wants it to mean.
192. U.N. Doc. NO. A/AC.138/SC.II/L.10, 1972 Rep. at 180.
193. The purpose in making such provision for the eco-
nomic zone was at least twofold. First, there is a genuine need
,to protect navigation in the economic zone and such provision
takes that into account. Second, and perhaps more important is
the context, the careful affirmation of freedom of navigation in
the zone is intended to demonstrate that it is community, not
coastal state, rights which need explicit mention. This further
demonstrates that it Is coastal authority in the zone which is
,plenary and dominant. In other words affirming some high seas
freedoms, without calling them that, is a means of confirming
that the area is not high seas. See the statement by Mr. Njenga,
!1 Off. Rec. 183, -para. 18.
194. Uruguay [U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.138/SC.II/L.24];
Ecuador, Panama and Peru [U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.138/SC.II/L.27],
1973 Report III 23, 30.
at 71. 195. China, U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.138/SC.II/L.34, 1973 
id.
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A difficulty faced even by the most vigorous supporters of
freedom of navigation arose from the general scope of authority
being conferred on the coastal state in the zone. The problem
was to provide protection for navigation and overflight while
recognizing coastal predominance in resource (and sometimes
other) uses. A number of approaches to this were promoted. One
is illustrated in the proposal by Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela
(SC.It, L.21) that in the patrimonial sea ships and aircraft
shall enjoy the right of freedom of navigation and overflight
"with no restrictions other than those resulting from the exer-
cise by the coastal State of its rights within the area." 19
6
Another formula, in contrast, contained a much narrower state-
ment of coastal state rights. 19 7 Despite these differences the
notion was clear that coastal states' rights were paramount and
could involve restrictions of an unidentified nature on freedoms
of navigation and overflight.
At the -Caracas session a proposal by an influential group
of coastally oriented states offered a somewhat clearer expres-
sion of the intent of this approach to subordinate community, to
coastal interests. Article 14 of this working paper declared:
In the economic zone, ships and aircraft of all
States, whether coastal or not, shall enjoy free-
dom of navigation and overflight subject to the
.exercise by the coastal State of its rights with-
in the area, as provided for in this Convention.19 8
The following article serves to emphasize the view that coastal
rights have higher priority by providing that "the coastal state
shall exercise its rights and perform its duties in the economic
zone without undue interference with other legitimate uses of
the sea . ..." No criteria are offered for determining what
196. U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.I38/SC.II/L.IO, 1973 Report
III 19. This leaves the content of coastal rights unspecified
and open-ended.
197. Argentina suggested that the right to free naviga-
tion and overflight should be "without restrictions other than
those that may result from the exercise by the coastal State of
its rights in the matters of exploration, conservation and ex-
ploitation of resources, pollution and scientific research."
U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.138/SC.II/L.37 and Corr.l, 1973 Rep. III 80.
198. Canada, Chile, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Mauritius,
Mexico, New Zealand and Norway, U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.62/L.4,111
Off. Rec. 82. For valuable discussion of the introduction of
this proposal, and of the Caracas session generally, see Miles,
"An Interpretation of the Caracas Proceedings," in Christy et al.,
supra note 80, at 39.
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'fundue interference" might be.199
Another conception of a way to emphasize the primacy of
coastal rights was offered by Nigeria. This proposal affirms
that all states have the rights of freedom of navigation and
overflight in the economic zone200and declares that the coastal
state "is under an international duty not to Interfere without
reasonable justification" with these freedoms.201 No criteria
are offered for "reasonable justification," and it is worth
noting that the interference contemplated here is not expressly
tied to coastal rights over resources and other activities.
Another proposal which places strong emphasis on coastal
rights is that by a large group of African States. Article 5,
paragraph 2, of this proposal states that in the zone all states
"shall enjoy" freedom of navigation and overflight and that these
freedoms shall be exercised "in such a manner as not to inter-
fere with the rights and interests of the coastal State."#202 In
introducing this proposal, although not claiming to speak for
all sponsors because of lack of time to consult, Mr. Warioba of
Tanzania emphasized the subordinate nature of the freedoms men-
tioned in Article 5 by stating that this Article "ensured that
in the future they would be regulated freedoms.",203 This ap-
pears to be an interpretation of Article 5(2).
The U.S. and U.S.S.R. proposals stress protection of free-
dom of navigation and overflight, but the former may have strong-
.er emphasis. It simply states that coastal rights in the zone
"shall be exercised without prejudice to the rights of all other
States. ; . as recognized in this Convention and In internation-
al law," including the freedoms of navigation and overflight.20
4
The phrase beginning "as recognized" appears to refer to the
rights of other states. The U.S. proposal in Article 7 states
199. Nor did formal discussions amplify on the question
of accommodating the freedoms mentioned with coastal rights.
I Off. Rec. 202-03, II Off. Rec. 149 ff.
200. U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.21/Rev.I, III Off.
Rec. 199, Article 2.
201. Article 3, ibid. Israel commented that this was a
"catchall phrase" which "could open the door to all sorts of
abuses." II Off. Rec. 179, para. 120.
202. U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.82, III Off Rec. 240.
203. I! Off. Rec. at 297, para. 11.
204. U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.38, III Off. Rec. 214.
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that "Nothing in this chapter shall affect the rights of freedom
of navigation and overflight, and other rights recognized by the
general principles of international law, except as otherwise
specifically provided in this Convention."2 05 This affirmation
requires reference to and Interpretation of other provisions.
The following article, however, would limit the scope of coastal
authority to affect other uses: "The coastal State shall exer-
cise its rights and perform its duties in the economic zone
without unjustifiable interference with navigation or other uses
of the sea, and ensure compliance with applicable International
standards established by t e appropriate international organiza-
tions for this purpose.oi2Ob The Implication of this is that the
coastal state does not have discretion to determine how it may
affect navigation and other community uses in the zone while
carrying out its own rights but must follow internationally pre-
scribed standards. The theory of this arrangement is commend-
able, but it does not mention what the coastal state Is ex-
pected to do or can do while awaiting action by the "appropriate
organization" to guide its decision-making. It could be a long
wait.
The Single Text adapts the coastal state approach of L.4
to the problem of the accommodation of rights in the zone.
Article 47(1) states:
"All States, whether coastal or landlocked,
shall, subject to the relevant provisions of
the present Convention, enjoy In the exclusive
economic zone the freedoms of navigation and
overflight and of the laying of submarine
cables and pipelines and other internationally
lawful uses of the sea related to navigation and
communication." (emphasis added)207
The subjection of navigation to coastal rights is reinforced by
Article 470) which declares that states exercising their rights
in the zone "shall comply with the laws and regulations enacted
by the coastal state in conformity with the provisions of this
Part and other rules of international law." It may be recalled
205. U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.47, III Off. Rec. 222.
206.- Id.
207. T-is provision not only gives priority to coastal
rights but it circumscribes other rights by limiting other law-
ful uses to those related to navigation and communication.
This is in contrast to the U.S. and Soviet references to other
rights recognized by international law. In the Single Text pro-
vision there are no such other rights except as they relate to
navigation and communication.
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-that the phrase "States shall comply with the laws and regula-
tions" is commonly taken to mean that the coastal state may
enforce its laws. Since according to paragraph I the freedom
0Fnavigation is a right in the zone, Article 47(4) appears to
confer on the coastal state an authority, even beyond that de-
rived from Article 45, to promulgate and to enforce laws and
regulations for navigation and overflight in the economic zone.
(i) Specific arrangements for accommodating inclusive use
Cables and Pipelines
Cables continue to be critically important means of com-
munication across the vast distances of the earth's surface, and
it is still necessary to protect their use. For much shorter
distances pipeline transmission of commodities is also highly
useful, if not essential, and its employment also warrants
proper safeguard.
The general principle of freedom to lay cables and pipe-
lines under the ocean has long been accepted in international
law without any question. The problem of reconciling these in-
strumentalities with coastal use of the shelf for seabed and
subsoil exploration and exploitation arose very early in the
consideration of the shelf issue, even prior to the discussion
of the matter In the International Law Commission. 208 The
recommendation of the Commission was ultimately adopted by the
1958 LOS Conference, with only the addition of the word "pipe-
lines":
Subject to its right to take reasonable measures
for the exploration of the continental shelf and
the exploitation of its natural resources, the
coastal State may not impede the laying or main-
tenance of submarine cables on the continental
shelf.
The precise operational meaning of this language has not ap-
parently been the subject of controversy. The Commission in
its deliberations expressed or heard the view that the coastal
state could determine the route to be followed by cables, but
if an existing instrumentality had to be moved before exploita-
tion could be undertaken this would be at the expense of the
coastal state. 20 9 It is unknown whether these expectations have
been generally recognized and acted upon.
There are few differences among the current LOS proposals
208. McDougal and Burke 704-06.
209. Id. at 705.
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concerning the cables and pipelines in the economic zone and
continental shelf. All proposals appear to recognize freedom to
lay cables and pipelines in the zone or on the shelf, subject to
the rights of the coastal state. China noted a need for coastal
consent to the route 210 but this Is generally understood to be a
condition implicit in and compatible with the freedom involved.
The U.S. zone and shelf proposal repeats in Article 29(1)
the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention provision which affirms the
priority of the coastal state's rights to explore and exploit,
but also declares that it "may not impede the laying or main-
tenance of submarine cables and pipelines on the continental
shelf."'2 1 1 Article 29(2) appears, in part at least, unneces-
sarily to emphasize the obvious, although perhaps It also use-
fully clarifies the relationship between coastal authority over
"installations" and, over cables and pipelines.
2 12
The Single Text refers to cables and pipelines in the zone
in the articles on the shelf, where the latter is defined to ex-
tend from the territorial sea "throughout the natural prolonga-
tion of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental
margin" or to 200 miles where the shelf does not extend that
far. 2 13 In an apparent effort to accommodate as many as possible,
the Text is more extensive than the 1958 Treaty and expresses
what appears to have been assumed in the latter. Thus Article 65
both declares that states are "entitled" to lay cables and pipe-
lines on the shelf and that the coastal state may not impede
such activity, subject to its right "to take reasonable measures"
concerning exploration and exploitation and (a new addition) pre-
vention of pollution from pipelines. Article 65(3) states that
coastal consent is necessary for the course of pipelines but does
not mention cables. Article 65(4) is the same as the U.S. pro-
posal mentioned in the paragraph above but refers more broadly
to the "operations of artificial islands, installations and
structures under its jurisdiction."
Article 65(5) concerns the problem of existing cables
and pipelines and the installation of new ones. The meaning
is not clear. States are to "pay due regard to cables and pipe-
210. U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.138/SC.II/L.34, 1973 Rep. 111,
P. 73.
211. U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.47, III Off. Rec. 225.
212. "Nothing in this article shall affect the jurisdic-
tion of the coastal State over cables and pipelines constructed
or used in connexion with the exploration or exploitation of its
continental shelf or the operations of an installation under its
jurisdiction, or its right to establish conditions for cables or
pipelines entering its territory or territorial sea." Id.
213. Article 62.
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lines already in position" and shall not prejudice "possibili-
ties of repairing existing cables or pipelines." Presumably this
directive establishes liability in the event that any prejudice
is caused. The "due regard" requirement similarly indicates a
priority position for the pre-existing facilities.
Artificial Islands and Installations2l'f
With the exception of that of the U.S., proposals for
accommodating installations in the economic zone with navigation
are quite brief, almost perfunctory. 21 5 The amount of attention
devoted to this-topic appears to reflect the degree of concern
over navigation as opposed to coastal resource interests. The
African proposal (L.82) provides simply that the coastal state
can establish safety zones around offshore islands and installa-
tions within which it can regulate, while Nigeria (L.21) pro-
vides that In safety zones a coastal state may "take appropri-
ate measures to ensure safety of installations and of navi-
gation." The slightly more elaborate East European zone pro-
posal (L.38) would place limitations on coastal authority. Ac-
cording to this proposal international standards are to govern
the breadth of the safety zones and also navigation which, though
beyond the limits of the safety zones, is close to installations
and other facilities.
The U.S. proposal (L.43) authorizes safety zones which are
to be "reasonably related to the nature and function of the In-
stallation."2 16 The breadth of those zones is to conform to ex-
isting international standards or to those prescribed by IMCO and,
where no standards apply, the zones are to be 500 meters around
installations for exploration and exploitation of the non-
renewable resources of the seabed and subsoil. No breadth is
mentioned concerning other types of installations contemplated
in these articles. As in the Soviet proposal, international
214. The discussion here does not consider the whole
question of regulating these instrumentalities but is limited
to the question of accommodating their use with navigation.
215. U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.138/SC.II/L.21 (Colombia,
Mexico, Venezuela), 1973 Rep. 11, 19; U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.138/
SC.Il/L.37 (Argentina); id. at 79; U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.62/C.2/
L.21/Rev.! (Nigeria), lIT-off. Rec. 199; U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.
62/C.2/L.38 (Bulgaria et al.), id. at 214; U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.
62/C.2/L.82 (Gambia et-l.T, id-.at 240.
216.' U.N. DocC. No. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.47 (U.S.A.), III Off.
Rec. at 225.
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standards are to govern "regarding navigation outside the safety
zones but in the vicinity of such offshore installations." As in
the 1958 Convention, "[i]nstallations and safety zones around
them may not be established where interference may be caused to
the use of recognized sealanes essential to international navi-
gation." Provision is also made for due notice of construction,
warning signals, and removal of installations.
The Single Text provisions draw mainly upon the U.S. and
Soviet proposals. The coastal state can fix the breadth of
safety zones but cannot exceed 500 meters "except as authorized
by generally accepted international standards or as recommended
by the appropriate international organizations." Other para-
graphs of Article 48 do not differ in any material way from the
U.S. proposal insofar as they relate to navigation.
(iii) Scope of coastal authority over vessel source pollution
Apart from treaty there is no general expectation that a
coastal state may lawfully prescribe and apply policy concerning
marine pollution beyond the territorial sea. 21 7 Article 24 on
the contiguous zone is interpreted by some as authorizing such
coastal competence,21 8 and the Continental Shelf Convention con-
tains a minimal recognition of a limited coastal authority around
217. See generally Bilder, "The Canadian Arctic Waters
Pollution Prevention Act: New Stresses on the Law of the Sea,"
69 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1970); Henkin, "Arctic Anti-Pollution: Does
Canada Make--Or Break--International Law?," 65 Am. J. Int'l L.
131 (1971); O'Brien and Chapelli, "The Law of the Sea in the
Canadian Arctic: The Pattern of Controversy," 19 McGill L.J. 322,
477-98 (1973) for an examination of the Canadian pollution con-
trol in the Arctic.
218. The United States appears to have acted on this as-
sumption. 84 Stat. 91.
It is probably irrelevant what Article 24 expressly pro-
vides. One court has now interpreted the Convention to be per-
missive and not restrictive, such that States are free to es-
tablish zones for other purposes. US v. F/V Taiyo Maru, U.S. v.
Masatoshi Kawaguchi, U.S.D.C. Maine, Southern Division, Civil No.
74-101-SD, Criminal No. 74-46-SD (1975).
In any case it is as obvious now as it was In 1960 that
the attempt to provide rigid limitations on extension of coastal
authority for specific purposes was not to succeed. See
McDougal and Burke 604-07.
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its shelf installations.2 19 Generally speaking the interna-
tional agreements on this point provide for enforcement measures
by flag states, although the 1973 Convention on the Prevention
of Pollution provides for coastal enforcement within its "juris-
diction" as defined by applicable treaty or by customary inter-
national law.
22 0
219. Article 5(7) provides that "The coastal State is
obliged to undertake, in the safety zones, all appropriate
measures for the protection of the living resources of the sea
from harmful agents." In commentary upon the extreme concern
thus displayed for possible pollution, it was noted in 1962 that
"This significant provision awaits its appropriate interpreta-
tion." McDougal and Burke 713. States now consider that it
might be helpful to undertake appropriate measures even outside
a 500 meter safety zone. Part III, Article 48 of the Single
Text deals with prescriptive competence on this point.
220. For a recent review of features of agreements, see
"Report of the Special W.orking Group of the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York on Jurisdiction over Vessel Source
Pollution" (March 13, 1975); U.S. Department of State, Draft En-
vironmental Impact Statement, Existing Controls on Vessel Pollu-
tion 57-81 (1974); Burke, Woodhead, and Legatski, National and
International Law Enforcement in the Ocean 19 ff7npress,
1975). 1
Data concerning flag state or coastal state enforcement
is exceedingly difficult to locate. Information reported to
I.M.C.O. recarding penalties imposed by states is very uneven
in quality and content. See, e.g., I.M.C.O. "Reports on prosecu-
tions for contraventions of the International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil," 1954 (as amended
1962) containing reports from Australia, Canada, Chile, Hong
Kong, Ireland and Italy. I.M.C.O. Doc. No. MEPC/Circ.17,
30 May 1975.
The difficulties of successful enforcement probably ac-
count for the lack of information on efforts. The observations
by the United Kingdom in Committee III are revealing:
"Additionally, in the case of pollution offences, you
have the problem of violations at sea, and what action one
can take. The enforcement of discharge regulations is par-
ticularly difficult.
"The UK is very active in trying to bring prosecutions
both on its own ships and on foreign ships in its territorial
waters on entering UK ports, and by pursuing cases with foreiqn
governments. We have wide powers and can impose very heavy
penalties. But despite that we have been unable to get suffi-
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It is not intended here to discuss in detail the issues
of vessel source pollution and coastal state jurisdiction to
prescribe and to apply policy. 22 1 The subject is dealt with
rather generally in economic zone proposals considered by Com-
mittee II but the burden of this work has been in Committee III
where marine pollution is one of the major agenda items.
The gist of the problem so far as navigation might be af-
fected concerns the scope of coastal authority in the zone to
prescribe for construction standards and for discharge of pol-
lutants and the extent of coastal authority to enforce appli-
cable standards relating to either construction or discharge.
Three different positions seem apparent in pollution pro-
visions found in proposals for the economic zone. At one end of
the spectrum are proposals most favorable to coastal state in-
terests and these provide that the coastal state has exclusive
jurisdiction to prescribe and to enforce measures for prevention
and control of pollution. 22 2 Although these provisions do not
spell out their applicability to vessel source pollution, there
is no basis for believing this source is excluded from the am-
bit of such provision.
Another approach is to provide that the freedom of navi-
gation is subject to rights in the zone and to include among
these rights that of taking the necessary measures to prevent
marine pollution. 2 23 Sometimes this approach is used along with
provision for exclusive coastal jurisdiction concerning marine
pollution in the zone.22
4
cient evidence for many successful prosecutions in the UK or by
a foreign government. In the last five years we were able to
link 203 spillages off our coasts with particular vessels out
of the 900 spillages sighted, but there were only 18 successful
prosecutions at home or abroad as a result.
"Thus we must get the matter into perspective. The great
bulk of enforcement happens before a ship commits a violation:
bringing successful prosecutions is, and can only be, a tiny
fraction of the total picture." Statement by Sir Roger Jackling
in the Third Committee, 26 March 1975, at 4.
221. For views on specific policies see Burke, Woodhead,
and Legatski, at 75-86, 102-111.
222. See, e.g., U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.138/SC.II/L.l0, 1972
Rep. 180 (Kenya); U7. Doc. No. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.21/Rev.l
(Nigeria), III Off. Rec. 199; U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.82
(African States), id. at 240.
223. E.g., U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.138/SC.II/L.21, 1973 Rep.
III, at 19 (Nigeria).
224. E.g., U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.138/SC.II/L.40, 1973 Rep.
III, at 87 (Algeria et al.).
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A third approach, most solicitous of the community in-
terest in free navigation, is to provide that the coastal state
authority is limited to prescriptions which are in accord with
international agreements or standards or are permitted by the
anticipated LOS Convention itself. Coastal enforcement would
be limited to that provided for in the LOS Agreement itself.
The U.S. proposal2 2 5 illustrates this approach.
Committee III is the forum to which states have presented
their detailed pollution proposals. Here it suffices to note
that these range, in similar fashion to the general provisions
in the economic zone proposals, from heavy emphasis on coastal
state authority for both prescription and application of laws in
the zone, to recognition of only internationally prescribed regu-
lation with no coastal enforcement action in the zone at all.
Some intermediate proposals recognize coastal competence to pre-
scribe and to enforce in the zone in specific and limited situ-
ations.226
The Single Text in Committee III devotes substantial at-
tention to the pollution issue. Its greater weight is on the
navigational interest rather than that of the coastal state's
concern over pollution.2 27
Provisions concerning the setting of standards in the
economic zone are not models of clarity. As a general proposi-
tion, the prescriptions for the economic zone are to be es-
tablished by international agreement. Article 20 is the pro-
vision that deals with standards for vessel source pollution.
In paragraph I it is provided that "States, acting through the
competent international organization or by general diplomatic
conference, shall establish as soon as possible and to the ex-
tent that they are not already in existence, international rules
and standards for the prevention, reduction and control of the
marine environment from vessels." Flag states are also, ac-
cording to paragraph 2, to establish "effective" prescriptions
for this same purpose, containing requirements that are "no
less effective than generally accepted international rules and
standards referred to in paragraph 1."
Paragraphs 4 to 6 concern the economic zone; they es-
225. U.N. Doc.No. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.47, III Off. Rec. 222.
226. The numerous proposals are reviewed in some detail
in Burke, Woodhead and Legatski, supra note 220, at 75-86.
227. Statement of Richard Frank, Hearings Before the
National Ocean Policy Study Subcommittee of the Senate Committee
on Commerce on the Geneva Session of the Third United Nations
Law of the Sea Conference, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 57 (June 3-4,
1975).
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tablish a measure, not altogether certain or clear, of coastal
prescriptive competence that (presumably) can be enforced by
that state. Paragraph 5 is particularly in need of clarifica-
tion or revision if it is considered desirable to provide for
extension of coastal law to the zone. It appears to be in-
tended to allow the coastal state to promulgate discharge regu-
lations, although the term "measures for prevention of pollution
from vessels" is not necessarily so limited, when certain condi-
tions are met. However the paragraph does not actually say the
coastal state may so prescribe. Rather, it says that in the ab-
sence of any, or any adequate, internationally agreed rules and
standards to meet "special circumstances," and where the coastal
state reasonably believes a part of its zone needs special manda-
tory measures because of specific conditions,228 such a state
"may apply to the competent international organization for that
area to be recognized as a 'special area."' But the paragraph
does not say what happens if this recognition is conferred.
2L 9
Apparently it is intended that in such a designated area the
coastal state can adopt preventive measures, but it might also
be intended that these be promulgated by the competent organiza-
tion. In fact a private proposal,made available to the Committee
Chairman and selected delegations, and from which paragraph 5 is
drawn, has a further paragraph, not carried over into the Single
Text, which calls for just such adoption of international regula-
tion for the special area.2 3 0 But in the Text the more reason-
able interpretation appears to be that the coastal state is com-
petent to act. This appears especially persuasive in light of
paragraph 6 which provides:
228. These conditions are: "for recognized technical
reasons in relation to its oceanographical and ecological con-
ditions its utilization, and the particular character of its
traffic." Apparently there should be a comma after "conditions"
but I would not swear to this. The draftsmanship at this point
is rough.
229. The sequence of acts simply stop-at the point of
application, as if it is simply to be assumed that coastal pre-
scriptive competence somehow automatically follows.
230. Article 33: ". . . States, acting through the com-
petent international organization, shall adopt as soon as possi-
ble and to the extent they are not already in existence, inter-
national regulations for the prevention, reduction and control
of pollution by vessels in all 'special areas' recognized as
such in application of the above paragraph." "Draft Articles Re-
lating to the Rights Which May Be Exercised by Coastal States to
Prevent Marine Pollution:'dated 2 May 1975.
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Laws and regulations established pursuant to
the internationally agreed rules and standards
referred to in paragraph 4 of this Article,
shall not become applicable in relation to
foreign vessels until six months after they
have been notified to the competent interna-
tional organization.
This seems to assume adoption of laws by the coastal state, at
least where the internationally agreed rules and standards are
inadequate.2 31
However ambiguous is paragraph 4, the next one clearly
establishes that under some circumstances, not coextensive
with those mentioned in paragraph 4, the coastal state is com-
petent to legislate unilaterally for pollution In the zone. It
reads:
Nothing in this Article shall be deemed to af-
fect the establishment by the coastal State
of appropriate non-discriminatory laws and
regulations for the protection of the marine
environment in areas within the economic zone,
where particularly severe climatic conditions
create obstructions or exceptional hazards to
navigation and where pollution of the marine
environment, according to accepted scientific
criteria, could cause major harm to or ir-
reversible disturbance of the ecological bal-
ance.
The limited scope of coastal authority conferred by paragraph 5
is worth emphasis. The laws are to be non-discriminatory and
are to relate to areas within the zone, not to all of that zone.
The only occasion for coastal enactments is 'where particularly
severe climatic conditions create obstructions or exceptional
hazards to navigation," which is not a widespread condition
around the globe. In addition the coastal state, it would ap-
pear, could provide relevant law only where shipping in the
area carried cargo or substances that could cause "major harm
or irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance." The
combination of these circumstances is likely to be extremely
localized, so that the authority conferred is not relevant for
most coastal states.
Turning to the Text articles on enforcement, none of the
numerous provisions expressly confer such authority on the
231. Nothing is said about the time of coming into force
of coastal laws where there are no internationally agreed rules
and standards, which is the other contingency envisaged by
paragraph 4.
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coastal state, to be exercised in the economic zone through
exclusive laws and regulations pursuant to Article 20(4) and (5).
Indeed it seems likely, to the extent that these obscure provi-
sions yield to meaningful interpretation, that coastal states
are accorded very little competence to take enforcement action
in the economic zone. Not one single article on vessel source
pollution deals with coastal enforcement action of national
laws in the economic zone, although Article 20 would permit
coastal prescription in the limited circumstances there speci-
fied.
2 32
Articles 30 and 31 do deal with enforcement measures in
the economic zone but only in respect of international rules
and standards.2 33 Article 30 permits the coastal state to re-
quire a vessel in the zone to give certain information (its
identification, port of registration, last and next ports of
call, and any other information required by the relevant in-
ternational regulation), where it has reasonable grounds to be-
lieve a vessel has violated international rules and standards
on discharges. This is the only step permitted to the coastal
state in this situation except for two instances, provided in
232. Article 20(4)-(6) can be interpreted to cover both
prescription and application although Chapter Six, in which they
are found, is entitled "Standards" and Chapter Seven is supposed
to deal with "Enforcement."
It perhaps needs special note that the text statement re-
fers only to coastal prescriptions embodying local policy and
not to international rules and standards which are embodied in
coastal law. In this latter situation there are modest actions
permitted the coastal state which aim at effective enforcement.
233. Articles 27 and 28 appear to deal with port state
and coastal state territorial sea competence respectively. The
latter includes a competence to arrest not only for violations
by foreign flag vessels in the coastal state's territorial sea
but also for certain violations in a requesting state's terri-
torial sea or economic zone. However proceedings beyond arrest
can be pre-empted by the flag state by commencing proceedings
during a 6-month period, or thereafter, by commencing proceed-
ings before the coastal state has done so. It is not clear how,
if at all, these provisions accord with Articles 16 and 18 con-
cerning innocent passage and coastal prescriptive competence.
According to Article 16 "any act of wilful pollution, contrary
to the provisions of the present Convention" is prejudicial, but
Article 28, Part III, refers to pollution in another's area of
jurisdiction. Article 18 confers regulatory authority only for
'preservation of the environment of the coastal State," not for
some other State's.
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Article 31, In which the vessel may be stopped and boarded for
inspection: where the "violation has been of flagrant character
causing severe damage or threat of severe damage to the marine
environment, or the vessel is proceeding to or from the Internal
waters of the coastal state." If the violation Is actually con-
firmed the coastal state cannot take further action, other than
to inform the next port of call which can arrest 'the vessel. 234
This latter procedure can apparently be requested by a coastal
state for any violation of discharge regulations in the eco-
nomic zone, not just those which threaten or cause severe dam-
age. But except as noted, the coastal state is not authorized
to take enforcement action In the economic zone. It is fair to
say that the only other significant enforcement action is ar-
rest and trial. The occasions for this are limited to appre-
hension of vessels which are in the territorial sea or are vol-
untarily In port, although the events may have occurred In Its
economic zone or that of some other state.2 3 5
Appraisal and Recommendation
If the Single Text proposed by the Committee II Chairman
in Geneva truly reflects the consensus in the conference, there
are ample grounds to fear that the continued effective use of the
ocean for transportation may be in some jeopardy.236 These
grounds are as follows: (1) the economic zone to be created by
-the treaty will not be a part of the high seas and, therefore,
rights of navigation and any other high seas freedom would not
be available as part of customary law; (2) any community uses
which will be recognized will be subject to coastal rights es-
tablished In the Convention; and (3) it would appear that rights
of navigation will be subjected to coastal regulation inde-
234. Article 27(3) allows for port state arrest for a
discharge "in the area extending to X miles from the baseline
from which the territorial sea is measured. . . ." Presumably
this means such an area anywhere and not just that of the port
state.
235. It is not clear that these provisions permit the
coastal state to arrest in its territorial sea for violations
in its own economic zone although it may arrest there for viola-
tions in another state's zone. This interpretation seems un-
likely, but Article 31 in conjunction with Article 28 lend them-
selves to this view. Perhaps Article 28(1) is intended to take
care of this situation.
236. An especially useful analysis of the problems in
recognizing coastal rights and preserving freedoms is the state-
ment of Mr. Jeannel of France, 11 Off. Rec. 184-86.
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pendent even of the coastal rights otherwise conferred upon that
state.
Comment upon the first difficulty noted above Is reserved
to the section on the high seas which follows. The hazards of
subjecting navigation to coastal rights in the zone, as estab-
lished In Article 45, is that the implementation of this by the
coastal state is left without any guidance from the Convention
other than the obligation to have due regard for the duties of
other states. It would be for each coastal state to determine
for itself how to mesh its new bundle of sovereign rights and
exclusive jurisdiction with navigation in the zone, having only
the understanding that the latter is subject to the former and
that "due regard" should be shown in exercising coastal rights
and jurisdiction. It is not clear what amount of interference
and Inconvenience, or perhaps worse, can be inflicted while
still having due regard for another's rights. A greater solici-
tude for community rights than this does not seem unreasonable.
The recognition in Article 47(4) of a coastal regulatory
authority affecting navigation even beyond its other rights In
the zone raises serious questions. It may be that poor draft-
ing Is responsible for this apparent grant of authority. Whe-
ther or not this is the case, nothing in desirable policy has
been suggested which would support this.allocation of compe-
tence.
The Single Provisions on pollution confer some, but very
little, authority on the coastal state to extend its laws into
the zone for environmental purposes. Article 45 in Part II
recognizes coastal jurisdiction, but it is non-exclusive and,
in accordance with the allocation of tasks to Committees, left
without specification in this Part. The text in Committee III
leaves a strong impression of hasty preparation which may ac-
count for its lack of clarity in allocating authority. The
provision for a limited prescriptive competence in the zone,
whose aim is commendable, is muddled and the section on en-
forcement contains nothing on the allocation of authority to
apply coastal law. Generally speaking the pollution provisions
are tied very strongly to international prescriptions, and the
only enforcement competence is for application of international
measures. Desirable policy, balancing environmental and navi-
gation concerns, would recognize somewhat greater coastal au-
thority than these articles permit, but insofar as unimpeded
navigation is concerned they cannot be faulted.
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E. Claims to Use of the High Seas for Transportation
and Communication
1. Clarification of Policy
There can be no serious question that it continues to be
in the community interest to provide for shared and unimpeded ac-
cess to the high seas for transportation by vessel and aircraft
and for communication by cables. It similarly continues to be
in the common interest not to tie freedom of use to specific
modalities of use but to recognize that such freedoms are to be
promoted and protected in light of whatever instrumentality
serves the purpose at a particular time.
To place highest priority on inclusive use for transporta-
tion and communication in an area as vast as the global sea does
not signify that an occasional exclusive use is always beyond
the pale and always impermissible. Freedom of navigation Is not
an absolute and this activity might wisely, on occasion, be re-
quired to defer to another use that requires some degree of ex-
clusivity. There are ample indications that this can be achieved
in practice without any irremedial problem, with the exploita-
tion of the continental shelf providing the most dramatic ex-
perience.
One ingredient of necessary policy Is that the high seas
extend to all parts of the ocean beyond national territory,
moderately defined, so that the maximum area continuesto be
regarded as open to use in accord with generally agreed prescrip-
tions. Contraction in the area of high seas and expansion of the
area of exclusive coastal authority means transferring decision-
making authority from the general community, with inclusive au-
thority exercised through multilateral institutions and pro-
cesses, to single political units each acting largely inde-
pendent of the other. Authority over the ocean would become
divided among numerous units, all coastal states, and community
use for transportation would become either impossible or vastly
more difficult.
2. Trend in decision
The 1958 Geneva Conference has little difficulty in agree-
ing on the necessity of maintaining freedom of navigation, over-
flight, and cable-laying in the ocean. Article 2 of the Con-
vention on the High Seas records what is usually considered cus-
tomary law on this by stating that the freedom of the seas "com-
prises inter alia, both for coastal and non-coastal States:
(I) Freedom of navigation; (2) Freedom of fishing; (3) Freedom
to lay submarine cables and pipelines; (4) Freedom to fly over
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the high seas." The Convention then goes on to indicate that
there are other freedoms than those listed and that they are not
absolute freedoms: "These freedoms, and others which are recog-
nized by the general principles of international law, shall be
exercised by all States with reasonable regard to the Interests
of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high
seas."
In the Third LOS Conference there has been no controversy
over providing that in areas conceded to be high seas there
should be freedom for navigation, overflight, and cable-laying
and pipeline. There are two matters of controversy, however,
that are worth remarking. One, already alluded to, Is that
there is now some opinion that the high seas should be severely
reduced in area by defining it as the area beyond the economic
zone. This alone would not necessarily affect, at least not im-
mediately, provision for freedom of navigation, overflight and
cable-pipeline laying in the zone, since the proponents of this
course make specific provision for these freedoms in the zone,
though subject to coastal rights and regulation.
The other difference is whether or not the enumeration of
freedoms ought to be exhaustive. Two proposals on the defini-
tion of the high seas offer such a listing2 3 7 while others would
retain the present open-ended enumeration.23 8
The Single Text is an amalgam of the various proposals,
on the one hand, adopting the extreme position that severs the
economic zone from the high seas while, on the other, suggest-
ing an enlarged list of freedoms of the sea which is open-
ended.23 9 Although the conception of the freedom of the sea
237. The U.S. proposal might be so classified but, for
whatever reason, it does not say much beyond affirming that the
economic zone is part of the high seas and that the high seas
regime, whatever it still is, will continue to pertain except
as it may be changed by other provisions. U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.
62/C.2/L.79, III Off. Rec. 239.
238. U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.138/SC.II/L.27 and Corr.] and 2
(Ecuador, Peru and Panama), 1973 Rep. III 34; U.N. Doc. No.
A/CONF.62/C.2/L.68, (El Salvador); III Off. Rec. 235.
239. Article 75 includes the four freedoms listed in
Article 2 of the High Seas Convention and adds freedom to con-
struct artificial islands and other installations permitted
under international law and freedom of scientific research. The
entire list "comprises inter alia the freedom of the high
seas." Paragraph 2 of Article 2 is replaced by a new one stat-
ing that "These freedoms shall be exercised by all States, with
due consideration for the interests of other States in their ex-
ercise of the freedom of the high seas."
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thus Is more expansive than that in the 1958 Convention, the
freedoms enumerated (and others not listed) are not directly
available in the economic zone except as specific provision Is
made elsewhere for their exercise in the zone. Article 47(1)
makes such provision for navigation, overflight, cable-pipeline
laying "and other internationally lawful uses of the sea re-
lated to navigation and communication," but subjects the free-
doms mentioned to coastal rights elsewhere established in the
Convention.
According to the Text the economic zone would not be a
part of the high seas nor would It be a portion of national
territory. So what status does it have? Article 47(3) is an
apparent attempt to resolve this dilemma:
In cases where the present Convention does not
attribute rights or jurisdiction to the coastal
State or to other States within the exclusive
economic zone, and a conflict arises between
the interests of the coastal State and any other
State or States, the conflict should be resolved
on the basis of equity and in the light of all
the relevant circumstances, taking into account
the respective importance of the interests in-
volved to the parties as well as to the inter-
national community as a whole.
The apparent intention of this is to provide guidance for re-
solving conflicting claims when there is no provision to fall
back upon to resolve the difficulty, as there would be if the
area were either a part of national territory or a part of the
high seas. Insofar as navigational interests are concerned,
however, it is worth emphasis that the residual authority is
already provided for in many instances. Thus, Article 47(1)
stipulates that enjoyment of the various freedoms there men-
tioned is subject to the provisions of the Convention which
confers extensive rights on the coastal state in the zone.
This emphatic tilt in the direction of a territorialist con-
ception of the zone not only might prejudice navigation uses
directly as a result of their subjection to so many coastal
rights but could affect the interpretation of Article 47(3) by
lending weight to importance of coastal interests as against
those of the other party and the international community as a
whole. Furthermore, the threat to long-term community Interests
in navigation is placed in realistic context by considering
that the "conflict" envisaged in paragraph 3 is likely to oc-
cur because the coastal state has already asserted a jurisdic-
tion based on its view of its interests in the zone. The
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formula recommended in Article 47(3) thus is likely to operate
only after some impact on community interests has been felt.
That impact will probably not be beneficial.
Appraisal and Recommendation
While the provisions concerning freedoms of the high seas
are unexceptionable in the Single Text, there can only be appre-
hension about the removal of the zone from the high seas. The
effect of this is to create a new legal part of the ocean where
the law applicable, if the treaty is widely accepted, Is only
that specified In the treaty. More importantly it seems very
likely that widespread adherence to a new law of the sea treaty
establishing an economic zone will lead to the expectation that
the zone is also recognized by customary law and that in cus-
tomary law, as well as treaty, the usual freedoms of the sea do
not extend to the zone. In other words, the treaty law would
come to be considered also as customary law. If this should
occur, the international law protection and priority accorded
to the shared use of the sea will be withdrawn from about one-
third of the ocean, and such use will be subject to coastal law
and regulation. The substitution of a wholly decentralized
authority, fragmented amongst over 100 coastal nations, does
not represent an improvement and could lead to serious impedi-
ments to continued efficiency in transport of commodities
around the globe.
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